


The Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri addressing the Jawans in a forward area.

TWENTYTWO FATEFUL DAYS

PAKISTAN CUT TO SIZE

by

D. R. MANKEKAR

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To

THE YOUNG OFFICERS AND JAWANS

who

BY THEIR RECKLESS COURAGE

and

SUPREME SACRIFICE

REDEEMED THE HONOUR OF OUR COUNTRY

and

WROTE A GLORIOUS CHAPTER INTO ITS HISTORY

PREFACE

In these pages an attempt is made to recapture and frame the inspiring picture of an emotionally roused, righteously indignant India sitting up and deciding to take no nonsense from anyone—an attempt to tell the great story of how a brief Twentytwo-day War wrought a miracle upon the Indian people.

Jeered, sneered at and goaded to action, the long-suffering, proverbially patient elephant at last turned on its tormentor. The reckless courage and perfervid zeal with which our young Officers and Jawans fought during the brief but intensive war symbolized that mood.

An insolent Pakistan and a perverse Western opinion whipped up that righteous indignation, which stung the nation into unprecedented unity, inspired our armed forces to prodigies of valour and roused our civilian population to unique war effort and rare acts of courage in border towns in the war zone.

The Twentytwo-day War in a sense shook and jolted India out of the rut of worn-out shibboleths and outdated slogans. Indeed, its impress on the nation's mind would be deep and far-reaching. Under its cruel impact, India would appear to have turned a new leaf—com-

pelled to re-evaluate long-cherished values, even revise her international thinking, if not philosophy.

Above all, the Twentytwo-day War galvanized the spirits of the Indian people, restored the nation's self-confidence and banished the defeatism that was beginning to grip our people.

This volume, besides, seeks to put the Twentytwo-day War in proper perspective and take stock of the fighting, in so far as it is permissible, evaluating its political and military impact on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, eliminating mis-emphasis and arriving at a sober assessment of the fateful event.

It would be wishful and far from correct to assume that the Pakistan Army has been routed. It is still left with a lot of kick, and is capable of giving a good account of itself if called upon to fight another war against India in the near future.

But it would not be incorrect to say that the Pakistan Army has been cut to size. The Twentytwo-day War knocked out of President Ayub his inflated notions of his Army's strength and power *vis-à-vis* that of India, and knocked into him a healthy respect for the men "on the other side of the hill". Ayub would hereafter pipe down on the "One Pakistani is equal to three Indians" line. He will now think twice before launching on another military adventure against the Indian Army.

It was Mao Tse-tung who laid down the military dictum: "In strategy, underestimate your enemy, but in tactics always overestimate him." Ayub's blunder was not to have paid heed to this wise military maxim formulated by his friend and ally. In his supreme arrogance and conceit, the military dictator underestimated his adversary both in strategy and tactics. That proved to be his real undoing in the Twentytwo-day War.

D.R.M.

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Acknowledgements

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The author must particularly thank the Army authorities for permitting him to publish the text of the Pakistani "Master Plan" of a projected thrust to Beas, and for specially preparing for him the two sketches included in this volume, illustrating the Pakistani "Master Plan" and the historic Battle of Assal Uttar.

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PROLOGUE

THE ROOT OF THE EVIL

The late Dorothy Thompson once set out on a quaint mission round the world. Her assignment was to see how the world looked from different points of the globe. This was in the mid-fifties.

From Istanbul, through Turkish eyes, Miss Thompson saw that nothing else mattered in the world apart from the Soviet Power malignantly looming across the border. From Cairo, it seemed as though little Israel enveloped the entire horizon; the Egyptians thought, spoke, read and wrote of nothing else.

Miss Thompson then touched down at Karachi to find that the Pakistanis' sole obsession was India. She was astounded to see so much Indian news, out of all proportion to domestic news, published in the Pakistani newspapers, even though all of it derogatory. The Pakistanis seemed to talk of India all the time.

When Miss Thompson arrived in New Delhi and told me of her interesting assignment, I asked her: "What

then is India's obsession?" Pat came her reply: "India —India's obsession is India."

That was indeed so true about our country, more so in the mid-fifties, when Panch Sheel was burgeoning and non-alignment blazoned over our banner. What with our narcissistic preoccupation with our efforts at self-improvement, we had no time for anything else. Our entire energies, including our foreign policy, were geared to economic development, even to the neglect of our defences and interests of international strategy.

Jawaharlal Nehru once described Pakistan as born in fraud and hatred—very strong words these for Nehru, who was always circumspect and restrained in the language he used about other people and countries.

But one does not have to dig deep for evidence that hatred of India is the very life breath of Pakistan's external and even internal policies. Every time something went wrong at home—which happened frequently in Pakistan in the last eighteen years—the Pakistani rulers conveniently whipped up the anti-India sentiment and stoked the Kashmir agitation. That did the trick. It diverted the people's wrath from domestic discontents and frustrations to the nation's pet aversion.

But why do Pakistanis have to expend so much of their energies and resources on hating India? Initially, the founding fathers of Pakistan inherited the Muslim League's detestation of the Congress and the Hindu Community. That detestation was further intensified when they found, to their chagrin, that the Pakistan they got was different from that of their day-dreams. It was truncated and "moth-eaten," as Mohammed Ali Jinnah himself bitterly described it.

It was however nobody's fault except that of the Pakistanis that their new homeland was truncated, that a thousand miles separated the two wings of their new state.

That is what it had to be. Nor was it within the gift of either the outgoing British or the Congress to hand them the entire Punjab and Bengal which contained large, compact Hindu-majority areas covering half of each province, or Assam which was clearly non-Muslim in majority.

Nevertheless, that remained the initial Pakistani grievance against India. In addition, industrially far backward, and afraid and jealous of India's economic strength and advancement, Pakistan, though born out of India's rib, suffered from a congenital inferiority complex towards her bigger neighbour. The course Indo-Pakistani relations took during the subsequent eighteen years only further fed that inferiority complex.

When the Qaid-e-Azam's initial manœuvre, in 1947, to coerce Kashmir, through invasion and military force, into acceding to Pakistan came a cropper, that added one more gripe to Pakistan's list of grudges against India. That blunder on the part of Pakistan only stampeded Kashmir into embracing the Indian Union and thus to seek Indian military help to ward off the Pakistani invasion and conquest.

With all these grievances totalled up, Pakistan's fevered imagination convinced her that India was out to destroy Pakistan—having first denied her a homeland of her own conception, and then having cheated her of Kashmir, which would have been Pakistan's had not India interceded!

Repeated declarations and assurances from New Delhi that India was fully reconciled to partition—even happy and relieved that a politically intransigent element within the body politic of India had at last been extracted and put aside—that we would, in pure self-interest, never want to put the clock back by seeking to annul partition,

failed to convince a Pakistan that had made up its mind on the subject.

This repressed jealousy and inferiority complex, almost pathological, have turned into an inexorable hatred and malice towards India. The Kashmir question has become the symbol and target of that hatred. Over the last eighteen years, the many successive regimes have nursed and shored up the Kashmir grievance against India to a point where it has begun to affect and distort Pakistan's international vision. A perverse imagination has raised India to a bogey.

Foreign policy is defined as a policy towards one's neighbour. Pakistan's foreign policy provides a classic illustration of that definition. Pakistan's hatred against India is the very central theme and sheet-anchor of her foreign policy. Points scored against India is the yardstick to measure the success of the country's foreign policy.

Pakistan's foreign policy is thus simple, uncomplicated and direct. Her every move in the international arena has to be tested on one touch-stone: How will that move contribute to the discomfiture of India and strengthen Pakistan's policy calculated to coerce and browbeat India into handing Kashmir to her?

It is in pursuance of this simple, single-minded foreign policy that Pakistan wormed her way into the Western Camp—not because she had anything particularly in common with the other members of the Bloc, but that she may win friends and influence countries in the pursuit of her feud against India. Pakistan had nothing against Soviet Russia, nor did it have any communist problem to tackle at home. But she could certainly put to good use the privileges accruing from that alliance.

That India had resisted Western blandishments and insisted on remaining non-aligned, thus incurring Washington's displeasure, was enough reason to induce

Pakistan to join the West and woo and get round Washington to champion her Kashmir case at the UN and elsewhere. Whatever might have been Washington's motive in getting Pakistan to sign with it a Mutual Security Pact, Pakistan herself, from the outset, made no secret of her own motive. That was to obtain, through that Pact, as much modern military hardware as she could lay hands on, in order to arm against India.

It is the same motive of grabbing at quantities of modern arms and acquiring allies in her vendetta against India that prompted Pakistan to join the CENTO and SEATO. However much Washington might have presented the blind eye and deaf ear to the embarrassing things said and done in Pakistan, Pakistani leaders themselves never felt inhibited in openly talking about using US arms and equipment to fight the Indians.

But the ludicrousness of the situation was finally spotlighted when Pakistan, a member of the SEATO, an organization solely set up to fight Communist China, flirted and colluded with Communist China and lent herself to be the instrument of Peking's policies! Indeed, Pakistan even invoked the SEATO, though in vain, to come to her aid in a war against India, in collaboration with China!

Nor is it anywhere laid down either in the Mutual Security Pact, under which Pakistan obtained the gifts of supersonic Starfighters and Sabrejets and Patton tanks from the US, or in the assurances given by the then President Eisenhower, the then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles or the then US Ambassador in New Delhi Ellsworth Bunker that those arms and equipment should be exclusively used against the Communists.

The only proviso that the American spokesmen stressed again and again was that those arms should be used in defence and not for aggressive purposes. Right through the long history of human conflict, however, how many

aggressors have ever confessed to having committed aggression?

In the thirties, Japan fighting on Chinese soil and gobbling up Chinese territory, loudly complained to the League of Nations of Chinese aggression against her!

Every wanton annexation committed by Hitler—the seduction of Sudetanland, the rape of Czechoslovakia and his march into Poland—was a "defensive" action!

To come to more contemporary times, in 1962, the Chinese crossed the recognized international border and attacked Indian forces on Indian soil and then accused India of committing aggression against China. In April 1965, Ayub sent the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army across the border into the Rann of Kutch and fought battles with Indian police and Army units, and then charged India with committing aggression against his country. This is the established *modus operandi* of aggressors from time immemorial.

Such being the nebulous definition of the term "aggression," Ayub knew very well what use he could put it to if and when he wanted to use the American-aid arms against India. What is surprising is that the US State Department should have been so naïve as solemnly to assure India that Pakistan would not be permitted to use American arms in aggression against India.

The conclusion is irresistible that the US was consciously arming Pakistan as a counterpoise against an unco-operative, non-aligned India that flirted too closely with Soviet Russia and, at that time, with Communist China too, in order to serve the ends of her political strategy of balance of power in this part of the world. The game would appear to be never to allow any one country to grow very much stronger than another, so that

no single power would grow strong enough to challenge the American hegemony in this part of Asia.

Running right through Pakistan's foreign policy, like a red thread, is the single aim of checkmating and, if possible, beating down India and wresting the long-coveted Kashmir from her. To that end every method and means is to be tried—the force of arms, the United Nations floor and diplomacy, bilateral negotiations, blackmail and perfidy, and collusion and conspiracy with India's enemy.

Thus when in 1947-48 invasion and force of arms failed to achieve the objective of annexing Kashmir, Pakistan pinned her hopes on the United Nations. For seventeen years she struggled and manœuvred in the lobbies and on the floor of that international body to tie down India to a settlement that would give over Kashmir to Pakistan.

When hopes of the UN pulling Pakistan's chestnuts out of the fire faded, Ayub, in 1959, tried another method. He took recourse to bilateral negotiations at the summit and turned on his personal charm on Nehru. When the Murree talks failed to bring home the bacon, Ayub came to the conclusion that the Kashmir Valley, which is the very crux of the dispute, could not be eased out of the Indian Union by any legerdemain; it had to be blackmailed out of India or taken by force. Only the method changed. The goal was constant, pursued relentlessly.

But until 1962, notwithstanding the acquisition of American arms and equipment, Pakistan still felt diffident about trying military conclusions with India. When, however, in 1962, the Chinese threat raised its head on India's northern border, Ayub decided that this was the time to strike—to try the blackmail-cum-armed force method to accomplish Pakistan's long-cherished ambition of wresting Kashmir from India.

Indeed, when on December 1, 1962, Peking suddenly and unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fire, none was more disappointed than Pakistan which was hurriedly preparing to fish in troubled waters and cash in on India's adversity. Ayub rushed forward to sign an agreement with Mao, giving away to the Chinese the territory claimed by them on the northern border of Pak-occupied Kashmir to signalize an era of Pindi-Peking collusion.

It kindled new hopes in Pindi of bringing India down on her knees. Ayub decided this was *the* opportunity for Pakistan to carry through her long-cherished and hitherto eluding ambition of snatching Kashmir. Faced by the Chinese threat and with her morale low following the humiliation suffered at China's hands, Ayub concluded, India would now be in a mood to yield to Pakistan's diplomatic and military sabrerattling. To the Pakistani dictator it was a case of "Now or Never."

And so an elaborate and ambitious blue-print was prepared, with every detail attended to so as to make sure nothing went wrong. It was a three-phased operation spread over several months.

The operation opened with the "softening" process, with an intensification of border tension. Cease-fire violations, shelling, intrusions and provocations from across the 470-mile cease-fire line in Kashmir suddenly multiplied. Thus whereas the cease-fire violations in Kashmir in 1963 were 448, in 1964 they rose to 522 and in the first seven months of 1965 they shot up to 1,800. Similarly, the East Pakistan border was deliberately kept "live" by Pakistani forces with frequent incidents of firing and intrusions.

The next phase in the operation was an escalation to mass-scale infiltrations of trained armed guerillas into Kashmir, timed for the first week of August. The infiltra-

tors' assignment was to sabotage strategic installations and spark a rebellion in the Valley on the D-day, which was August 9. In the third and final phase, the Pakistan Army was to intervene to "liberate" the Kashmiris from India, and in the process, if necessary, wage a war with India.

Oh, for the plans of men and mice!

Part One

THE PROBING TEST THAT MISLED

The Last Straw

The cup had filled to the brim. The 1962 humiliation rankled deep in the mind. The Indian Army smarted under it. The nation was going through a bout of mental depression, almost amounting to self-flagellation. Self-depreciation was the keynote of the press comment and leaders' speeches and statements. The atmosphere was oppressive.

At home, crisis was piling upon crisis. The food situation was worse than ever. Foreign exchange was getting even scarcer, flinging a spanner into economic development. The Third Five Year Plan was floundering. The language issue had erupted into ghastly riots in the South, and centrifugal regionalism was threatening to disrupt the nation's integrity. In the international arena, India's efforts for a breakthrough resembled those of a caged animal desperately trying to break out.

The Government of India had gone round the world with a begging bowl in hand, seeking military aid and getting rebuffs from some of the world powers who presumed to decide what should be our defence security requirements. Indian diplomacy met with scant respect

abroad. We slumped in the esteem of Afro-Asian opinion. It looked as though we had not a friend in the world.

The Western Press had jeered at the Indian Army's discomfiture at the hands of the Chinese in 1962, forgetting Dunkirk, Pearl Harbour, Malaya and Korea. A nation geared to the arts of peace—one that traditionally abhorred war—cannot easily switch to the war mentality, as the British and the Americans bitterly realized in the last World War. One expected they would never forget that lesson. But then human memories are short.

This was an agonizing era for India. And to our impotent rage, Pakistan seized this opportunity to harass us. She colluded with China and indulged in warlike gestures, provocations and intrusions along the border and let loose a propaganda barrage against India in the diplomatic arena.

President Ayub Khan now missed no opportunity to fling insults and contempt at the Indian Army, of which until about two decades ago he was a limb. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, the irrepressible Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, went round the world raving against India. Their ambassadors broke all rules of diplomatic conduct to traduce our country from the capitals to which they were accredited. Pakistan perversely campaigned against India being given arms by Washington and London to fight the Chinese aggressors.

Such then was the high-octane fuel that was feeding and building up the combustion of public opinion in this country. An impatient nation demanded that the Government and the Army stop shilly-shallying, act and wipe out the humiliations heaped upon the country and avenge themselves against a perfidious neighbour.

Resentment and frustration were heaping up. Indian leadership gritted its teeth. The Indian Army strained at the leash.

This was the psychological moment President Ayub chose to launch an ambitious military adventure against India in order to wrest Kashmir. Victim of his own propaganda machine, he convinced himself that the Government of India was a push-over and the Indian Army a "paper tiger."

But then he failed to reckon—as the Chinese did in 1962, and many foreign observers continue to do—with the peculiar complex that independent India carries with her like a branded guilt. A thousand years' history, replete with foreign invasions and conquests, underscored the scorching moral: that India's undoing all along the line was her political disunity, which had repeatedly led to her defeat in battle, conquest and political humiliation. Particularly fresh in mind was the memory of an India torn by dissension and internecine wars, as British conquerors walked over her prostrate body, hardly 200 years ago.

This branded guilt operates in us like a 'conditioned reflex' and stings us into desperate, heroic unity at the first sign of threat to the country's integrity and external security—when we bestir ourselves and take time off from our national pastime of internecine squabbling, and close up ranks.

It is this 'conditioned reflex' that prompts the DMK leader, C. N. Annadorai, in the South, heading a confessedly secessionist movement, to forget his creed and rally to the country's cause.

It is this 'conditioned reflex,' again, that impels a Tara Singh or a Fateh Singh to suspend his threats of a "fast unto death" and morchas for the Punjabi suba at the moment of danger to the country; or whips the normally destructive opposition parties to bury the hatchet and stand by the Government. These were, however, partly

responsible for giving the misleading and exaggerated picture of a disintegrating polity in this country.

It has been claimed that one of the factors that deterred Peking from pursuing its aggression against India in 1962 was the stunning, and entirely unanticipated, spectacle of patriotic unity displayed by Indians, completely belying the prognostications of their embassy and intelligence agencies, which had averred that this country was in the process of political disruption.

Western commentators, correspondents and foreign students of Indian affairs were equally taken aback by the spectacle they witnessed in this country when actually the fat was in the fire—which seemed to them out of character with the picture they had obtained on the basis of their study of the conditions in the country.

Ronald Segal and V. S. Naipaul, and scores of British and American writers before them, have expatiated on the "doomed Hindu nation," about the deleterious, if not fatal, impress of the caste-system, their other-worldly philosophy, and what-not, on the national character of the Indian people, and about the "spindle-legged Indian soldier" who could not fight except under British officers!

These doleful observations by friendly, and not so friendly, critics, while presenting an over-drawn gloomy picture of modern India, stung us to the quick and deepened our complex and sharpened our 'conditioned reflex' to any threat to our security and national integrity.

Ayub, who should have known better, however also put faith in the press and intelligence reports brought to him about the low morale and disruptive trends rampant in India. He decided to strike.

And so he deliberately set his hob-nailed soldier's foot

on the war escalator, too confident of himself to worry about the consequences.

In April 1965, Ayub launched full-scale border intrusions in the remote, desolate Rann of Kutch, by way of a probing test to gauge the mood of the Indian Government and capabilities of the Indian Army. It was a precursor of, and preliminary to, the more ambitious operation scheduled some four months later.

Ayub proved a good pupil of Mao who had made a close study of his military and political strategy. But Ayub proved a bad student of human psychology when it came to assessing the Indian temper. Nor could one give the Pakistani dictator the credit for originality. For, what he did in the Rann of Kutch was a faithful imitation of what the Chinese did in Aksai Chin in equally desolate, God-forsaken Ladakh, a few years earlier.

Ayub too carved a track in Indian territory just across the border, when this country was not looking, as the Chinese did in Ladakh. And then, again, like the Chinese, he vociferously claimed that territory as his own, to follow it up by military force to overwhelm a numerically insignificant Indian Border Police post in the region.

The Pakistanis exploited the initial surprise element and the advantages of a first strike, to inflict a reverse or two on the defenders. Then when the Indian Army got ready to face them by deploying its strength, the Pakistanis cried murder and loudly accused India of wanting to start a total war and of committing aggression against the Pakistanis—on Indian soil! Here too there was nothing original. This is what the Chinese did on India's northern border.

Ayub would appear to have equally faithfully copied Mao's political technique. Having invented a border dispute where none existed, Ayub's next step was to win for that dispute international recognition.

So he readily accepts the British Prime Minister's mediation proposal, while stalling at New Delhi's offers of bilateral talks. He then piously declaims the need to resolve tensions between the two neighbouring countries and to settle their differences peacefully.

And even while he spoke of relieving tensions, as subsequent evidence proved,* he was plotting in a big way for the more ambitious and bigger military adventure against India still to come.

Under Harold Wilson's pressure, when India accepts the provision for the appointment of a tribunal to determine the border dispute in Kutch, Ayub attains his immediate objective, in that he wins international recognition for a dispute he has newly raised in the Rann—a dispute which India had stoutly refused to entertain all along when the issue was raised from time to time.

* A diary captured from a Pakistani bomber pilot on September 5, 1965, shot down over Jamnagar, showed that the PAF had been doing practice runs over Indian airfields as far back as April 1965. Similarly, heavy defence preparations like concrete pill-boxes and anti-tank obstacles laid out in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors bore testimony to the fact that Pakistan had been preparing for war against India in a big way for the preceding one year or more.

THE PEARL HARBOUR TECHNIQUE

And so the drama opens, as produced and directed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan: For his offensive he had chosen ground where he enjoyed the utmost advantage, and India was in a tight corner. In the Rann of Kutch he was operating from an elevated region, linked up by good lines of communications, including roads and an airfield close by. The Indian defenders were manning posts in a most inhospitable terrain, with no water and no communication links whatsoever, apart from soft marshy tracks, with much of the territory submerged under water six months in the year.

One morning in January 1965, Indian Border Police patrols discovered that the Pakistanis had established a 20-mile track between Surai and Ding, about a mile and a half on the Indian side of the border. When a Pakistani patrol moving along that track was challenged by an Indian patrol, the former claimed that it was patrolling Pakistani territory and counter-charged that it was the Indians that were intruding!

They further claimed that the track was actually an old customs trail, which had always been used by the Pakistanis—*à la* Aksai Chin! Later it was also noticed that Pakistan's semi-military force, the Indus Rangers, had occupied Kanjarkot and established a standing post there.

To counteract their mischief, the Indian Central Reserve Police moved in four companies to establish a post at Vigokot, six miles south-east of Kanjarkot, two companies of which were sent forward to establish a post at Sardar, a thousand yards from Ding, on the border.

In accordance with the ground rules prescribed by the 1960 Indo-Pak Agreement, the D.I.G., Rajkot Police Rangers, sought a meeting with his counterpart of the Indus Rangers, to determine the *status quo*. The meeting was held at Kanjarkot on February 15, but the Pakistan side was represented by, instead of the Chief of the Indus Rangers, the local commandant who was not armed with adequate powers to arrive at worthwhile decisions. Thus the meeting proved infructuous.

It has to be noted that India's repeated proposal for a meeting of survey experts on both sides for a demarcation of the boundary on the ground was consistently dodged or rejected by Pakistan.

At the Kanjarkot meeting, however, the Pakistani representative went on record denying that the Indus Rangers had occupied Kanjarkot. He stated that the latter were only patrolling the area south of Kanjarkot which, according to him, was the old customs track joining Surai with Ding. Similarly, the Pakistan Government's note dated March 1, in reply to India's protest note of February 18, also stated that the Pakistanis had not occupied Kanjarkot.

While thus the dispute was being thrashed out through inter-Governmental correspondence, Pakistan decided to

precipitate matters. In the second week of March, the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistan Army, then located at Malir, the cantonment near Karachi, was moved to the Sind-Kutch border. It consisted of three battalions—18th Punjab, 8th Frontier Force and 6th Baluch—and had in support one battery of 25-pounder artillery and one mortar battery. The order of attack on Indian positions was given on the afternoon of April 7 and the battalions left their concentration area the next day.*

In the small hours of the morning of April 9, two battalions of the Pakistani regular army fell upon the two companies of the Indian Border Police at Sardar Post. The attack was covered by artillery fire from 25-pounder guns and supported by heavy mortars and machine-guns. The defenders were outnumbered and outweaponed.

Nor were the Border Police trained to fight a regular war. They were there to perform the duties of routine patrolling of the border. Nevertheless, their performance against the Pakistani Army regulars was remarkable and most commendable.

In the first encounter, which took place at 3.30 A.M., the Policemen beat back the enemy and exacted a toll of 24 dead. Indian losses were reported to be two killed, three wounded and four missing.

The Pakistanis then put in a second attack. After holding the Sardar Post for 14 hours under intermittent fire from Pakistani artillery and mortar, the Policemen withdrew to their base at Vigokot, late in the afternoon.

The Indian Army arrived on the scene soon after, having been ordered immediately to take over from the Border Police.

Incidentally, strangely enough, even though the

* This was revealed in a document seized from a Pakistani prisoner captured in the fighting in Kutch.

Policemen had withdrawn from the Sardar Post, the Pakistanis failed to occupy it, so that when 24 hours later the Indian Army re-occupied the Sardar Post, no Pakistani was found there.

The next day, Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda reported to the country of Pakistan's aggressive action in Kutch and announced that the Indian Army had taken over from the Border Police the task of guarding the Kutch-Sind border. He also stated that in the initial engagement the casualties had been "fairly heavy on both sides" and that the situation was "grave" and "developing from moment to moment and hour to hour."

The Government of India protested to Pakistan against the latter's use of regular troops in breach of the mutual agreement and against the unprovoked aggression on Indian territory leading to loss of life and property.

The outstanding show put up by the Indian Border Police against a numerically superior and better armed regular Pakistan Army merits recounting in these pages. A report in the *Indian Express* dated July 5, 1965, describes their gallant performance in these words:

> The attack commenced with a stealthy advance by several hundred Pakistani soldiers at 3.30 A.M. The intention was to take the Indian Border Police posts by force. The Police were however vigilant and had taken precautions against being surprised. The alarm was raised when the attackers had not yet reached the Indian positions.
>
> So effective was our Policemen's marksmanship and so regulated was the firing from their mortars and automatic weapons that the Pakistani forces in front of the Indian positions were pinned down and could not advance further. In the confusion, the attackers fired at their own men.

In the meantime, another prong of the enemy, which had advanced in a flanking attack, managed to take advantage of the temporary stoppage of the machine-gun on their front and to rush into that part of the post. They then seized the post commander Sardar Karnail Singh and threatened to shoot him unless he gave the order to cease fire.

Meanwhile two Indian police jemadars observing that the Pakistani soldiers had entered their post, promptly launched a fierce counterattack. As a result, the Pakistanis were driven away, but they managed to drag with them the brave commander, one of his jemadars, nine policemen and eight non-combatant personnel. The enemy however left behind 4 prisoners, while 34 dead Pakistanis were counted outside the Indian positions. Four of the bodies were of Army officers, and on one of them, that of a captain, was recovered a document which proved to be the order for the attack.

The failure of the first wave of attack was followed by an intensive artillery bombardment on Sardar Post for about an hour. Later in the morning, the Pakistani Army sent forward armoured cars under cover of a smokescreen while the artillery bombardment was resumed. In the afternoon the bombardment became intense. Ultimately, after heroic resistance lasting over 14 hours, with their ammunition and water reserves exhausted and greatly outnumbered by the enemy, in the face of superior fire-power, the Policemen withdrew and were replaced by Indian Army units.

With an entire brigade in position along the Sind-Kutch border and having inflicted what they considered a crushing defeat on our forces in Kanjarkot, Pakistan now believed that India had been "softened up" enough

to be induced to negotiate on Pakistan's terms. On April 10, Pakistan proposed talks between the two Governments, first among officials and later at ministerial level.

India accepted Pakistan's offer, but Shastri in a speech in the Lok Sabha firmly insisted that Pakistan should first withdraw from Kanjarkot before any talks could take place. The Government of India rejected Pakistan's claim that Kanjarkot was in Pakistan territory. When Pakistan refused to withdraw from Kanjarkot, the proposal fell through.

The Indus Rangers' Commandant's admission at the conference in February as well as the Pakistan Government's note of March 1 belied the Pakistani claim that Kanjarkot was "well within the area of the Rann of Kutch which had been in its *de facto* occupation since August 1947." In point of fact, the Indus Rangers occupied the old mud fort of Kanjarkot on March 3, and twelve days later, they set up another post at Ding.

India thus insisted that the Kanjarkot post was actually set up by Pakistan during the preceding few weeks and that there was no post in the disputed area prior to March.

And then to our surprise, in the traditional fashion of aggressors right through history, on April 13, our High Commissioner in Karachi was called at the Pakistani Foreign Office and handed a note protesting against alleged aggression by India in the Kutch-Sind area! "What was a peripheral and marginal aggression through the construction of a track," as an Indian official spokesman put it, had now been "enlarged and consolidated by Pakistan by the occupation (by the Pakistani Army) of Kanjarkot on April 9."

On April 16, Bhutto haughtily ruled out "any possibility of the Kanjarkot post being vacated to facilitate talks on the disputed border in the Rann of Kutch"—one

could already discern a ring of the hauteur of a victor in Pakistani leaders' statements by now. The Pakistani Foreign Minister declared: "There can be no question of our accepting any conditions as to evacuation or disbanding of this or any other post within our own territory."

Shades of Pearl Harbour! And thus while New Delhi was kept engaged in a fruitless dialogue with Pindi and a series of proposals were shuttled back and forth between the two capitals, on April 23-24, the Pakistani Army once again struck, this time on an even larger scale and simultaneously at four points. Pakistan put an entire brigade, supported by tanks and 100-pounder artillery into this four-prong attack.

The heaviest of these attacks came on April 24 at a place called Point 84, 30 miles east of Kanjarkot and six miles south of the border. Now for the first time the Pakistanis used tanks and 100-pounder guns in support. The attack was however repulsed, and three Pakistani tanks were destroyed. Each side claimed 300 casualties.

Sardar Post, 3 miles south-west of Kanjarkot; Vigokot, south-east of Kanjarkot; and Bier Bet, 45 miles south-east of Kanjarkot, were the other three points simultaneously attacked by the Pakistani forces. It was officially claimed in New Delhi that in the grim battle at Bier Bet Indian forces had inflicted as many as 140 casualties and disabled or destroyed six Pakistani tanks.

The Pakistan Army Public Relations, as active as ever, rushed foreign correspondents to the site of the fighting, and exhibited a few Indian prisoners and their equipment captured, while one Pakistan Army officer boasted: "They (Indians) dropped their equipment and ran like hell."

On April 24, a New Delhi press dispatch had stated: "Undeclared war is on along the Kutch-Sind border, with

Pakistani troops blasting at our defence posts deep inside Indian territory."

The same day, an official spokesman in Karachi claimed, "Indian guns had been silenced when Pakistani border forces took retaliatory action in Chhad Bet following repeated firing from that place on Pakistani positions by Indian Army."

According to Indian official figures, the total of Indian casualties since April 9, when the Pakistani troops attacked Sardar Post, were 65, both civil and military, while the Pakistanis suffered four times as many. The Indian spokesman denied that the Pakistanis had occupied Bier Bet, and claimed India had adopted attrition tactics in the Kutch fighting and the tactics had paid, in that we had taken a heavy toll of Pakistani personnel and equipment at a minimum cost to India.

Almost simultaneously with these attacks, Pindi put forward another set of proposals, this time suggesting the withdrawal of forces on both sides. An Indian official spokesman questioned the *bona fides* of Pakistan's peace proposals, accompanied as they were by a massive attack launched on our defence positions in Kutch.

Now riding an even higher horse, Pakistan demanded of India assurances that she would not impose any preconditions to the proposed talks and that no force would be used. India readily gave the first assurance. On the second, India firmly pointed out that it was not for India, the aggrieved party, to give any such guarantee. It was Pakistan that had used force and therefore the undertaking to renounce force had to come from Pakistan.

On April 27, a Pakistani spokesman in Karachi defined what Pakistan meant by "withdrawal on both sides from the disputed territory." This territory, he explained,

comprised 3,500 square miles of the northern half of the Rann. Speaking to a hurriedly convened special press conference, the spokesman declared that the Indian stand—that there was no dispute about the pure disposition of the Rann and that only a tiny strip around Kanjarkot was the disputed territory—was totally unacceptable to Pakistan.

He said Pakistan had established on April 23 a salient ten miles deep and about 20 miles long between the Indian posts of Bier Bet and Chhad Bet in the disputed area. And he haughtily declared: "It will be maintained as long as necessary to prove that the area is disputed." The spokesman further threatened that with the advent of the rainy season, the Pakistani forces "may have to occupy the high land now in Indian hands."

He made no bones about the fact that Pakistan had gone back upon its own three-point proposal of cease-fire, restoration of *status quo ante* and talks at political level.

On the other hand, the Indian spokesman in New Delhi ridiculed the Pakistani claim to have occupied an area of 10 miles deep and 20 miles long between Bier Bet and Chhad Bet in Indian territory. He pointed out that Bier Bet was only 7 miles within Indian territory from the border and the Pakistani forces had withdrawn to the north of Bier Bet.

The Indian spokesman also pointed out that the dispute was confined to the boundary marked by the survey maps. Besides, Pakistan had admitted that her forces had never come south of the same international boundary. "Against this background it is so much nonsense for them to say now that India provoked them," the spokesman added.

An Erroneous Conclusion

This was the moment when the cup that had filled to the brim, spilled over. On April 28, Lal Bahadur Shastri came before the Lok Sabha to make a memorable speech. The Prime Minister declared: "If Pakistan continues to discard reason and persists in its aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country, and it will decide its own strategy and the employment of its manpower and equipment in the manner which it deems best."

The grim warning implicit in these sober but pregnant words was not missed by Pakistan. In plain language Shastri had warned that if Pakistan did not halt its aggressive activities in the Rann of Kutch, the Indian Army would not hesitate to strike at a point of its own choosing anywhere along the 800-mile West Pakistan border. The statement was followed up by movement of Indian troops to the Punjab border.

Immediately, Pakistan began to squeal about the "Indian threat of a second front." Official spokesmen in Pindi loudly complained about India concentrating forces on the Pakistan border with aggressive intentions.

Pakistan's friends and guardians in the international arena intervened to pressurize New Delhi against "escalating" the fighting by opening a new front. Mr Harold Wilson's efforts at mediation were redoubled. Pakistan's stalling tactics abruptly ended. Ayub was now found to be in a mood for peaceful talks.

In the course of that historic speech, Shastri related the patient efforts made by New Delhi to make Pindi see reason and to seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute through negotiations. But Pakistan had ridden a high horse, prevaricated and demanded its pound of flesh before coming to the negotiating table.

Shastri attributed Pakistan's "irrational behaviour" to her "obsessive hatred against India which the Pakistani leaders, the Pakistani press and the communal fanatics in Pakistan have worked into their system over the past two decades."

The Prime Minister concluded: "Mr Speaker, I have uttered these words after most serious thought and with full consciousness of my responsibilities. This is one of the most fateful moments of our times. I realize that both India and Pakistan stand poised at the crossroad of history. The path of reason and sanity, of peace and harmony, is still open. Even while our police, and later our army, have been defending our soil with commendable courage in face of heavy odds, the path to peace has not been blocked. But it is a path on which we cannot walk alone. It takes two to make friendship and peace."

There is a grim earnestness about these words, coming as they do from a man noted for understatement.

In the meantime, on April 29, Indian troops had to give up the Bier Bet feature under Pakistani pressure of superior numbers. But before withdrawing they inflicted 140 casualties on Pak troops. An Indian company had fought a Pakistani brigade which had, besides, the

advantage of terrain and logistics. It was, then, reported that the Pakistani forces were moving in a southwesterly direction between Bier Bet and Point 84.

From President Ayub's monthly broadcast on May 1, it was however clear that Shastri's forthright warning to Pakistan had registered. In his broadcast, Ayub complained, "India has now threatened us with further aggression in a battleground of her own choice." And Ayub protested: "Does she realize that this will mean a general and total war between India and Pakistan with all its unpredictable consequences?"

He then growled: "How can such a reckless and provocative statement be made by highly responsible persons?" He gratuitously added, "We on our part are prepared to sit round the conference table and to settle this dispute peacefully, as we always tried to do."

And now singing a different tune, Ayub stated: "We have been accused of naked aggression. If we had wanted to commit aggression, we would have chosen a better area than the mudflats of the Rann of Kutch, but our desire to maintain peace restrained us in spite of frequent and grave provocations." But the fact was that he chose the mudflats for his aggression against India because the Pakistani Army enjoyed distinct advantage over India both in the matter of terrain and logistics.

The Pakistani forces were not only poised on a higher ground, on an escarpment, but they had harder earth in front of them so that they could use even tanks, which they actually did. The ground on our side was too soft and marshy for tanks to operate on. Thus our men were handicapped in not being able to meet their armour with our own.

Then again, because of the tenuous communications, even our ammunition had to be strictly rationed. Looming around the corner was the threat of flooding of the

region within a month, following the onset of monsoon. When ultimately India decided to hit back, our Army chose the Punjab border instead of the Rann for the purpose, because of the disadvantages suffered by our forces in the region. Thus instead of our troops in Kutch getting reinforcements, the latter were switched to the Punjab.

The apprehensions expressed by Ayub in his broadcast underlined the policy he had prescribed for Pakistan in regard to India. While keeping up Indo-Pakistan tension at white heat, and even accompanying it with local skirmishes at points chosen by Pakistan, such tension should not be allowed, at any cost, to grow into a major war. For such a long-term war fought all along the Indo-Pakistan border, riddled with vulnerable points, would prove fatal to Pakistan, what with India's vaster resources and stronger industrial base.

It is thus that, the moment India threatens to counter with stern action the Pakistanis' local aggressive activity at points of her choosing, Pakistan immediately pipes down. This is what Liaquat Ali Khan did in 1951, after all the noisy sabre-rattling he indulged in. And this is exactly the consideration that now influenced Ayub's thinking on the subject.

Besides, Ayub seemed to pursue Mao's much-bruited political-cum-military strategy of two-steps-forward-one-step-backward, calculated to confuse the adversary. "If the enemy attacks, you withdraw, if the enemy retreats, you pursue him," read Mao's dictum.

On May 3, the Rajya Sabha affirmed the Indian people's resolve "to drive the Pakistani invaders from the sacred soil of India." During the debate, Shastri, however, also revealed that the British Prime Minister had a few days earlier made certain proposals to him, and to Ayub, in the framework of which a cease-fire could be brought

about. Shastri added, "The British Prime Minister is still pursuing his efforts, and therefore, for obvious reasons, I am unable to say much more about this matter at this stage." He then assured the House, "In the exchanges I have had with Mr Wilson and in any further exchanges, we shall not depart from the position that along with the cease-fire, there must be a restoration of the *status quo ante*."

On May 9, a Pakistani spokesman in Karachi wailed, "India has massed the bulk of its total 20 divisions plus all its armour and a tactical air headquarters in offensive formations against the West and East Pakistan borders. Twelve divisions are actually deployed on the borders—ten against the West Pakistan border and two against the East Pakistan border—but another six divisions ostensibly deployed against China had been moved into supporting positions against East Pakistan."

After the spurt of fighting in the last week of April, an uneasy unofficial truce had descended upon the Kutch border, and Pindi and New Delhi occupied themselves with verbal exchanges, while chewing over the Wilson proposals.

On May 25, the Pakistani troops suddenly broke the *de facto* truce by attacking an army patrol in the Bier Bet area, about 7 miles inside Indian territory. The Pakistani attack was supported by armoured cars, and the enemy came down suddenly on the Indian force of 20 to 25 men in a bid to surround and capture the patrol. The Indians however beat back the attack and knocked down two armoured cars before returning to base.

There was yet another flare-up before the formal cease-fire. On June 15 morning, Pakistani forces put in two probing attacks in the vicinity of Sardar Post and Vigokot. The Pakistanis retreated after suffering casualties. In an

incident near the Sardar Post, nine Pakistani soldiers were killed and an officer, Major A. K. Afridi, was captured.

In the entire series of clashes in the Rann, Indian casualties were reported to be 93 against Pakistan's estimated 350. India lost 15 lives—8 Policemen and 7 soldiers. No Indian officer was killed, but two majors and a captain were wounded along with 28 soldiers and 10 State Reserve Police. Altogether 47 men (20 Policemen and 19 armymen) were reported missing, including one major of the Police and a lieutenant.

Of Pakistani losses, no details were available, but 34 dead were counted at Sardar following the Pakistani attack, in brigade strength, on the post. Pakistan is believed to have suffered at least 140 casualties in the engagement in Bier Bet where the Indian defenders also knocked out six Patton tanks.

On July 21, a Karachi announcement stated that India and Pakistan had agreed to exchange prisoners taken during the Kutch fighting. Pakistan had 45 Indian prisoners, including a major, while India had five Pakistani prisoners.

On June 17, in London, where the Commonwealth Prime Ministers were meeting in conference, Shastri and Ayub met and had an informal chat. According to reports, it was a cordial meeting, with which Shastri expressed himself as "very happy." This unscheduled summit meeting accelerated the pace of negotiations towards a cease-fire, through Harold Wilson's mediation.

On June 29, both New Delhi and Pindi announced their acceptance of the Wilson proposals and an Indo-Pakistan agreement was signed at 12 noon on June 30, making a cease-fire operative from 6 A.M. on July 1.

The agreement comprised three articles: (1) Cease-fire; (2) Withdrawal of forces; and (3) Constitution of a tri-

bunal to settle the border question. The pact conceded substantially India's stand in that Kanjarkot was to be vacated and the *status quo ante* as on January 1, to be restored.

A four-month limit was set for the enforcement of the cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces and the constitution of a three-member tribunal which would finally settle the border question. One month each was provided for the first two phases, and two months for India and Pakistan to decide on the personnel of the tribunal. The tribunal would determine where exactly the Indo-Pakistan international border lay in the region. Its award would be binding on the two parties.

The preamble of the agreement stated that the Governments of India and Pakistan agreed to a cease-fire and to restoration of the *status quo* as on January 1, 1965, in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border, "in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border" and accepted the necessity that "arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area."

Article One provided for an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hours GMT July 1, 1965. Article Two required that on cease-fire, all troops on both sides would immediately begin to withdraw—the process to be completed within seven days. Indian police might then reoccupy the post at Chhad Bet in strength no greater than that employed at the post on December 31, 1964.

Indian and Pakistani police might patrol on the track on which they were patrolling prior to January 1, 1965, provided that their patrolling would not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to January 1, 1965, and, during the monsoon period, would not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964.

If patrols of Indian and Pakistani police should come into contact, they would not interfere with each other, and in particular, would act in accordance with the West Pakistan-India border ground rules agreed to in January 1960.

Officials of the two Governments should meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as might prove desirable, in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the aforesaid provisions and to agree on the settlement of any such problem.

Article Three, which deserves to be quoted in full, read:

"In view of the fact that:

"(*a*) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well-established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground;

"(*b*) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory;

"(*c*) At discussions in January, 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data, regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute;

"(*i*) As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2(*vi*), (withdrawal of troops on both sides) which in any case will not be later than one month after the cease-fire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrange-

ments for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the tribunal referred to in Article 3(*ii*) and (*iv*) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full.

"(*ii*) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communique of October 24, 1959, have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (*iii*) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties.

"(*iii*) For this purpose there will be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the chairman, shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire, they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.

"(*iv*) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (*iii*) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full."

Shastri's insistence that the *status quo* as on January 1, 1965, should be restored and that Kanjarkot should revert

to India was conceded by the agreement. By the same token, however, India had to agree to Pakistani patrolling of the Surai-Kanjarkot track because Pakistan was able to prove that she had been doing so before January 1, 1965.

Similarly, even as Pakistani troops were to withdraw from Kanjarkot, Bier Bet and Point 84, because they were not there on January 1, 1965, Indian troops too had to withdraw from Sardar Post and Vigokot for the same reason. But the *status quo ante* also meant that the entire area reverted to the Indian Police jurisdiction with the Pakistanis, military or police, not allowed to remain at any point on this side of the international boundary, because they were not there before January 1, 1965, apart from patrolling the 20-mile Surai-Kanjarkot track.

By November 1, on the expiry of the prescribed four-month period, whether India and Pakistan agree or not on a common choice of a chairman, the Tribunal would be set up, with a chairman nominated by the UN Secretary-General, as provided for in the agreement.

Ayub was now effusive in his praise of the agreement. He declared, "I hope they will constitute a turning point in Indo-Pak relations. . . . It was a victory for common sense and it constituted a model for the manner in which all India-Pakistan disputes could be settled, should other peaceful means of settling them prove unavailing."

He said both Governments sought reduction in tension and welcomed this development. "Our relations have drifted down a dangerous course for too long," he now discovered. "These agreements signify it is possible to arrest this process and that all India-Pakistan disputes can be settled through peaceful means." He hoped the two countries would "live as good neighbours and direct their resources to developing their economies in peace."

Shastri and Ayub exchanged personal messages express-

ing their common desire to improve relations between the two countries by removing the cause of tension along the borders in the east and the west. They also stressed the need for an early effort to resolve all the remaining border disputes.

It however proved a pious hope, as Pakistan failed to fulfil it and continued firing and intrusions on the East Pakistan border, solely with a view to keeping up tension. And even while the Dr Jekyll in the Pakistani President was speaking the language of peace and goodwill, Mr Hyde in him had already started plotting against India with elaborate preparations for aggression in Kashmir and Punjab, as documents seized from captured Pakistani soldiers and airmen revealed.

It was indeed too much to hope that the Kutch Agreement would overnight create a favourable atmosphere in which Pakistan would suddenly turn a new leaf and fulfil in practice the spirit of the Agreement's preamble. Hardly had the ink dried on the Kutch Agreement, when Pakistan activated the Jammu and Kashmir front as well as the East Pakistan border. The idea was to keep up tensions along the Indo-Pak border in the hope of "softening up" India.

On May 16, Pakistani forces launched a series of attacks against our positions in the Kargil sector calculated to disrupt our tenuous land route to Leh. There were in all 14 incidents in Kargil area between May 16 and June 7, in which 60 Pakistanis were killed, 40 injured and 3 captured. Thereupon the Indian Army ousted the Pakistani forces from two vital hill features that overlooked the road to Leh and plugged the menace to that vital line of communication.

These two positions in Kargil were however voluntarily relinquished by India following the Kutch Agreement

and an assurance from the UN that the Pakistanis would not be permitted to cross the cease-fire line and menace the Leh road.

But a month later, Pakistan opened the first phase of its Kashmir adventure by smuggling across the Cease-fire Line in Kashmir some 5,000 armed infiltrators, specially trained in guerilla warfare and sabotage work, with instructions to sabotage strategic installations and incite a rebellion within the State.

Now coming to the implementation of the Kutch Agreement, a meeting between the officials of India and Pakistan was held on July 29. The meeting discussed points like the route, the frequency and the strength of patrols, telephone communications, etc.

The next phase in the implementation of the Agreement was a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan to agree on the determination of the border in the light of the claims of the two countries and to arrange for its demarcation. The talks were scheduled to take place at Delhi on August 20, and Mr Bhutto had planned to visit the Indian capital for the meeting.

In the meantime, the tension between the two countries intensified, following Pakistan's aggressive activity in Kashmir in the shape of some five thousand armed infiltrators sent across the Cease-fire Line to create political chaos and turmoil in that State. Simultaneously, anti-India propaganda pouring out of Pakistan reached a new high.

In the circumstances, New Delhi came to the conclusion that the atmosphere was hardly favourable for any worthwhile meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the two countries. Accordingly, on August 18, Sardar Swaran Singh sent the following message to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:

In view of the atmosphere created by the sharp deterioration of relations between India and Pakistan, we feel that there is no possibility of the meeting between the Ministers referred to in Article 3(*i*) of the India-Pakistan Agreement dated 30th June 1965. We consider, therefore, that the better course would be to proceed to the next stage of reference to a Tribunal on the footing that no agreement has been reached between the Ministers and we suggest this course be adopted.

This was obviously a wise step, as it saved much wasteful discussion between the representatives of the two Governments. It would have only led to a reaffirmation of the respective viewpoints by the two Foreign Ministers, without taking the dispute any nearer the solution, while further stoking tension between the two countries.

Bhutto promptly accepted Swaran Singh's suggestion that the two parties should straight away proceed to the third stage of the Agreement, namely, constitution of a tribunal within four months of the cease-fire, i.e. by October 31.

As required by the Agreement, since then, India has nominated Dr Ales Bebler, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, as a member of the Tribunal, and Pakistan has named Mr Nasrollah Entezam of Iran as her nominee on that body.

Under the Agreement, the two Governments were to select a Chairman unanimously within three months of the cease-fire, i.e. September 30, 1965, and in the event of their failure to agree, the Secretary-General of the United Nations was to be requested to nominate the Chairman. Following lack of agreement between India

and Pakistan on the question, the UN Secretary-General was requested and he accepted the responsibility to nominate the Chairman but asked for extension of time till December 31, 1965, to name him.

Pakistan's Notional Claim

The Rann of Kutch, as its name indicates, is a marshy wilderness lying at the northern extremity of the Gujarat State of the Indian Union, adjoining the Sind Province of West Pakistan. The Rann is 50 miles wide and 320 miles long, comprising desolate mudflats, with hardly any human habitation and little vegetation. For six months in the year, beginning with May, as the western monsoon winds whip in the waters of the Arabian Sea, the Rann is submerged under water. The region is better accessible from Sind than from the Indian side.

Before independence, the Rann formed part of the territory of the Princely State of Kutch. Following partition and separation of Sind as part of the newly-created Pakistan, the need arose for the demarcation of the international boundary between Kutch and Sind. Accordingly, the Maharao, the Ruler of Kutch, sought from Karachi such a demarcation, on the ground, of the recognized and *de facto* boundary between Sind and the Rann.

To the utter amazement of the Maharao and New Delhi, the Pakistan Government replied that the entire

northern half of the Rann was a territory in dispute and therefore it was no mere question of demarcating the boundary but a settlement of a territorial dispute.

Between 1947 and 1965, at least eight notes have been exchanged between the Governments of India and Pakistan on the subject, each party sticking to its guns.

Pakistan's case is:

The Rann of Kutch is a land-locked sea or an inland lake, largely uninhabited and periodically submerged by the Arabian Sea. It should be treated as such, and as laid down by international law in regard to inland seas, the boundary should run halfway through the Rann.

The Rann is located between the former province of Sind and the former Princely State of Kutch, now part of the Indian State of Gujarat, and not part of Kutch.

Pakistan cites the Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908, in support of her claim to nearly half of the Rann, north of the 24th Parallel. This gazette states that the Rann is "bounded on the north and northwest by the province of Sind . . . its limits, exclusive of a portion of the great salt marsh termed the Rann, extend from 22 degrees 45 minutes to 24 degrees north and from 68 degrees 25 minutes to 71 degrees 11 minutes east."

The area (3,500 square miles) is part of Sind province. Pakistan has continued, after 1947, to exercise jurisdiction over the territory and had also maintained a police post at Chhad Bet, which is situated in the northern half of the Rann. In 1956, the Pakistanis were ousted from the Chhad Bet post by Indian forces. "In order to avoid a clash and in the hope of reaching an amicable settlement with India, the Government of Pakistan decided against using force to retake Chhad Bet and confined itself to lodging a protest with the Government of India."

Pakistan dubbed India's denial of the existence of a territorial dispute in the Rann as a *volte-face,* and

claimed that at the 1960 Swaran Singh-Shaikh talks India had conceded the existence of such a territorial dispute, in that the two countries agreed at the conference to resolve the dispute peacefully and laid down the ground rules for both sides, pending a final accord.

Afraid that its legal claim to the Rann territory may not hold water, Pakistan is keeping ready the second string to its bow, by trying to prove that the Rann is a separate entity belonging to neither Sind nor Kutch, that it is an inland sea sandwiched between Sind and Kutch and therefore under international law applied to inland seas and lakes, the international boundary should run right in the middle of the Rann!

At a press conference in Pindi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared: "It must be remembered that the central fact is that this is a dispute over territory which lies roughly north of the 24th Parallel. The dispute has arisen not because the boundary is undemarcated but because the disputed territory is in India's adverse possession."


At this press conference Bhutto trotted out the theory that the Rann is inundated for nearly half the year, and therefore it should be treated as an inland sea or a lake.

India's case is:

What was the position at partition? Where did the actual border run between the province of Sind and the Kutch State in 1947? All official maps issued until August 1947, as well as records of the British Government up to that date, show that the entire Rann of Kutch belonged to Kutch State. Since the Kutch State forms part of the Indian Union, the Rann of Kutch, too, belongs to India.

India cites the Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1909 (a year later than the one cited by Pakistan) in support of her stand, which states that the Province of Sind was "bounded on the south by the Rann of Kutch and the Arabian Sea."

Pakistan's Map of Rann of Kutch Indicating its Territorial Claims North of the 24th Parallel



In 1908 claims and counter-claims were exchanged between the Province of Sind and the Ruler of Kutch, regarding the boundary in the small western portion; but there was a settlement which was formalized in a Resolution of the Government of Bombay and was approved by the then British Government of India.

This resolution not only defines the boundary in the western area which had been the subject of claims and counter-claims, but also clearly indicates the rest of the boundary of Sind which stands out as the established and undisputed boundary of Sind, clearly indicated on a map. The wording of the 1914 Resolution of the Government of Bombay is very clear:

"On a full review of the evidence, therefore, the Government arrived at the conclusion that the boundary between Kutch and Sind should be the green line in the accompanying map from the mouth of the Sir Creek to the top of the Sir Creek at the point where it joins the blue dotted line; from there it should follow the blue dotted line due east until it joins the Sind boundary as marked in purple on the map."

As a result of this Resolution, a roughly triangular portion of territory was awarded to the Province of Sind and continues to be part of Sind today. The fact that Pakistan retains this triangular portion awarded to Sind by the British Administration in 1914 is a confirmation of the validity of that Resolution.

All the documents issued on the authority of the Political Department of the British Government of India to show political changes in 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1942 clearly depicted the Rann of Kutch as falling within the Western India States' Agency and never as part of the Province of Sind.

The official maps published by the Survey of India during the British Administration also showed unmistak-

ably the boundary between the Province of Sind (Pakistan) and the Princely State of Kutch (India).

Thus all evidence prior to August 1947, when Pakistan was constituted, leaves no basis whatsoever for any dispute regarding the border between Sind and Kutch.

Nor are there any grounds for regarding the Rann of Kutch as a sea, dead or alive. The Gazetteers described the Rann as a salt-waste. The word 'Rann' owes its origin to the word 'Irina' in Sanskrit which means salt-waste. In 1906, the British Government of India conveyed its decision to the Surveyor-General of India instructing him to show the Rann as marsh and not as a lake in political maps.

It is not correct to state, as Pakistan claims, that at the 1960 Indo-Pak Ministerial level talks, India had accepted Pakistan's contention in regard to the existence of a territorial dispute. In fact, it was the basic differences on fundamental facts between the two parties that was responsible for the stalemate and adjournment of discussions on the subject.

Actually, at these talks, between Sardar Swaran Singh of India and Gen. Shaikh of Pakistan, four of the five border disputes on the agenda were speedily resolved. They primarily arose out of different regional interpretations of the Radcliffe Award, and were settled in a spirit of accommodation.

Pakistan gave up her claim to Chak Ladheke and, in return, India gave up her claim to the three villages of Theh Sarja Marja, Rath Hardit Singh and Pathanke. That disposed of the first two items. In respect of the Hussainwalla Headworks, it was decided that the boundary would be the district boundary between the Ferozpore and Lahore districts. Similarly, settlement was effected in regard to the Suleimanki Headworks, and an

agreement about the adjustment in the district boundary was arrived at.

It was the fifth item on the agenda, in respect of the Kutch-Sind border, that defied resolution, though the conference lasted nine days. Finally, the talks adjourned, both countries agreeing to collect further data and meet again later with a view to arriving at a satisfactory settlement of the Kutch border dispute. No agreement was possible on the question because no common meeting ground could be found between the viewpoints represented by the two parties.

The conference also reached an agreement in respect of the ground rules which would be operative on the West Pakistan-India border. The ground rules laid down that on the India-West Pakistan frontier the *de facto* boundary would be the one generally known to the security forces of both sides and the local population.

In case of disputes arising in any sector regarding the *de facto* boundary, the *status quo* would be maintained by the local post commanders and a working boundary in the areas under dispute should be decided upon by the officers designated for the purpose and jointly recorded in a descriptive manner and clearly identified on the ground.

Speaking in the Lok Sabha on April 28, 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri declared: "I want to state clearly and emphatically that we reject and repudiate these claims in their entirety. Pakistan claims that the Rann of Kutch is an inland sea and therefore Pakistan is entitled to half of this area. This is completely untenable. The Rann is not an inland sea and has never been recognized as such."

The Prime Minister added, "Pakistan's claims also ignore the historical fact that even though the Kutch-Sind border is undemarcated, it is well-defined on maps and well recognized in fact. Prior to the partition of India,

the Kutch-Sind border separated the then British Indian province of Sind and the Indian State of Kutch. Not being an international boundary then, it did not need to be demarcated. The boundary itself was however well defined in all official maps dating from 1872 to 1943 and even later, and was well-known and well-established. . . . The boundary shown in official maps of undivided India prior to August 15, 1947, cannot be questioned."

International lawyers, with experience of such matters, however believe that the tribunal's hearings may drag on and it might not be less than a year and a half before it formulates its verdict.

The Kutch agreement of June 1965, based on Harold Wilson's mediation proposals, however, weakens Pakistan's case in the Rann. For example, the basic principle adumbrated in that agreement is the restoration of *status quo ante* as on January 1, 1965. Under this clause, Pakistan has had to withdraw completely from the region north of the 24th Parallel, over which Pakistan claimed to have had jurisdiction not only after 1947, but even before that.

While requiring Pakistan to withdraw from all the three points occupied by her, namely, Kanjarkot, Bier Bet and Point 84, the agreement permits India to remain in Chhad Bet, a point over which Pakistan claimed jurisdiction, and to have maintained a police post from 1947.

The only concession the agreement made to Pakistan's claims was to permit her to patrol the Surai-Ding track which, she had proved, she had been using all the time since 1947 and even before.

Since Pakistan was a willing party to that agreement, it amounted to her acquiescence in India's contention that Pakistan came on the scene only after January 1965 to enforce her untenable territorial claim on the region.

Although exchanges on the subject had taken place

between the two Governments from time to time, the problem had remained a low priority item for a long time. A couple of years ago, however, reports came thick and fast about large resources of oil lying buried in the mudflats of the Rann. Thereupon the vast, desolate marshland suddenly hit the headlines, and Pakistan's interest and territorial claim in the region were activated.

* * *

What did Ayub gain from the Kutch adventure? If his objective was, as some think, to coerce India into talking on the Kashmir question through a military threat, he obviously failed to gain that aim.

It could however be argued that that was not his immediate objective in Kutch. In the Rann he was concerned with taking measure of the Indian Army's capabilities *vis-à-vis* his own American-aid equipped and American trained troops. That had never been done. Indeed, the last time the two armies were pitted against each other was as far back as 1948 in Kashmir. Since then much water had flowed in the Indus.

Ayub had yet to test Pakistan's new Army, equipped and trained with most modern weapons, against its Indian counterpart. He wanted to do that in a limited operation in the Rann by way of a laboratory experiment, preliminary to his much more ambitious and large-scale operation against India in Kashmir that he had been planning for quite a while and which was scheduled for August-September.

He wanted to test his theory that Pakistan's quality could make up for India's quantity and beat the latter. At the end of the Kutch operations, Ayub concluded that he had found the answer and that his theory had proved

valid, that the Indian Army could never stand up to his American armour, artillery and other most modern weapons. That conclusion made up his mind for him and confirmed his decision to launch the ambitious adventure in Kashmir later.

Politically, of course, he could hardly conceal his sense of triumph on the conclusion of the Kutch Agreement. With that agreement, providing for the appointment of a three-man tribunal to adjudicate the border dispute in the Rann, whose verdict would be binding on both parties, he had got his foot in the door and his claim to half the Rann registered and internationally recognized and acknowledged by India.

Since the tribunal would be more of a politico-judicial body, with the respective nominees of India and Pakistan sitting alongside a neutral chairman nominated by the UN Secretary-General, it was quite on the cards that the verdict would finally be given by the neutral chairman, striking a compromise between the rival claims. Such a compromise would amount to a concession to the Pakistani claim in the Rann. It might lead to India yielding to a Pakistani claim that she had hitherto refused to recognize as existing and to handing over to Pakistan at least some of the territory claimed by her. And thereby Pakistan stood to gain something, and lose nothing. (At a purely judicial enquiry, with her strong legal case, India might win hands down.)

These anticipations obviously inspired the generous sentiments that Ayub gave expression to when addressing a press conference immediately after the signing of the agreement—which seemed completely out of character with his consistently uncharitable pronouncements on India in the preceding months and years.

Ayub's assessment of the political outcome of the Kutch

episode might yet come true. But the Pakistani President arrived at an erroneous and misleading conclusion when he decided on the basis of the fighting witnessed in the Rann that the Indian Army was a "push-over." It was however this conclusion that goaded him to launch the September 1 adventure of a full-scale war against India.

Part Two

PAKISTAN'S "BAY OF PIGS"

PAK'S "GRAND DESIGN"

The design was indeed grand. The Pakistanis shouted about it from housetops. Their newspapers published pictures of Mujahids and stories about the guerilla warfare proposed to be let loose in the hapless State of Jammu and Kashmir. Their leaders bragged at public meetings about their plan to "liberate" the Kashmiris.

The "grand design" appeared simple, yet foolproof—at least on paper. As 5,000 armed guerillas poured into the State from all around, like flooding waters engulfing a basin, the Srinagar regime would be swept away under the deluge. That was to be Ayub's gift to his people on Pakistan's National Day, August 14.

While the Pakistani troops kept the Indian Army occupied with intermittent artillery firing and cease-fire violations, the infiltrators would blow up bridges, sabotage strategic installations and help the Kashmiris to stage a *coup d'état* in Srinagar. Then the Pakistan Army would march in to protect the revolution!

But, alas, the Kashmiris seemed to be impervious and unappreciative of all the travail and trouble the Mujahids

had gone through in order to "liberate" them! The Kashmiris' only response was to hand them over to the police! With their bitter memories of the Pakistani "liberators'" depredations in their land in 1947 still fresh, the Kashmiris would have nothing to do with them this time.

Thus was exploded the first myth of the ambitious Pakistani project—that the Kashmiris were impatiently waiting to be "liberated" by Pakistan—a line assiduously propagated abroad by President Ayub and his Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Pakistan's disappointment was all the greater because of the elaborate and long preparations that had gone into the "grand design," accompanied as they were with so much fanfare and sabre-rattling.

For a year and more, the Pakistani leaders and press had been talking of starting an "Algerian type" of struggle in Kashmir. Military officers in Pindi and Murree mugged up on Mao's texts on guerilla warfare and politico-military strategy. Chinese experts, it was reported, had been imported to train Pakistanis in guerilla techniques.

Srinagar had known about the training centres set up in Pakistan for saboteurs and guerillas early enough. In July the representatives of the Union Home Ministry and of the State Government met at a high-level conference at which the problem was discussed and the conference was of the view that Pakistan was not prepared for a large-scale war with India, though sabotage activity by armed guerillas was anticipated.

Besides, other preparations were on to put Pak-occupied Kashmir (POK), and West Pakistan as a whole, on a war-footing. In addition to the one division already deployed in POK, the 7th Infantry Division was brought

down from Peshawar, as also some units of Khyber Rifles from Jamrud and Sangai forts.

Further, Pak troops now moved closer to the international border with Jammu and Kashmir. Simultaneously, Pakistani military concentrations were reported along vital sectors of the Cease-fire Line. Indeed, in the Kargil area, fur had already begun to fly.

In POK itself, compulsory military training for students and youths, between the ages of 16 and 25 years, was ordered and a ten-man "action committee" set up to direct subversive activities across the Cease-fire Line.

In June 1965, an ordinance was promulgated making it obligatory for all employers in Pakistan to relieve reservists on recall and ensure their re-employment and promotion on their return. Another ordinance provided for the recall of Air Force reservists.

A third ordinance instituted a Mujahid Force, with a strength of 1,50,000. This was in addition to the 8,500 Razakars, a semi-military volunteer force, trained to use rifles. The Mujahids were given a fortnight's military training, including a course in guerilla warfare. On completion of their training, they took the oath of allegiance to the President of Pakistan. Thereafter, they went back to their normal vocations. Now and then they were called up for refresher courses. While in action, they were generally expected to take up guerilla duties in their own home localities, though they could volunteer for special outside assignments.

The Mujahids and Razakars were to play the subsidiary role of complementing and assisting in the tasks of the regular Pak Army through guerilla and sabotage activity behind enemy lines.

In May, an important conference was held at Murree between President Ayub and General Mahomed Musa, Commander-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, following which

Gen. Musa undertook an extensive tour of Occupied Kashmir. During that tour, Gen. Musa conferred with field commanders and explained to them the "steps initiated and completed by him with the concurrence of the President."

It had been decided to raise a highly-trained 30,000 strong guerilla force labelled "Gibraltar Forces." This force was to infiltrate into the State of Jammu and Kashmir to sow political trouble and confusion and help the Kashmiris to rebel against the Srinagar regime.

The Headquarters of the "Gibraltar Forces" was located in Murree, and Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik, GOC, 12 Pak Infantry Division, was put in charge of the forces. The "Gibraltar Forces" were composed of men from the regular Pak Army, the "Azad Kashmir" militia, the Frontier Scouts Units, the Mujahids and the Razakars.

The "Gibraltar Forces" consisted of ten "Forces" of brigade-strength each. A "Force" comprised six units, each unit of five companies (110 men to a company), equipped with a light machine-gun, rifles, stenguns, hand-grenades, time-bombs, ammunition and explosives. They were all commanded by officers from the regular Pak Army, with a brigadier at the head of each "Force."

The "Forces" bore such romantic names as Tariq, Khilji, Salaudin, Kasim, Khalid, Ghaznavi, Murtaza, Babar, Nasrat and Sikandar. Their personnel was trained at four centres in POK, where they were put through a six-week course, covering long cross-country marches and other toughening up exercises, besides being taught sabotage techniques and the use of various types of weapons.

In the second week of July, President Ayub gave a "pep" talk to the ten "Force" commanders at a specially convened conference at Murree. On August 1, on the

eve of the launching of the "Operation Gibraltar," Major-General Akhtar Hussain Malik addressed the company commanders at Kotli, in POK, and gave them their final briefing.

On August 5, almost simultaneously, from the south-western tip of Jammu, to Poonch and Uri in the west, Tithwal in the north-west, Guraiz in the north, and to Kargil in the north-east, armed infiltrators dribbled into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, at various points along the 470-mile long Cease-fire Line. Some of the groups had crossed the line even earlier.

The main column, made up of the Salaudin Force, converged on Srinagar. They were to arrive in the city on August 8, mingling with crowds coming in to attend the festival of Pir Dastagir, a Kashmiri saint, being celebrated on that day.

The next day, August 9, was the anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh Mohamed Abdullah. The Plebiscite Front and the Kashmir Action Committee had jointly given the call for a demonstration to register protest against his detention.

The plan was that the raiders, fully armed, were to participate in the demonstration, and in the name of the people, stage a rebellion, storm and capture the radio station and the airfield, and overthrow the Government and install a pro-Pak administration in its place.

Thanks to the vigilance and patriotism of the Kashmiri people, the diabolical plan was frustrated, and the infiltrators never got to their rendezvous on schedule. Then in despair they resorted to destructive activity calculated to create chaos in the State.

In most cases, however, the raiders covered much ground, but could get nowhere with the tasks assigned to them, because the local inhabitants, to their utter chagrin, would not co-operate. Indeed, they had to hide in the

forests during the day, afraid of being reported against and captured by the locals; they stole out only at night for whatever mischief they could do.

The raiders went about in pairs, it was noticed, one bearing an automatic rifle, the other, a helper, possibly a Razakar, carrying supplies and equipment. They brought with them Indian money, in addition to arms, ammunition, explosives and demolition implements. A Major captured was found to carry Rs. 5,000 in Indian currency in cash on his person.

The first alarm was given by a cowherd boy. On August 5, teenager Mahomed Din was tending his cattle in Darakasi, near Gulmarg, off the Uri-Poonch bulge. Two armed strangers, wearing green salwar-kameez, approached him and tried to befriend him, and then offered to pay him Rs. 400 if he would bring them information about the location of grain stores and transport depots and serve them as their guide and informant.

The lad grew suspicious of the intentions of the armed strangers, and rushed to the nearest police thana, at Tanmarg, and reported his discovery. Immediately, the security forces were on the scent. The raiders resisted and fired, and in the ensuing action, the group disintegrated.

About the same time, in the south, in Jammu province, villager Wazir Mahomed stumbled upon some suspicious-looking armed men near Galuthi, in Mendhar, and informed the local military authorities about their presence. This band too was promptly tackled.

Now the balloon was up. Throughout the length and breadth of the State, the security forces were alerted. A dragnet operation was launched. Bands of intruders were stalked, engaged and liquidated. Scores of them were captured, and large quantities of arms and ammunition seized from them.

Friendless, hungry and living a hunted life, a majority of the raiders got demoralized. Many surrendered, many others gave up the "jehad" and trickled back across the Cease-fire Line, while a considerable number were killed in action.

The position at the end of August was the raiders were largely contained in a 10-mile belt along the Cease-fire Line from Chhamb in the south to Uri in the north. In the northern sector they were mainly active in the Guraiz area. Quite a few raiders were however still floating about in the Valley.

Those who merged into the local population—mostly Gujjars in the hilly areas—started terrorizing the neighbourhood in order to obtain food. Those who took refuge in the scrubb-covered hillside as in Gulmarg, Yusmarg and Tanmarg, raided the nearby villages to pick up something to eat. In the Rajauri sector they set fire to a village on August 22 in a rage against the local people who had refused to provide them with food. When Indian security forces rushed to the spot, the marauders fled, but 18 of the group were killed in the action.

By August 9, some 3,000 infiltrators are estimated to have entered the State. Another 2,000 are believed to have come in since then. From the first wave, about 1,000 fled back across the Cease-fire Line, another 1,000 have been either killed or badly wounded or captured.

Thus, on August 9, the appointed day, when they were supposed to capture power in Srinagar, the raiders were already on the run. But the organizers and directors of the "grand design," sitting in remote Murree, bumptiously confident of success and victory, were psychologically unprepared for the fiasco. Nor did they have any clear idea what was actually happening across the Cease-fire Line. They rigidly stuck to their original programme,

including the preconceived propaganda line on the radio and in the press.

The "grand design" included the establishment of a Revolutionary Council in Srinagar and a "Sada-e-Kashmir" Radio that would broadcast news, propaganda and activities of the Revolutionary Council to the Kashmiris, Pakistanis and the world. As it turned out, on August 9, both the Revolutionary Council and the Sada-e-Kashmir radio had to be hurriedly improvised in POK, instead of in Srinagar.

The result was almost comic. Every day and night, the Sada-e-Kashmir radio blared out the commands of the Revolutionary Council to the Kashmiris, with no one paying heed to them, while the Pakistanis believed that both the Revolutionary Government and the Sada-e-Kashmir radio functioned from Srinagar.

Much of the news and propaganda that this ghost radio put out was built around the elaborate, advance programme that was to be implemented by the infiltrators in Srinagar, with the aid of a fertile imagination and a change in the tense! Thus the Sada-e-Kashmir radio poured out a plethora of imaginary stories about engagements fought and victories won by the heroic Mujahids against the Indian Army in Kashmir!

When the raiders deliberately set fire to 300 houses in the congested Batamalu locality in Srinagar, where reside lower middle-class and working people, the ghost radio reported how the Mujahids had burned down the Government offices in the city and boasted that it was now "ashes, ashes, and ashes all the way" where there were the Government offices before!

Since most of the stories put out by the Sada-e-Kashmir radio were based upon events expected to take place but did not, their effect on the Kashmiris was hilarious, and they held their sides as they listened to hair-raising

accounts of events supposed to have occurred in their midst, which they themselves had never noticed!

The Pakistani press, in unison, blared out about an "uprising" in Srinagar and claimed that the city had been cut off and that the Mujahids had captured the radio station and the airport (which were the assignments given to the Mujahids but which they could not accomplish).

Dawn of Karachi, on August 9, reported a "proclamation" by the so-called Revolutionary Council which was supposed to have replaced the Government in Srinagar. The "proclamation" spoke of an "armed struggle" launched by the Revolutionary Council, which the paper described as a "new element as distinct from sporadic encounters in the past." This proclamation was originally intended to be broadcast over the Srinagar radio on August 9, but was subsequently distributed clandestinely by hand and post to people in Srinagar.

The proclamation declared that the "Revolutionary Council of Patriots," as the national government of Kashmir, was now the "sole lawful authority" and that it had scrapped "all alleged treaties and agreements between Imperialist Government of India and Kashmir." The proclamation appealed "to the world to support this freedom movement" and exhorted the people of Pakistan "to join us in our struggle for life and liberty."

Over to Offensive

Of the several groups of Pakistani raiders that infiltrated into Kashmir, the Salaudin Force, which headed for Srinagar and the Valley, and the Ghaznavi Force that operated in the Mendhar-Rajauri area, have taxed our security authorities the most. Comprising six companies, the Salaudin Force crossed the Cease-fire Line on July 30 evening and reached Chor Panjal on August 1 morning. From that point, two companies moved towards Gulmarg, and the remaining four marched to Khag. On August 9, they clashed with the Kashmir Armed Police and also attacked and destroyed the Bimna bridge, killing the police guard.

It was this group that was responsible for the many incidents at Baramulla, in the Valley, around the city of Srinagar and in Badgam and Yusmarg.

Elements of the group penetrated four key suburbs of Srinagar, in the vicinity of the Cantonment, the military depots, the army installations, the radio transmitter and the Government Secretariat. Near here was discovered a large ammunition dump secretly built up by their allies inside the city. They entrenched themselves

behind the Tatto Ground and came out at night to snipe at the police lines.

When they failed to get the co-operation and welcome they expected from the local inhabitants, the raiders in a rage and despair resorted to arson. They set fire to the congested Batamallu locality. About 300 houses were gutted—the only house spared in the fire was that belonging to Mohiuddin Kara, founder-president of the pro-Pakistan Political Conference. Four raiders were captured on the spot, and when interrogated, they revealed that they had been assigned the task of burning down the entire locality. A bag containing incendiary material was also recovered from the vicinity.

The group that headed for Yusmarg spread into Anantnag through Shupayaian and Kulgam and operated in the Anantnag-Achibal-Gazigund area. The weight of the series of encounters with our security forces, however, wore them down until they disintegrated. The band that pushed towards Gulmarg, subjected to heavy shelling from Indian Army artillery, suffered many desertions. By August 15, demoralized remnants melted across the Cease-fire Line.

The Khag forest, which had been turned into a stronghold of the Salaudin Force, was the scene of a major encounter between the raiders and the Indian Army, following which the raiders threw up the sponge and trekked back to POK via Sonat Nullah. With that, the worst was over so far as the infiltrators in the Valley were concerned. Their back would appear to have now been broken. Hereafter, the raiders' activity in the region did not amount to more than an irritating nuisance. Such then was the fate of the Salaudin Force.

The Ghaznavi Force entered Jammu from Kotli in the first week of August. It consisted of six companies to start with, but what with constant reinforcements coming

in, it ultimately swelled up to nearly 2,000. This group operated in the Mendhar-Rajauri-Chingas-Jhangar area. They signalled their entry with an attack on an ammunition dump in Narian, but were beaten back by our troops.

The raiders were milling around this area in considerable strength from the very beginning. By August 18, they got virtual control of Budhil. They established their headquarters in Dudaruni, and by September 7, as many as 1,500 raiders were reported to be concentrated in the Dudaruni-Dana-Budhil area.

In this region, the raiders were often supplied by airdrops, and on one occasion, got 500 rifles airdropped at Dana. In the first week of September a convoy of nearly 100 mules infiltrated and delivered arms and ammunition and other supplies to the group.

The men of this group were also sighted at Mohr, where they attacked an Armed Police post and otherwise did considerable damage. Some also got to Arnas and Riasi, and others penetrated as deep as Ramban. This group was also responsible for incidents in Rajauri, Mendhar, Surankot, Galuthi and Bhimber Gali.

By September 3, three days after the massive armoured thrust launched in the Chhamb region by the regular Pakistani Army, 1,000 infiltrators were in Dana and Pharwala, with their base in Kuliana. Dela and Shakarmarg were their dropping zones. By September 7, some 1,500 infiltrators were reported in the area of Dudaruni, Dana and Budhil, with their ammunition dumps located at Tehri and Nangbagh.

Indeed, by the middle of September, this region was swarming with infiltrators who shot at our posts and convoys, raided villages, carried out sabotage activity and clashed with our security forces. A company of this force spread out to Poonch and Mandi.

Right through the 22-day shooting war between India and Pakistan, a wide region in Western and South-western Jammu was dominated by infiltrators. An all-out drive against the raiders in this region could actually be launched only after the cease-fire. But a majority of the infiltrators managed to retreat to POK during the nights of September 25 and 27.

The task of the Tariq Force was to strike towards Dras and Kargil. Comprising 400 men, this Force was raised in Skardu, in Baltistan, and consisted largely of the Karakorum Scouts, besides the Mujahids and the Razakars. It had also a complement of 10 Baluchis of the regular Pak Army.

The Force infiltrated through Gultari, Marpo La and Kaobal Gali. One of these groups headed for Zoji La and Sonamarg. They attempted to blow up the Hamilton Bridge on the Srinagar-Sonamarg road, but did only minor damage to it. They also tried to blow up a cement bridge near Zoji La. The Mujahid component of the Force proved more a nuisance than a help, while the Karakorum Scouts are reported to have mutinied twice.

The Tariq Force got into a head-on clash with our security forces on August 29 night near Sumbal bridge. In this encounter 20 of the raiders were killed, following which the rest fled across the Cease-fire Line. By September 9 this Force was reported to have been disbanded.

The Babar Force, 400-strong, entered the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Bhimber, Sadabad and Penga into Kalidhar, with a view to spreading out in the Naushera-Sunderbani area. On August 9, 150 infiltrators were sighted at Banjaro, north of Chhamb, and by August 12, 300 of them had established a camp in Narjira and Panapura. Some 200 of them penetrated Kalidhar where they were engaged by our security forces and suffered heavy casualties. By the middle of August, they were

all forced to retreat into POK under cover of heavy artillery barrage provided by Pak Army.

The Qasim Force, of 500 men, with its base at Taobat, entered the forest near Bandipur, having come through Kamzalwan. Elements of this force attempted to burn down a bridge near Kamzalwan on August 11, and then on August 15. They fired at the rear headquarters of a J & K Militia unit near Sonarwain and the police station at Bandipur. One band made its stronghold at Malud Behak and operated in the area of Woyil Bridge. Our security forces used the helicopter to tackle this group, which was finally disrupted by the last week of August.

The Khalid Force entered Kashmir in the first week of August, through Qazinag Dar-Tutmari Gali route and through Athmugam. On August 12, one group of this Force attacked an Indian Army base at Naugam and on August 21 attacked the Laingyat bridge. Our security forces liquidated this Force by the third week of August. The second group of the Khalid Force moved from Kagam through Kundal Shahi, Balakot and Athmugam, crossed the Salkhala bridge and Rauta and through Domari Gali, reached the forest of Buduambal. This group blew up the Kazilpura bridge, and then attacked Chokibal.

The Nasrat Force confined its activity to the Tithwal-Tanghdar area, the Sikandar Force skirmished in the Guraiz area, and the Khilji Force milled around the Kel-Minimarg region along the Cease-fire Line.

In addition, another group of infiltrators from bases in Pakistan territory in Shakargarh raided the Samba area in Jammu with a view to disrupting the communications between Pathankot and Jammu and even ambushed some convoys during August and September.

As the earlier batches of raiders were either liquidated or were found aimlessly milling around, Pindi decided

to reinforce the effort and plunged in its regular Army in their support. Many a band of raiders pushing across the border, particularly in south and west Jammu was now given artillery cover by the Pak Army. Soon the artillery was followed up by Pak Army infantry. The fighting was now in the process of escalating in another fateful step.

Thus Gen. R. H. Nimmo's report to the UN Secretary-General, records on August 10 an attack of "armed raiders" on two bridges and one picket in the sensitive Kargil sector. Four days later, reporting the crossing of the Cease-fire Line by armed bands from the Pakistan side, the Chief of the UN Military Observer team notes: "Indian positions along the Cease-fire Line were subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Pakistan side on August 15/16. The attacking forces captured nine Indian positions on August 16/17." All the nine posts were however subsequently retaken by us.

This Pak attack was of battalion strength, in which Pak artillery had taken part. Here was evidence, supported by UN authority, of the Pakistan army being directly committed in its desperate effort to prevent its "grand design" degenerating into a "Bay of Pigs" fiasco.

The Indian Army now came to the conclusion that the only effective way of stopping the infiltrator menace was boldly to cross the Cease-fire Line and plug the routes along which the raiders dribbled in. Once the decision was taken, the action was swift.

Following the aforementioned Pakistani attacks on two bridges and one picket, six to eight miles on the Indian side of the Cease-fire Line in the Kargil sector, the Indian troops, on August 15, the Independence Day, crossed the Cease-fire Line and occupied three Pakistani positions near the Line, northeast of Kargil. That removed a

constant danger to our lifeline between Srinagar and Leh.

Those three points had once before been wrested from the Pakistanis in mid-May when the latter repeatedly attacked our defence positions and traffic on the highway. Following the Kutch Agreement, however, our Army relinquished those posts on assurances from the UN Observers that they would prevent future Pakistani intrusions in the area. But while the UN Observers looked on helplessly, Pakistanis were now once again intruding in the sector.

On August 24, Indian troops crossed the Cease-fire Line also in the Tithwal sector and occupied two Pakistani posts, for long centres of Pakistani mischief. These included the strategically vital Pir Saheba. From there, the Indian troops advanced up to the Kishenganga river. On September 11, the Pakistanis blew up the Mirpur bridge across the Kishenganga, and the Indian Army now dominated the Muzaffarabad-Kel road, thereby sealing off the infiltrators' route to Kargil and Guraiz.

The next day, the Indian Army crossed the Cease-fire Line in the Uri sector too and drove the Pakistanis out of two posts on mountain-tops, 8,000 ft. to 9,000 ft. high, guarding the entry routes of the raiders. These posts were two to two-and-a-half miles on the Pakistani side of the Cease-fire Line and about six miles from each other. Except for an odd machine-gun burst, there was little resistance from the Pakistanis here. There were no casualties on the Indian side, but the booty captured included four 81 mm. mortars, Browning automatics, and a rocket-launcher.

This remarkable operation was climaxed with the capture of the vital 8,600 ft. high Haji Pir Pass by a brilliant stratagem.

A frontal assault on this narrow Pass was impossible; it was so situated that it could be defended by a handful

of soldiers against the heaviest attack. In a flanking movement an Indian Force spent all night climbing up a high, steep mountainside in order to slither down next morning on the heads of the Pak defenders and take the Pass by storm.

The high Haji Pir Pass, a strategic point situated halfway between Uri and Poonch, had been considered impregnable by both sides. It had to be a two-pronged attack from Bedore, on the east and Sankh, on the west. Major battles had to be fought before Bedore and Sankh could be wrested from the enemy. The Pakistanis were entrenched in shell-proof bunkers ringed by barbed wire and well-defended by machine-guns.

The climb to the Pass was slow, slippery, steep and long. It had to be undertaken in darkness at night, and it was raining at the time. The men were racing against time. They had to get to the top by morning and finish the assignment by surprise. But let me tell the story in the words of Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Ranjit Dayal, the hero of the operation, himself:

> About 9.30 P.M., on August 26, I and my men attacked the Sankh Hill feature. We continued to climb the whole night. We reached the peak at 4.15 A.M. Despite enemy shelling, we continued to advance. Soon the enemy ran away, leaving two mmgs and three lmgs behind.
>
> The next hill feature was Sar, then in enemy hands. We captured this hill by 9.30 A.M., and another hill feature, Lud Wali Gali, two hours later. We had consolidated our position by 6 P.M. that day.
>
> I then sought permission of my commanding officer to capture the Haji Pir Pass. The permission was granted, and then began the march forward. The enemy fired from two directions. I sent one platoon to

> silence the enemy guns. I and the rest of my men continued to advance and reached Hyderabad Nullah by 7 P.M.
>
> From then on it was bad going. The pass from there was a 4,000-foot-steep climb. It was raining heavily. The ground was slushy. I left the beaten track and took another route. In fact, it was not a route at all. It was a steep climb. Despite heavy odds, we reached the road leading to the pass at 4.30 A.M. on August 28. I decided to give my men carrying guns and batteries the much needed rest. After two hours, we again started climbing and at 8 A.M. we reached a bund near the pass.
>
> Leaving some men there to keep the enemy engaged, along with the rest of the party, I climbed another hill feature and from there rolled down and stormed the enemy position at the pass. The enemy fled in confusion leaving their guns. By 10.30 A.M. we were in complete control of the pass.

A fierce counter-attack was repulsed the next day. The Indian Army men followed up that triumph by taking a string of 19 other Pakistani posts in the area. From the Haji Pir Pass area, the Indian Army captured 45 tons of ammunition and food stocks to feed 1,000 men for a whole month.

On September 10 the entire operation was rounded off with a link-up between an Indian column moving down from Uri and another moving up from Poonch, thus straightening out the famous Uri-Poonch bulge, covering some 250 square miles, and plugging the most important routes of entry into Jammu and Kashmir for the raiders from the west.

During the mopping up operations spread over nearly two months—the job is still far from completed—the

Indian Security forces had shot or captured some 2,000 infiltrators and seized truckloads of arms and ammunition and other equipment. It is now estimated that not more than 50 raiders are still at large in the Valley, hiding in the jungles, scared and hungry, desperately trying to flee across the Cease-fire Line. There are, however, still over 1,500 infiltrators operating in the western Jammu region, particularly in the Poonch-Rajauri area.

Those directing the infiltrators' operations from the safe and distant headquarters in Murree, however, will never say die. They are reported to be raising fresh Mujahid forces with a view to pushing them across the Cease-fire Line and "liberating" the Kashmiris by force! Evidence is piling up of renewed large-scale preparations.

"Curiouser and Curiouser"

When Hitler wanted to conquer a neighbouring country, he first planted a fifth column therein. That fifth column worked for Hitler from inside and prepared the ground for his armies to march in and clinch the issue. He was at least honest. He did not call the act a "liberation war." It was naked conquest and annexation. Pakistan was trying in Kashmir an old recipe when she sought to "liberate " it in August 1965—indeed, a recipe Pakistan had tried once before in 1947 and failed.

In the post-war era, the Chinese Communists perfected the process and gave a new connotation to the term "liberation"—any regime that Peking disapproves of, faces the threat of being "liberated." The "liberation" would appear to be a three-phased process—the famous three-step formula of General Vo Nguyen Giap, Ho Chi Minh's guerilla expert. Opening with a campaign of harassment of the disapproved regime and intended victim, the process soon enlarges into guerilla ambushes and sabotage—as was attempted by Ayub's Mujahids in

Kashmir—which ultimately evolve into regular set battles between large formations.

The launching phase is accompanied by a wild, no-holds-barred propaganda barrage against the chosen victim, to be followed by infiltration of armed guerillas into that country who would engineer an internal rebellion and stage a *coup d'état* to overthrow the disapproved regime, and install in its place a stooge Government. In the final phase, the regular army of the "liberating" country steps in to protect the newly-installed puppet government.

In order to assure success the aggressor must always be prepared to intervene with conventional forces in support of his paramilitary units or guerilla allies. Had the promised US air force support materialized, the American-engineered "Bay of Pigs" operation in Cuba in 1961 might not have turned into a fiasco.

Even as the existence of a contiguous socialist state is considered essential by Communist doctrine for the success of an internal Communist revolution, the intervention of the conventional forces in support of the "freedom fighters" or "liberators" is a vital clincher for a "liberation war."

Whether in unconventional invasions or conventional wars, an effective method of defence is attack—the defence against paramilitary invaders is an attack on their bases far inside the enemy territory from which he launched his paramilitary assaults. This is the lesson that the American Army is underscoring in Viet Nam. This is also the lesson that the Indian Army learnt in tackling the armed infiltrators in Kashmir.

In the post-war years this technique of infiltration and invasion by paramilitary forces has been tried in varying degrees of success in Asia, and particularly in Indo-China. In South Viet Nam, the Viet Cong are playing the role of

"liberators" sponsored by Hanoi and Peking—the North Viet-Namese regular army is now reported to be openly fighting side by side with the Viet Cong guerillas. But for the American intervention, South Viet Nam would have long ago been "liberated" and gobbled up by Peking Communists.

In Laos, the "liberation" technique has been applied with considerable success. In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk has already caved in to his powerful neighbour and saved himself the "liberation" process. It is essentially a formula of coercion designed to pressurize an indigenous regime to carry out the "liberators'" behests under the threat of being "liberated"! By whatever name one calls it, and under whatever disguise, it is a naked and direct invasion—a paramilitary intervention in support of a fomented or fabricated local insurrection.

In the circumstances, not only the unstable, underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, exposed to Mao's threat of "liberation wars," but also crusaders against Communist expansionism, like the United States, should feel concerned to discourage such unconventional invasions. It is equally the concern of the United Nations to drive home the moral to all predatory States of the world that aggression, whether direct or indirect, does not pay.

The entire region, stretching from Cairo and Baghdad to Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, is in a state of flux and a potential victim of the much-bruited Chinese passion for "liberation wars." "We in our part of the world," observed with some passion Malaysia's Representative at the UN, Radhakrishna Ramani, in his speech in the Security Council, "have been facing for over two years this kind of war—infiltration and subversion and sabotage—and we may speak with some knowledge learnt in the hard school of experience. It is an exhausting,

exasperating war where the initiative is forever with the aggressor."

In ringing tones Ramani warned: "The art and science of this wearying, wasteful war have now been perfected in Asia. The peril of our times is the expansion, export and propagation of this kind of war into regions farther beyond, regions which are judged to be 'ripe for revolution.' Today, however, Asia is its testing ground."

It is this technique, forged in Peking, that Ayub was putting across in Kashmir. If his guerillas failed in their assigned political and military tasks, the fault is not that of the technique but that of his guerillas who, by and large, seemed to lack the stamina and faith in the "holy" cause entrusted to them.

The fact remains that the five thousand trained and armed infiltrators that poured into Kashmir with the slogan of liberation and *jehad* on their lips, left the Kashmiris cold. That gave the direct lie to Bhutto's claim from the floor of the Security Council that the Kashmiris were impatiently waiting for the Pakistanis to come and liberate them. His other protestation that the raiders were no Pakistani outsiders but local "freedom fighters" was equally exposed when the latter hopelessly failed to stir up political trouble in the Valley.

Even as Sir Mohamed Zafrullah did in 1947, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1965, blandly denied Pakistani participation or direction of the guerilla invasion of Kashmir. Nevertheless, the fact that the raiders came from Pakistan and Pak-occupied Kashmir, trained and armed by Ayub's Government, has been proved to the hilt from the confessions made to UN Military Observers and the Indian Army by prisoners captured from among the infiltrators. Indeed, they were found to be personnel of the regular Pakistan Army or its limb, the "Azad Kashmir"

Battalions, or Pakistan's paramilitary organization, the Mujahid Force.

All these are hard facts staring in the face of any impartial, objective observer—facts which were forcefully projected in such important official UN documents as the reports of Gen. R. H. Nimmo, Chief UN Military Observer in Kashmir, and the reports of U Thant, UN Secretary-General himself, to the Security Council. And yet it would appear that these tell-tale facts made little impression on many members of the Security Council.

Indeed, from the New Delhi end of the telescope, the goings-on at the Security Council during the fateful month of September 1965 looked, like Alice's Wonderland, "curioser and curioser." Indians were indignant as they watched the spectacle of the Big Powers fiddling, while Kashmir was burning—as manipulators busied themselves in the lobbies of that international body to "fix" the agenda and procedure of the discussion to suit their preconceived notions and prejudices, instead of responding to the logic of the situation created by deliberate Pakistani acts of aggression in Kashmir.

UN's own officer, specially designated for the purpose, Gen. Nimmo indicts Pakistan for committing wanton aggression in Kashmir by sending across the Cease-fire Line thousands of armed infiltrators. U Thant, UN Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council, points his finger at Pakistan as the party responsible for the flare-up in that hapless State.

Yet, strangely enough, the debate that ensues in the Security Council, following the presentation of the aforesaid report by U Thant as well as the resolution adopted by that international body, seemed to ignore or bypass the operative and vital parts of the two reports.

U Thant's report to the Security Council, dated September 3, stated:

> Gen. Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on August 5, were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. . . .
>
> As regards violations by artillery, there was heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the line from the Pakistan side in the Chhamb-Bhimber area on August 15-16, and on August 19 and 26 the town of Poonch was shelled from the Pakistan side, some of the shells hitting the building occupied by UN Military Observers. Pakistan artillery again shelled the town of Poonch on August 28.

The Secretary-General's report continues:

> On the morning of August 9, a cable was received from Gen. Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the CFL. On the basis of this report, I saw the representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about *the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the line* [italics mine] and also my strong appeal that the CFL be observed.
>
> That same afternoon I saw the representative of India, told him of the information I had received from Gen. Nimmo and of the *démarche* I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days I repeated these appeals orally for trans-

mission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the line be withdrawn to its own side.

I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-fire and the CFL will be respected henceforth [italics mine] or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by their representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the cease-fire agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise.

The Secretary-General's report then laid down the conditions for a restoration of the cease-fire. These conditions demanded: willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they had entered into; evacuation by both sides of positions occupied by them and withdrawal of "all armed personnel" of each party to its own side of the Line; a halt to the firing across the CFL; and

A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the CFL from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.

According to the Chief Military Observer's report to the UN Secretary-General, dated August 30, 1965, between August 5 (the date on which the infiltrators began to pour into Jammu and Kashmir) and August 30, there were 23 cases of violations. Of these, no less than 19 were committed by Pakistanis. UN Observers record that all the 19 incidents occurred on the Indian side of the CFL in which raiders attacked Indian army positions

and patrols. Of these, four out of the total 23 incidents, attributed to Indians, occurred towards the latter part of the month (one each on August 12 and 14 and two on August 24) and were by way of retaliation by the Indian Army and were openly acknowledged to the UN Observers.

On August 7, in the Baramulla sector, armed groups attacked five bridges, two formation headquarters and six pickets on the Indian side, all located two to seventeen miles from the CFL. Gen. Nimmo's report comments on this incident as follows:

> UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place. The casualties of the attacks seen by the Observers included: 13 Indian soldiers killed, 12 Indian soldiers wounded and one Indian policeman wounded; one raider killed and one wounded.
>
> The Observers interviewed one of the captured raiders who stated that he was a soldier of the 16 Azad Kashmir infantry battalion and that the raiding party was composed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and 100 Mujahids (armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics). UN Observers noted that some of the materials said to have been abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

The Nimmo report records another incident on August 24, also in the Baramulla sector:

> It was reported on August 24 that in a clash at the Chor Panjal Pass, six miles on the Indian side of the CFL, Indian troops had killed 21 "intruders." UN Observers visited the site of the clash and saw nine bodies dressed in green "salwar" (trousers) and "kamiz" (shirts). The clothing and general appearance

of the bodies led the Observers to believe that they were those of Azad Kashmir soldiers.

In an incident on August 10 in the Kargil sector, small armed groups attacked two bridges and one picket, six to eight miles from the CFL. The UN Observers confirming the attacks, remarked: "The dress worn by the dead raider was similar to the uniform of the Pakistan Frontier Corps of Scouts."

On August 16 in the Galuthi sector, a convoy of Indian vehicles, civilian buses and one UN jeep was fired upon with 2-inch mortars, rocket-launchers and small arms on the main road from Poonch to Galuthi. The report states: "UN Observers confirmed the incident. They saw eight Indian soldiers killed, seven wounded and three vehicles destroyed by bullets and grenades. The UN jeep was hit by bullets."

In all the remaining 16 out of the 19 incidents, UN Observers confirm that Indian positions and patrols were attacked, even though in most of them the verdict was qualified with the remark: "UN Observers confirmed that the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was presumed that they did." Such qualification of the verdict would appear to be inevitable because the investigations could take place quite some time after the event and therefore there was no way of authenticating an allegation made against the attackers who would have by then vanished from the scene, unless captured.

Some of the incidents catalogued in the Nimmo report are large-scale military operations. In the Poonch sector, for example, "a group of raiders attacked an Indian picket, 14 miles north-east of Poonch. In later attacks,

large groups of raiders occupied the town of Mandi and several pickets in the area. Indian troops recaptured Mandi on August 12 and continued their drive against the raiders.

"UN Observers confirmed most of the reported fighting. The number of raiders was estimated to exceed 1,000. The available evidence indicated that some of the raiders must have come across the CFL. As of August 24, the raiders were still holding some Indian pickets north of Mandi. The situation was still confused and UN Observers were unable to visit some of the areas concerned because of continuing hostilities and closed roads."

Since his report of August 30, Gen. Nimmo submitted a further report covering the incidents that occurred up to September 3. These are of special relevance here in that by now the Pakistanis seem to have given up all pretence and their army openly participated in the actions.

Thus on September 1, an Indian convoy was ambushed by an armed group in Gund, 24 miles on the Indian side of the CFL on the Srinagar-Leh Road. UN Observers confirmed the attack and saw for themselves the bodies of 8 attackers, one prisoner captured during the clash and a quantity of arms and equipment left by the attackers.

The prisoner informed the Observers that he was a member of the Karakorum Scouts (based in the Skardu sector on the Pakistan side) and that he and a number of other Scouts had been selected to destroy the bridge at Gund on the Srinagar-Leh Road. The Observers also noted that some of the arms and equipment abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

In contrast, at distant United Nations, we noticed a deliberate and consistent manœuvre, right through the proceedings of the Security Council (*a*) to keep in the

background, if not suppress, the blatant fact that it was Pakistan that was responsible for the present flare-up in Kashmir, and (*b*) to equate India with Pakistan and apportion blame equally between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and refuse to draw a distinction between the aggressor's offensive acts and the defender's reflex action thereto.

This concern to equate the aggressor with the victim of aggression was stretched to the outrageous extent of playing down the very relevant fact that India unconditionally accepted the cease-fire proposal of the UN Secretary-General and to give the impression that both parties were equally intransigent, whereas, in truth, it was Pakistan that imposed conditions that amounted to rejection of the proposal.

The Malaysian Representative, in his speech during the Security Council debate, was provoked to comment on the Secretary-General's statement that "both Governments have added to their replies to my request for an unconditional cease-fire, conditions and qualifications." Mr Ramani remarked: "It was only fair that there should have been some indication of the essential difference between the ready willingness of one (India) and the reluctant response of the other (Pakistan)."

With aggression by Pakistan clearly established through the horse's mouth, as it were, it is strange that the Security Council should fail to take cognizance of that fact in its discussions and resolutions.

The late unlamented League of Nations signed its death warrant when it condoned aggression in prosecution of "big power politics." Yet the United Nations seems to be following in the doomed footsteps of its predecessor.

For seventeen years India has looked up to the Security Council in vain for justice and fairplay on its straight

and simple plaint of Pakistan's aggression against Indian territory.

If the weak and the aggrieved among the nations of the world could not get justice at the UN, that international body would have failed in its sole function and purpose. It would be fatal for the United Nations, and the world as a whole, if people's faith in that international institution withered away.

The Twentytwo-Day War

Like a gambler who, in desperate rage, raises his bid and stakes his all in a last throw, President Ayub Khan now decided to fling his regular Army into the fray, regardless of consequences.

On September 1, 1965, the curtain went up on the main drama—the Twentytwo-Day War that shook the Indo-Pak sub-continent. Pakistan launched a mighty thrust that, if successful, might have, at one stroke, lopped off the State of Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India, militarily and politically.

It was a massive thrust, in brigade strength, supported by 90 tanks. It was proudly named "Operation Grand Slam." It was intended to be a *blitzkrieg*, charged with a twin task.

In the first swoop, it was to capture the strategic town of Akhnoor, on the Chenab, and cut the road passing through it, from Jammu to Rajaori and to Poonch, thereby bottling up Indian forces in the western region of the State.

In the second swoop, the column was to take Jammu

city and get astride the Jammu-Srinagar highway and isolate the Indian forces north of the Banihal Pass.

It was a well-thought-out plan, much rehearsed on the drawing board and pronounced foolproof. Indeed, the Pakistanis were so cocksure of their success that they brought along with them in their drive to Chhamb a batch of foreign correspondents.

If it had worked, Pakistan might have at last attained its life-long ambition, and Ayub would have gone down in that country's history as the greatest Pakistani ever born, superseding even the great Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah.

The coming event had cast its shadow many days before. For the preceding fortnight, the chosen target area, the Chhamb region, had been subjected to probes from across the Cease-fire Line as well as the international border.

On August 14, regular Pakistani forces crossed the CFL in battalion strength (1,000 men) and attacked our positions. The twin object here was to test the Indian strength in the area as also to relieve the pressure faced by a group of infiltrators who were being hotly chased by our security forces. After fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the intruders were thrown back across the CFL. Sixty Pakistani Army personnel died in the action.

On August 16, the Pakistanis kept up mortar, machine-gun and medium gun fire on Indian posts all along the CFL, and it was particularly heavy in the Chhamb sector. The fire was duly returned by our security forces.

The next day, heavy movement of Pakistani troops was noticed across the CFL. The Pakistan Army had brought up its field regiments. The Chhamb sector now faced continuous and concentrated fire from across the CFL for 48 hours. After a brief respite, the firing was resumed on August 18.

Further north, in the Mendhar sector, on August 22,



▲ *Not a Bhangra Dance!*: Pakistani guerilla infiltrators being rounded up by our Jawans from a hut in a village in Jammu.

Roadside Hospitality: Girls of Patti, near Amritsar, stop passing army vehicles and offer cold drinks to the Jawans. ►




Reeling, Rolling Road to Leh: An army convoy with supplies zig-zagging its way through the Hangroo Loops along the Srinagar-Leh highway. ▼





▲ *Pill Turns Bitter*: A Pakistani pill box, with an Indian Jawan standing guard on its roof, following the capture of Burki village, on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal, in the Kalra sector.




◀ *Kheema at Khem Karan*: Brig. T. K. Theograj, who commanded the Armoured Brigade that made "Kheema" of Pak Pattons in the Battle of Assal Uttar, in the Khem Karan sector. The tempo got so hot that as the battle reached climax Brig. Theograj's order to his "tankis" was reduced to one word: "MARO."

▼ *The Smiling General*: Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri, exchanging a joke with the Jawans during a visit to the Khem Karan sector.





Air Chief in Overalls: Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, chats with air crew at Halwara air base.




The Bridge That Was: Jawans wistfully looking across Ichhogil Canal at the site of a bridge blown up by Pakistanis during their retreat.

"Patton Nagar": The "Patton Cemetery" at Bhikiwind, near Amritsar, where some 60 captured Pattons, Chaffes and Shermans are parked, is a standing memorial to Pakistan's defeat in the Battle of Assal Uttar.




The Tricolour Flutters Now: The Jawans triumphantly hoisted the Indian Tricolour over Haji Pir Pass, on capturing that supposedly impregnable key pass, through which Pakistan sent hundreds of infiltrators into Kashmir.





Ack-Ack Got Him: Wreckage of a Pakistani B-57 Bomber on view at Halwara air base.

A Tell-Tale Exhibition: Arms and ammunition captured from the Pakistani raiders, on display.



regular Pak troops intruded across the CFL and attacked our posts, using in support artillery, light machine-gun and mortar fire. Heavy fire from Indian security forces broke up the attack.

Gen. Nimmo's report to the UN Secretary-General records an Indian complaint on August 14 that "armed elements from the Pakistan side allegedly crossed the CFL in the Chhamb area and penetrated up to one mile on the Indian side of the Line. Indian positions along the CFL were subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Pakistan side on August 15-16. The attacking forces captured nine Indian positions on August 16-17 (subsequently retaken by Indian forces)."

The Nimmo report remarks: "UN Observers confirmed the shelling of Indian positions and considerable fighting in the area. . . . The Observers were unable to investigate most of the alleged attacks on the spot because of continuing hostilities."

Thus Pakistan was preparing the ground for its "Operation Grand Slam." Indeed, the preparation was so elaborate and open that the UN Military Observer in the region had even warned the Indian authorities about the movement of Pakistani infantry and armoured units from Sialkot to the Bhimber sector, on the other side of the CFL, in south-west Jammu.

At 4 A.M. on September 1, the Pakistani artillery opened up in a big way on the Chhamb sector. It was more intense this morning than ever before. Simultaneously, by way of deception, the Pakistanis shelled the Jhangar area, north of Naushera, with 25-pounders and 81 mm mortars.

This "softening up" process went on for an hour. Then the Pakistani infantry launched a probing attack on Burejal, near Chhamb, from the village of Tahu, in

Gujarat district, in West Pakistan, across the international border. The attack was beaten back by the defenders.

The Pakistanis put in a second attack, this time from the village Melu, again across the international border. This too was repulsed. A third attack, launched from yet another point was also thrown back.

Following these three preliminary probing skirmishes, Pakistan mounted its main massive offensive. It comprised an infantry brigade and two tank regiments of Pattons. The attacking force came simultaneously across the international border and the Cease-fire Line from Bhimber, with Dewa as its immediate objective.

Once again here, as in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan had chosen a terrain favourable for herself—the only point along the entire 470-mile Cease-fire Line which was "tankable." Besides, as the Indian Army Chief, Gen. Chaudhuri, explained to a press conference on September 23, the Indian forces in the Chhamb-Akhnoor area suffered from certain other handicaps.

Answering the criticism why India did not have heavy tanks in this sector, Gen. Chaudhuri said: "Firstly, India did not have as many tanks as the Pakistanis. Secondly, under the Cease-fire Agreement, India could keep only a limited number of troops in Jammu and Kashmir. For Pakistan it was easy to bring in their tanks and troops from their nearby cantonments in Sialkot, Kharian and Gujarat, whereas Indian bases were far away in India."

But it would not be correct to say that the Pakistani thrust in Chhamb came as a surprise to the Indian Army. Indeed, the UN Observer in the area had himself warned us. The utmost that could be said in extenuation was that the Indian forces in the area did not expect that the Pakistani attack that ultimately came would be that massive.

It is however also true that the defenders were over-

whelmed both by numbers and armour. A single infantry brigade, without the backing of heavy tanks, and besides charged with the guarding of a lengthy and tenuous l of c, was up against an enemy four times its size supported by the heaviest tanks in the world.

By the sheer weight of Pakistani column's armour and numerical strength, the Indian defenders were pushed back, in stages, to the Munnawar Tawi. Thus a grave situation was developing.

Round about 4.30 P.M. Gen. Chaudhuri came to the conclusion that air support was imperative to our thin line of defence against the Pakistani massive thrust, if its progress towards Akhnoor and Jammu town were to be halted.

The conclusion was immediately conveyed to the Minister of Defence, who entirely agreed with his Army Chief. The issue was placed before the Prime Minister, and the demand was approved.

The following was the time-schedule of the fateful decision and its implementation:

5.10 P.M.—The Defence Minister conveyed the decision to the Air Chief, Air Marshal Arjan Singh.

5.20 P.M.—The order went out of the Air HQ in New Delhi.

5.45 P.M.—IAF fighter aircraft in the air.

6 P.M.—The first sortie launched.

That evening, the IAF Vampires and Mysteres carried out 28 sorties in seven missions (no Gnats or Hunters were used on the first day).

The IAF lost four Vampires that evening in action. But the enemy drive, which had by now got to some six miles inside Indian territory, had been staggered. The

enemy was taken completely by surprise. He did not at all expect India would introduce her air force in the fighting.

Before the hectic day closed, the IAF fighters had knocked out 13 tanks and five others were hit by ground fire. Eleven of them were actually seen burning. In addition, 30 to 40 heavy vehicles of the enemy were also destroyed.

The air-cum-ground battle continued at the same intensity for the next five days. On September 3, the PAF brought into battle its Sabrejets, and in response, the IAF sent out the Gnats for the first time. And the IAF almost immediately drew blood and got measure of the much-bruited American supersonic Sabrejet. The IAF shot down its first Sabrejet. The honour went to Squadron-leader Trevor Keelor. The next day, Flight-lieutenant Virendra Singh Pathania shot down another Sabrejet in a dramatic air battle over Akhnoor.

After this, the IAF's tail was up. The small highly manœuvrable, Indian-made Gnat got on top of the legendary American fighter plane. Keelor blew up the Pakistani F-86 Sabrejet in mid-air in an air battle over Chhamb. But the thrilling story deserves to be told in Keelor's own words:

> We decided we should have an offensive-defensive formation. When we went into the area we flew at a very low level and we immediately eased up so that their radar would pick us up. They did, and they came. That was the whole idea. . . .
>
> We carried out some tactical manoeuvre. Sure enough it foxed them. One came right up on my side eventually. He was sandwiched between the lead formation and my formation at the rear. We shot it out of the sky.

He had (I could see as I was closing in on him) two Sidewinder missiles on and I was a little out of range at that time; so I just moved my throttle forward—we have a wonderful acceleration—and closed in very quickly.

I sighted on him and in my very first burst the right side of his aircraft just disintegrated and he went flicking over his back, absolutely out of control and that is the way he went down.

Flt.-Lt. Pathania who, also flying a Gnat, shot another Sabrejet the next day, gave this exhilarating account of his encounter:

Now this particular Sabre headed towards Akhnoor, and I started to chase him. We were really down to about a hundred feet, and just over Akhnoor, when I was within firing range—that is, about sixhundred yards—I gave him the first burst. After the first burst, I saw that the enemy aircraft had started smoking.

Thick smoke was coming out, but it was still pressing on, so I closed in further, by about a hundred yards, and at about fivehundred yards I gave him another burst. This time I saw bits and pieces flying from the enemy aircraft.

But the aircraft did not explode. So I pressed on, and gave a third burst at about fourhundred yards, and this time the enemy aircraft started emitting black smoke.

And finally, when I found that my guns had stopped, I peeled off the aircraft and had a good look, and found that there was no canopy left in the aircraft, and I could not see any pilot inside the cockpit.

But the enemy advance had been only staggered; not

halted. On September 5, the Pak forces captured Jaurian and were pressing towards Akhnoor. And the Pakistani Commander-in-Chief, General Mahomed Musa, sent his notorious congratulatory message to his troops in which he exhorted them: "You have got your teeth in him. Bite deeper and deeper till he is destroyed."

The Pakistani armoured thrust now got within six miles of Akhnoor. In the meantime, certain significant developments occurred.

On September 2, UN Secretary-General, U Thant, appealed to India and Pakistan for a cease-fire as from September 4, but Pakistan would not look at it. India was prepared to accept it provided Pakistan withdrew from Chhamb.

On September 3, U Thant made to the Security Council the long-awaited report in which he said Pakistan had refused to give "any assurance that the cease-fire line would be respected henceforth."

On September 4, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi arrived in Karachi and conferred with Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for six hours, and issued a statement supporting the "just action taken by Pakistan to repel the Indian armed provocation."

On September 5, a PAF Sabrejet attacked anti-aircraft installations near Amritsar, thus escalating the war further, to a new front.

This sequence of events was enough to make up New Delhi's mind. The Army HQ in New Delhi now decided that serious diversionary moves directed at Pakistani territory itself was the only remedy for the dangerous military situation developing around Akhnoor.

An attack in the Sialkot sector would appear to have been the immediate answer. But events were moving so fast that Lt.-Gen. P. O. Dunn's Corps, just ordered to

Jammu, whose task it would have been, was still in the process of formation.

Lt.-Gen. Joginder Singh Dhillon's Corps, further south in the Punjab, was however in position, and undertook to launch immediately, on September 6, a three-pronged drive on the Lahore sector.

In the meantime, I Corps accomplished a feat of organization, logistics and transportation, by assembling its allotted formations in just about 72 hours, and on September 7 night mounted a two-prong attack on the Sialkot front.

This double move on the Lahore and Sialkot sectors had the desired effect on the Pakistani thrust in the Chhamb-Akhnoor sector. The Pak 7th Infantry Division and a Para Brigade were switched from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to meet the new Indian threat.

Now the spotlight moved away from the Akhnoor area in Jammu to the Lahore and Sialkot sectors, where epic battles were being fought. With that the fighting in the Akhnoor sector went static.

Pakistan would appear to have blundered in packing over 90 tanks plus scores of heavy vehicles and equipment on wheels in a five-mile wedge—one reason why Indian air and ground forces took such a heavy toll of their armour.

A fleet of 40 tractors had now been put into the field by the Pakistan Army whose task was to evacuate the scores of Pattons and Shermans destroyed and disabled by air and ground action by the Indian forces.

* * *

For a long time to come, Indians—and students of the Twentytwo-Day War between India and Pakistan—would persist in asking the question: If only the UN

Secretariat had promptly released Gen. Nimmo's Reports to the Secretary-General (instead of holding them up till September 3), would Ayub have dared to escalate the fighting in the manner he did in the Chhamb sector on September 1?

For, the Nimmo Reports supplied direct evidence that proved that it was Pakistan that had engineered the massive invasion of Kashmir by guerillas, whom she had armed and trained, and it was Pakistan that had committed 19 out of the 23 violations of the Cease-fire Line during the month of August 1965.

Ayub's sole alibi for launching an even more blatant act of aggression against Indian territory was: "India has embarked on a course of aggression across the Cease-fire Line in the last few months. . . . These blatant acts of aggression cannot and shall not be allowed to go unchallenged."

In notifying to the United Nations Military Observers Group its act of aggression against India in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistan Army Command pleaded that its troops had crossed the CFL on September 1 "to forestall Indian action in the area."

An official spokesman in Pindi insisted: "The situation has been forced upon Pakistan by the continued Indian aggression," and "that the action was aimed at forestalling any further aggressive moves by India." He described the situation as grave but insisted that "its responsibility squarely lies on India, which had been committing aggression across the Cease-fire Line during the past few months." He then declared, "the world was fully aware of the wanton aggression committed by India in utter violation of the sanctity of the Cease-fire Line, assured by various agreements involving even the highest world forum."

The Nimmo Reports showed who repeatedly violated

the "sanctity of the Cease-fire Line, assured by various agreements involving even the highest world forum."

If the Security Council and the world—and Ayub—had known what the Nimmo Reports had stated about Pakistan's blatant violations of the CFL and direct involvement in the "Operation Infiltration" into Kashmir, the Pakistani President's style of his September 1 broadcast to the nation might have been somewhat cramped. Nay, thus exposed, he might have even been deterred from launching on the war.

INITIATIVE SNATCHED

The Indian Army this morning entered West Pakistan in a three-pronged offensive along a thirty-mile front in the Lahore sector: Defence Minister Yeshwantrao Chavan made this dramatic announcement to a packed Lok Sabha on September 6.

The House greeted the announcement with a loud applause. A section of the Western Press mistakenly construed the applause as an expression of a naïve chauvinism. The applause, on the other hand, expressed the people's sense of relief that their Government had, at last, given up what they considered a policy of "offering the other cheek" and had stood up to Pakistani bullying.

It was a nation that had, for eighteen long years, with increasing impatience, put up with Pakistani insolence, venomous propaganda and pin-pricks along the border. It was the nation that had, further, been called upon to swallow the humiliation heaped upon it by China in 1962. The Kutch incidents, earlier in 1965, had rubbed that humiliation deeper into our skin. It was a nation nursing this complex that now applauded their Government for turning a new leaf, at last, and seizing the initiative.

The entire operation across the Punjab border got to a smooth, efficient start. The three simultaneous thrusts were launched from (*a*) the Wagah border, along the Grand Trunk Road; (*b*) on the Khalra-Burki axis, and (*c*) along the Khem Karan-Kasur axis. All headed for the 47-mile-long Ichhogil Canal, the formidable moat that guarded and defended the city of Lahore.

To all the three divisions that marched forward, the task assigned was (*a*) to get to the east bank of Ichhogil Canal speedily, (*b*) to forestall the Pakistani threat of invasion of India, and (*c*) to blunt the edge of the much-vaunted Pakistani war machine.

In other words, the aim was to dash forward and convert Pakistan's great defence ditch, Ichhogil Canal, into our own defence line—as, indeed, that could also be our defence line if we could get command of it.

This canal built in the last seven years (towards which India had made a financial contribution) is 140 ft. wide and 15 ft. deep and deliberately constructed as a major defence moat and anti-tank obstacle facing the open Indian border, three miles at its closest and nine miles at its widest. Both banks of the canal bristle with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun emplacements.

As India's Defence Minister made it clear from the outset, the capture of Lahore was never the Indian Army's objective in the operation. It was not contemplated, firstly, because, if captured, Lahore would have proved a heavy liability, both militarily and politically, sucking up a considerable proportion of our troops badly needed elsewhere; secondly, the Indian Army, then still going through the process of reorganization and therefore in a state of flux, was not prepared for a task of that magnitude, physically and psychologically.

If territorial conquest was our objective, we would have needed an infinitely larger force than the six and a

half divisions we had at our disposal as against the six divisions the Pakistanis had arrayed against them. Thus, incidentally, the comment of the Western Press that the Indo-Pak fighting was a "war between quality (Pakistan's) and quantity (India's)" was incorrect.

The same night, that is September 6, Ayub tried another trick. Some 500 paratroopers drawn from Pakistan's commando unit known as the "Special Service Group," were dropped in sticks of 60-70 near the forward Indian air bases of Pathankot, Adampur (Jullunder), Halwara (Ludhiana) and Ambala. They were armed with machine-guns, automatic guns with telescopic sights and sabotage implements.

But once again a Pakistani trick went awry. The paratroopers were dropped too far away from targets and too late, so that they arrived at their rendezvous out of schedule when it was getting light and were found out before they could do any damage. The majority of them were captured on the very first day, and the rest rounded up in the next few days. Hardly any damage was done by them to our air bases.

The Indian Infantry Division, heading for Ichhogil Canal, along the Khalra-Burki-Lahore axis, overnight flexed its muscles and prepared the ground for the main operation by eliminating two enemy strong points, Theh Sarja Marja and Rakh Hardit Singh. The main attack however began at 5.30 A.M. the next day, September 6.

Our forces' swift advance indicated that they achieved complete tactical surprise. The Ghawindi barrier was crossed on schedule. The first major opposition was expected at Hudiara Drain, halfway between the border and Ichhogil Canal. The Indian forces reached the Hudiara Drain at 7 A.M., and were greeted by heavy artillery fire.

By 10 A.M., the Hudiara village was captured by the Indians. The idea now was to get behind the well-defended Hudiara Drain. By 5 P.M., the nearby village Nurpur was taken. When the enemy noticed that we had got behind him, he blew up the bridge across the 140 ft. wide Hudiara Drain and retreated. After this battle, the Pakistanis withdrew their armour to the other side of Ichhogil Canal.

On September 7 morning, the Indian forces struck in the direction of Burki. By 2.30 P.M. that day, our engineers had flung a Bailey bridge across the Hudiara Drain, and by dusk our forces were in Barkha Kalan. All of September 8 was taken up with cleaning up the area of enemy snipers and stragglers.

On September 9, the attack was mounted on the well-defended Burki village, situated on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal. Eleven solid, cement-concrete pill-boxes, placed at a thousand yards interval, guarded the approaches to the village. These pill-boxes were well camouflaged to look like village mud huts. Each pill-box was 15 feet square, with 3 ft. thick walls and roof made of reinforced cement concrete, and 6 ft. inside height and 5 ft. outside height (above ground).

Three of the four walls had each a steel-shuttered aperture for guns, while the fourth side had the entrance door. Each pill-box was manned by three men, one handled a machine-gun, another a Bren-gun, and the third an automatic rifle, and was stocked with 20,000 to 30,000 rounds of ammunition. The pill-boxes were so sited that they covered the gaps between them by effective cross-fire.

Phase one of the Burki operation comprised the capture of Burki village by one battalion, and phase two aimed at securing lodgement by another battalion on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal.

The battle of Burki began at 8 P.M. The enemy fought for every inch of ground. Both sides used tanks, even though it was night time. In addition, the Pakistanis put across one of the heaviest artillery barrages ever experienced by an advancing force. They fired 120 mm mortars, 8 inch guns, 105 and 150 mm guns as well as radar-equipped super-heavy guns. Some 2,500 shells rained over our men in the course of 45 minutes. By 9.30 P.M. the village of Burki was wrested from the Pakistanis. In order to do that, our Jawans had to silence each one of the eleven pill-boxes. And how they did it is a saga of personal heroism.

A Jawan would crawl along the ground towards the wall of a pill-box, avoiding the trajectory of its guns, then climb up the five-foot wall on to its roof and lob into the pill-box hand-grenades through the open door in its back side.

Thus Subedar Gurdev Singh clambered to the roof of a pill-box, bent over and shoved a few grenades into the door in its back and after a while, in chastest Punjabi, shouted into the door: "Hey, you! Pick up your mother on your head and come out." The next moment, a soldier emerged out of the pill-box, with his machine-gun on his head!

At another pill-box, Havildar Aya Singh, in equally forceful Punjabi, called out: "Those inside, you b's, bloody well get out!" A Pakistani havildar crept out crying: "Please don't kill me. I will give you very good information."

A Pakistani soldier's body was found lying in a rifle trench all evening and then the next morning too. Thereupon an Indian officer shouted to his men to bury the body. The "body" suddenly sprang to life and begged to be spared and pleaded for some food!

When finally Pak army defenders had been pushed out of the Burki village, they left behind villagers armed with light machine-guns who sniped at our Jawans from hidden positions up trees or behind bushes. Cleaning up the village was thus quite an operation. Four truckloads of dead bodies were taken away by the Pakistanis from the village.

To the 4th Sikh Battalion, commanded by Lt.-Col. Anant Singh, should go the honour of capturing Burki village. Later, in another operation, in a night attack, the battalion ran into an ambush, and Lt.-Col. Anant Singh and 129 of his men were captured and taken prisoner by Pakistan.

While the first battalion was fighting its way into Burki village, the second battalion was pushing up to the east bank of Ichhogil Canal. By 11.30 P.M., they were in undisputed possession of the east bank sector of the canal. As though in sheer impotent rage, the Pakistanis thereupon opened up on the Indians some of the intensest fire ever experienced—in half an hour they fired 1,800 to 2,000 rounds.

Having attained its objective by September 10, thereafter, this Division kept itself busy consolidating its positions and patrolling, till cease-fire came on September 23. It had under its control 150 square miles of Pakistani territory, the largest chunk in this sector.

Further north, in the Wagah sector, another Indian Division, driving along the Grand Trunk Road, was moving so fast that by 10-30 A.M., one of its battalions found itself on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal, and then it crossed the canal to the other side and reached the Bata factory in the outskirts of Lahore.

But the column had got too far out, completely isolated from its supporting armour. Thus caught in the enemy's "home ground," fired upon from all sides and attacked

from the air, the column suffered heavy losses and fell back to the east bank of the canal. Thereupon the Pakistanis blew up the bridge behind them. In the meantime, PAF fighters strafed our armour and vehicles moving up the Grand Trunk Road to catch up with our infantry.

Simultaneously, another column, of battalion strength, had moved in the direction of Lokoke, from where it pushed to Raina, then to Bhaini and to Dhilawin and captured the bridge there. Powerful enemy counter-attacks however pushed this column all the way back to Raina.

Thereafter, until the cease-fire, the battle swayed between Ichhogil Canal and the border. Meanwhile, the key village of Dograi, on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal, in this sector, exchanged hands at least thrice, before it was finally captured by us on the night of September 22, a few hours before the cease-fire.

In a determined counter-offensive, that opened on September 7, the Pakistanis put in their Pattons, Chaffes and Shermans, and their powerful American-gifted artillery thundered. The counter-offensive rose in intensity on September 8, 9 and 10, and then tapered off to spend itself out by September 11. On September 12 the Indians counter-attacked. Our artillery played havoc with the enemy positions. By now the enemy's back had been broken.

In these battles both sides used tanks in the night, which is normally never done, as tanks are blind at night and must be rushed to "harbour" by dusk.

The final battle for Dograi started at midnight on September 21 and lasted six hours. The village was strongly defended by three companies of 16th Punjabs, one company of 8th Punjabs and a battalion of 12th Frontier Force.

The Indians went into the attack with one company engaging the enemy frontally, and another doing a flanking movement, with a 6,000 yards detour north of the village. The latter column reached the canal bank and then moved down to attack Dograi from the rear.

That so completely surprised and demoralized the Pakistani defenders that they abandoned their arms and equipment and fled across the canal, blowing up the bridge behind them. They left behind 305 men killed including two captains, and 105 prisoners.

In this memorable battle, Major A. R. Tyagi won the second highest military decoration, Maha Vir Chakra. Major Tyagi led the assault on Dograi.

"In the engagement, he received two gunshot wounds but despite that, he led his men in one of the fiercest hand-to-hand battles of this war," says the citation. "He personally captured two enemy tanks intact by destroying their crew with hand-grenades and killed a Pakistani major. Before the battle was over, Major Tyagi had received five bullet wounds. The valiant hero of Dograi died four days after the battle in a military hospital."

In this battle a Pakistani battery commander, Col. Tashim Baig and another officer Col. G. F. Golewalla were found hiding under a Patton tank and the latter on being discovered immediately shouted: "I am a Parsi."

The Wagah sector perhaps saw the fiercest fighting of the entire Lahore front. The Indian Division in this sector inflicted maximum casualties on the enemy. Thirty-three per cent (108, including five officers) of the total number of prisoners on the entire front were captured by this division. It also captured 21 tanks, one squadron of which it put to use.

On September 22, during the battle of Dograi (when

39 of the enemy were killed and seven tanks destroyed), the Pakistanis continuously fired their artillery for 20 hours—indeed, as the Divisional Commander commented, if the fighting had continued another four days, the Pakistanis would have run out of their ammunition.

He computed that the Pakistanis had expended seven months' ration of ammunition in 22 days, since they were firing their artillery on an average four to five hours a day and the accepted standard War Wastage Rate is 18 rounds per day per gun.

Even though the enemy possessed a surfeit of tanks in this sector, for some strange reason, they persisted in small-scale attacks—each attack came in a troop (3 tanks), —in penny-packets—which neutralized their advantage of numbers.

The Pakistani air attacks were as intense and prodigal as their artillery. On one day the PAF carried out forty sorties against this Indian Division—and our men shot three of their aircraft with small arms fire. Their target was our guns, which were performing to deadly effect.

Further north, at Dera Baba Nanak, on September 6 morning, an independent brigade was across the border and the Dera Baba Nanak bridge in no time. But by the evening, the Pakistanis took back possession of the bridge. The DBN bridge exchanged hands once again the next day. Then, on the third day, under the inspiring leadership of Col. Chajju Ram, our Jawans finally recaptured the bridge. But the retreating Pakistanis blew up a span of it.

The blowing up of the bridge at Dera Baba Nanak prevented our Army from pushing towards Narowal and Pasrur, and thus sitting astride the rail and road communication link between Lahore and Sialkot. But it also plugged a projected ambitious Pakistani armoured thrust

to Gurdaspur and thence to Pathankot, our key railhead for Jammu and Kashmir.

Now that the bridge was down, no Pakistani armour could cross into India from that direction. That relieved us of one anxiety. Thereupon, a regiment of our armour keeping vigil north of Amritsar against such an eventuality, was promptly switched to the Khem Karan sector where it was badly needed by our forces, then under heavy pressure from the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division.

In the far south, in Sulemanki, Pakistan took the offensive. Their objective was Fazilka. On September 6, they came across the border in brigade strength and attacked Pukka for three consecutive days. But our defending forces successfully contained the attack. After the cease-fire, on September 23, however, the Pakistani forces encroached three miles into our territory in this sector.

THE "ASSAL UTTAR"

The *pièce de résistance* in the second act of the drama that shook the Indo-Pak continent was, however, enacted in the Khem Karan sector by an Indian Division.

After an unlucky start on September 6, this Division went on to fight and win, ably assisted by an Indian Armoured Brigade, the most decisive battle of the Twentytwo-Day War. That was the battle that crippled the pride of the Pakistan Army, its 1st Armoured Division, equipped with the powerful, legendary Patton tanks. The battle, significantly enough, was fought at a village called "Assal Uttar," which means in Hindi and Punjabi "the genuine answer."

Pakistan had concentrated in this sector its strongest force, with great expectations and big plans. They had here four regiments of Pattons, one regiment of Chaffes, besides one infantry division, Pak 1st Infantry Division.

The Fourth Indian Division went into the fray on schedule at 5 A.M. on September 6. Its first objectives were the capture of (1) the Joint Check-post, just across

the border; (2) Ruhiwal, (3) the Bund Junction, (4) Theh Pannunam, and (5) Ballianwalla.

The Indian forces succeeded in taking the first four objectives by 11.30 A.M., but at Ballianwalla, the enemy held out successfully. Then at about 2.30 P.M., the Pakistanis got their armour through at Pattukunha and cut across between the Joint Check-post and Ruhiwal, and by 4 P.M. retook Ruhiwal as well as the Bund Junction.

Throughout that night, the powerful Pakistani artillery kept up a deafening cacophony. The next morning the Pakistani Pattons converged on the Indian positions in two columns from either side. By September 7, under the heavy pressure of Pak armour, the Indian forces retreated until they fell back to Khem Karan, the point from where they started.

From that point onwards however the Indian forces' withdrawal was a deliberate tactical retreat, with the Pakistanis in hot pursuit under the illusion that the Indians were in flight.

On September 8 evening, the Indian "master plan" was hatched to trap Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division to annihilation. The idea was to entice the Pakistan's "apple of the eye" to Chima and Assal Uttar, where they could be got into a narrow wedge, with the Nikusa Nala on the south and the Rohi Nala on the northern flank.

Our forces dug themselves in at Valtoha and let loose the water from the canal in the south-east in the Valtoha gap.

On September 8 morning, the enemy came with two squadrons of Chaffes and one of Pattons on a rekkee-in-force (15 tanks) when he hit against our infantry positions on the main road. The rekkee-in-force went back after a clash.

That night the enemy returned with a whole combat

group (one Patton regiment and two squadrons of Chaffes). It was a critical night, as he had brought armour in force and the defenders could not use tanks—with their infra-red eyes, the Pattons could, but not our Shermans, which were "blind" at night. But the Indian artillery stepped into the breach and did a grand job.

On September 9, an Indian Armoured Brigade was rushed to the scene and straightaway committed. It actually arrived by 9 that morning, and three squadrons were immediately disposed—a squadron each on either flank of the gunners, and the third positioned on the Rohi Nala. In addition, other tanks took up three positions on the Khem Karan-Bhikiwind road. The entire battle plan formed into a horse-shoe, into which the enemy was to be enticed and "made a meal of."


That day the Pakistanis launched yet another—the third—attack on our infantry position, which too was flung back. On September 10, the enemy came up in full force, with his infantry rolling up immediately behind a phalanx of armour.

The main battle was joined at 8.30 A.M. Having failed to pierce our infantry position, the enemy armour tried a flanking movement, a sort of left hook, with a view to getting behind the infantry position.

There lying in wait, further behind, almost concealed in tall standing sugarcane crop, was a squadron of Centurions. The moment the line of Pattons turned and exposed their broadside, the Centurions opened up and threw the enemy into confusion. Here it was that we captured 15 Pak tanks intact, with their engines running and crew jumping out to surrender.

The enemy made a second, this time, a wider flanking movement to get at our gun positions which had played havoc into them, and then ran into the jaws of another

BATTLE OF ASSAL UTTAR



line of our Centurions, poised for a scrap still further in the flank.

Pakistan's 5th Armoured Brigade led the attack. When it was beaten back mauled, Pak 4th Armoured Brigade took its place. Bogged down on its left flank by the flooding waters from the cut nala, and harassed by our infantry, artillery and armour, the enemy was like an animal turned to bay. Brigadier Theograj, commanding the Indian tanks, now had just one word of order for his men: "Maro."

At 11.30 A.M., at the height of the battle, the GOC, Pak 1st Armoured Division, Major-General Nasir Ahmed Khan, issued over the field wireless the following memorable order to his forward commander:

> "From Imam to Imam Baaz: In the name of Islam and Pakistan, push forward. Get through the b——s."

The forward commander in reply pleaded: "Just can't, sir. Indian tanks all round."

The "Imam" thereupon impatiently ordered: "If you can't go forward, come back."

The "Imam Baaz" now replied: "Sorry, sir. Can't do that either. Indian tanks behind too."

The "Imam" then shouted: "All right. You stay put. I am coming forward."

All this time, one of our artillery observation posts was listening in to the strange dialogue over the wireless, and from that moment, our artillery was on the watch-out for the "Imam's" tank.

The OP at last detected at the 38-mile stone what looked like the "Imam's" tank. They let it come down to the 36-mile stone, at Chima village, and then opened up. The next moment the Patton lay "dead," with the VIP inside dead too.

The next signal our OP intercepted was a frantic message from the Pakistanis which announced: "*Hamara subse bada Imam mar gaye.*"

It was in this battle that Company Quarter-Master, Havildar Abdul Hamid, of the Grenadiers, won the greatest Indian military decoration, the first Param Vir Chakra of the war. Hamid was in a jeep mounted with a recoilless gun when he stumbled upon a group of four Pattons, in a sugarcane field, heading towards his Company. He immediately took cover behind a mound and shot at point blank range a series of three tanks, one after the other, and then disabled a fourth, when he was himself shot up.

He fired from such close range that the first tank he hit, immediately burst into flames. The enemy could not spot him and the second enemy tank swivelled its guns frantically. This tank was also knocked out by another burst from Abdul Hamid's gun.

Then the intrepid Havildar hit and severely damaged the third tank. As he was aiming at the fourth, he was spotted, and a shell from the tank's 90 mm gun blew him to bits.

"In an action in which his light detachment of recoilless guns was pitted against several of the supposedly invulnerable Patton tanks, he achieved the impossible," read the citation.

Having to fight in sugarcane and maize fields and peer through a 9 ft. high, thick, ripening standing crop, the Pattons' visibility was reduced to a thousand yards, which is a Centurion's range, and thus it lost its extra advantage. Then again, quite a few of the heavy Pattons got bogged down into the submerged soft soil following the letting out of the water from the Rohi Nala by our forces.

This epic battle, which began on September 8 and

ended on September 10, comprised a series of six engagements, with which the Pakistanis were seeking a breakthrough. On the last day was fought the clincher and the fiercest of the series, when Pakistan's 4th Cavalry (50 tanks) was trapped and completely annihilated and the rest of the armoured division badly mauled.

In the entire series, the Pakistanis lost 97 tanks counted as destroyed, disabled and captured. The Pakistani Armoured Division Commander and Artillery Commander, Brigadier A. R. Shamin were killed, and Lt.-Col. Mohamad Nasir captured.

The Pakistanis had come into battle with four regiments of Pattons, one regiment of Chaffes and one division of infantry (1st Pak Infantry Division).

In this battle the Centurions proved that in a defensive role they were more than a match to the Pattons.

After this battle, the enemy was steadily pushed back until he fell back on Khem Karan, right on the border but on our side. There he dug in, so that at cease-fire, on September 23, he was still there, occupying a strip of our territory ten miles long and three miles deep.

* * *

This victory has a double significance. First, in this battle, the pride of Pakistan's Army, 1st Armoured Division, entirely American-equipped and trained, was almost crippled. Apart from the psychological impact of the reverse on Pakistan, the exploding of the myth of the Patton tank's impregnability must have proved yet another disillusionment to the Pakistani Army.

The Patton tank, believed to be the last word on armour, is a frontline weapon, weighing 44 tons. Its main gun is of 90 mm calibre, with a range of 2,000 yards. In

addition, it carries one browning machine-gun of .30 calibre and one of .50 calibre mounted on the turret for anti-aircraft role.

Although some later models have been developed, Pakistan has standard M-47 and M-48 types. Both have infra-red "eyes" to see at night, and are equipped with automatic gears, giving the driver great mobility. The maximum speed of the tank is 40 miles an hour. The Pattons have elaborate systems of computerized ranging and fire control.

In addition, the Pakistanis had the Chaffes and the Shermans for medium and light armour.

In contrast, our armour comprising Centurions (heavy tank) and Shermans belonged to the Second World War vintage, and light AMX-13s. As against the Patton's range of 2,000 yards, our Centurion's maximum reach was 1,000 yards.


Similarly, whereas the Pakistani American-gifted artillery had a range of 25,000 yards, that of our guns was just about 18,000 yards.

Secondly, this pivotal victory in the Khem Karan sector aborted a Pakistani "master plan" to blitzkrieg its way to Beas and cut off our defence forces west of Beas from the rest of India. If it had succeeded, east of that point, up to Delhi, the Grand Trunk Road lay open, practically undefended, with all our forces on the other side of Beas —thus bringing within an ace of realization Ayub's dream of "strolling up" to Delhi!

A copy of the battle order of this "master plan," captured from a Pakistani officer prisoner, revealed that Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division, with its base at Kasur and Khem Karan, was to embark, on September 8, on a three-pronged drive north-eastwards, with three points along the Grand Trunk Road as their respective objectives. (See map and Appendix 11.)

PAK PLAN

MAPS:- PUNJAB SHEETS 44I, 44J, 44M AND 44N



A diagram of Pakistan's "Master Plan" of a massive three-prong drive to Beas which was to be launched from Kasur on September 8, designed to cut off our army poised for action on the Punjab border from the rest of India.

The Pak battle order, phased the operation as follows:

First phase: 1st Armoured Division to move from its location in the Raiwind-Changha Mangha harbour area to Kasur.

Second phase: A thrust via Chima and Dibbipura, along the Kasur Branch Canal, to Jandiala Guru, by the 3rd Armoured Group; and a drive along the Khem Karan-Bhikiwind-Amritsar road by 12 Cavalry.

Third phase: A drive along the Sobraon Branch Canal, via Nabipur and Fatehabad, to Beas, by the 4th Armoured Group, entrusted with the main task to blow up the bridges there.

Under the Plan, by 1430 hours, on September 8, the invaders were to be in Harike, and reach Beas on September 9 evening. The plan sought advantage of the topography of the land in Punjab, where a myriad canals, rivers and nalas all run from north-east to south-west. The invading forces were to follow the contours of these waterways, driving up from south-west to north-east, to the Grand Trunk Road, instead of having to negotiate so many river crossings.

But like the other diabolical plots of Pakistan against India, this too went agley.

At Bhikiwind, a visitor comes upon a unique memorial to the Battle of Assal Uttar as also to Pakistan's Armour and the United States' Patton Tank.

It is a vast tank cemetery, popularly known as "Patton Nagar," where have been parked some sixty Pakistani tanks, a majority of them Pattons, captured in battle, collected from different parts of the sprawling battlefield.

PATTON MEETS ITS WATERLOO

It was however in the Sialkot sector that the war reached its climax and the Patton met its Waterloo. Here, in a battle spread over four and a half square miles and 15 days, India's Armoured Division met head-on Pakistan's 6th Armoured Division and vanquished it. In the battle, Pakistan lost 243 tanks.

On September 7 night, Lt.-Gen. Dunn's 1 Corps opened the Sialkot front. Sialkot was the base of the Pak offensive into the Chhamb sector and indeed the nerve-centre of Pak Army. The Pak Army's 4 Corps was ensconced here, with its 15th Infantry Division deployed in defence of Sialkot city and the border, and 6th Armoured Division, supported by 7th Infantry Division, was poised for offensive action against India.

Sialkot itself was heavily defended, with powerful artillery guarding the city all-round—three field regiments (18 guns each): one medium gun regiment, one heavy mortar regiment and one 155 heavy battery. The range of the Pak 155 gun is 22,000 yards, and we have nothing

like it in our artillery. In addition, three infantry brigades manned the city's defences, and the villages at the approaches to Sialkot bristled with pill-boxes, bunkers and gun emplacements.

The Indian offensive opened at 2300 hours in the shape of a large pincer movement converging on Sialkot. One arm of the pincer swept around from the north, and the other approached the city from the south. A complete tactical surprise was achieved, and by 6 A.M. both the Divisions attained the first objectives set for them.

The northern arm of the pincer had three tasks assigned to it: The first task was to secure lodgement in Pakistani territory astride the main Jammu-Sialkot road. This was accomplished with the capture of Unche Bains, Niche Bains and Bajragadi. The opposition the Indian forces met was described as "light to medium." But the Pakistani artillery reacted within 20 minutes.

On September 8 morning, the Pakistanis counter-attacked. Beginning at midday, for two and a half hours, Pak artillery pounded the Indian positions incessantly. It was the precursor to two successive assaults on Unche Bains, which both were repulsed. The second one was accompanied by Pattons and Chaffes. Thereafter followed the main attack on the Sialkot-Jammu road, accompanied by artillery. The Indian forces stood up to it bravely. Two Pak companies, supported by eight tanks, found near Suchetgahr, were pushed back, with the loss of five of their tanks.

The Division's second task began on September 12, which was to hold on to their lodgements until September 16, so that our armour might come up. Its third task was, as from September 18, to consolidate the Indian positions by capturing Tilakpur and Madhopur and cut

the road to Chaprar. That was done on September 17 by the capture of three Pakistani posts in Tilakpur area, north-east of Sialkot, following yet another pitched battle in which three enemy Chaffes and one Sherman were destroyed.

Three days later, with the cease-fire round the corner, the Pakistanis put in a ferocious counter-attack in the Sialkot-Chaprar road with a view to oust the Indian forces sitting astride it. But the counter-attack was beaten back. When the cease-fire came, the Indian forces were in Kalarwanda, having just thrown back an assault.

In the meantime, the other arm of the pincer, moving from the south, met with stiff resistance before capturing Charwa and Mahrajke. In the Charwa battle, the Pakistanis lost 254 killed counted and 100 captured, besides nine Bedford truckloads of small arms, five jeeps, three ambulances, three recoilless guns and 160 rounds of ammunition seized.

In Mahrajke, 100 Pakistanis were killed and 100 prisoners taken. But in both towns, as Pakistani troops withdrew, they left behind civilian snipers armed with rifles and light machine-guns. It took the Indian forces another three to four days to clean them up.

The Indian forces thereafter advanced on to the key town of Philora, and after a fierce tank battle, captured it on September 10-11. Four days later, they wrested Alhar station and cut the main rail-link between Pasrur and Sialkot. At Alhar station, 30 yards separate our forces from those of Pakistan.

Meanwhile, India's Armoured Division was leap-frogging its way to the Philora front. On September 4, the main elements of the Division entrained from Jullunder. On September 8 morning it had not only reached

Jammu but moved into the theatre of war in three columns.

The magnitude of this feat would be appreciated if it was realized that an armoured division contains some 3,000 vehicles, and on the road, with 100 yards in between, the line of vehicles would stretch to 150 miles. Smooth and speedy movement of such a large number and variety of vehicles and men is a job in itself. In addition, that movement had to be kept secret for security reasons, and therefore the vehicles moved only by night. One hundred and fifty civilian trucks, mobilized at twelve hours' notice, helped in the gigantic task.

In order to achieve surprise, the Armoured Division carried out a feint, by implying that the attack was going to come west of Akhnoor, whereas in actual fact the attack was launched from the direction of Samba in Jammu.

The bulk of the Pak armour, in the shape of its recently formed 6th Armoured Division, was also located in this region, between Philora and Sabzkot.

By 9 A.M. on September 8, the armoured columns reached the Philora area, and then began the first phase of an epic 15-day tank battle, the like of which has not been witnessed since the ferocious clashes of Rommel's Panzers with Allied armour in North Africa in World War II. In all 400 tanks were locked in battle from both sides.

Pakistan committed in the action six to seven regiments of armour, Patton M-47s and M-48s, tank destroyers and Shermans and Chaffes. Many of the Pattons appeared to be brand new; the paint on their number plates still not dry, their milometres showed very little mileage and their rubber tracks free from any wear and tear.

The advance column of our armour dashed forward somewhat rashly, away from its infantry support, in an

open country, with its flank exposed. The enemy immediately took advantage of its vulnerability and hit the column hard in the rib. The lapse was immediately remedied with the next assault, which was steadier and more circumspect.

In the first day of battle, that day, the Pakistanis lost 20 tanks, and the Indians 12. The next two days were confined to a sparring match preliminary to the big show. Then began the most important battle of the series.

On September 10 night, Indian armour moved forward towards Philora town. The battle of Philora actually began the next morning. The armour commander Maj.-Gen. Rajinder Singh's strategy in this battle was so to manœuvre the enemy as to isolate his armour from the infantry and then, thus deprived of each other's support, to annihilate them both separately.


The trick worked to a T. The infantry was decoyed towards Mahrajke, away from their protecting armour, and decimated, while our tanks and artillery engaged the enemy's armour at Philora and systematically hammered it to bits. On the first day, on September 11, the Pakistanis lost 30 tanks. The next day, the Pak losses doubled —they lost 65 tanks to our six.

By early afternoon, the Pak armour defending Philora disintegrated. Thereafter, Indian infantry units charged through the town's defences and captured Philora itself.

It was in this battle that the war's second Param Vir Chakra was won, also, alas, posthumously. In describing Lt.-Col. A. B. Tarapore's gallantry that won him the country's highest and most coveted military award, one could do no better than reproduce the words of the citation. The citation read:

> On September 11, a regiment commanded by Lt.-Col. Tarapore was given the task of delivering the main

AREAS OCCUPIED BY (1) INDIA IN PAKISTAN AND IN PAKISTAN-OCCUPIED KASHMIR AND (2) BY PAKISTAN IN INDIAN TERRITORY AS AT 3.30 AM. (IST) ON 23RD. SEPTEMBER 1965



armoured thrust for the capture of Philora in the Sialkot sector. While the regiment was pushing forward to drive a wedge between Philora and Chawinda as a preliminary, the enemy launched a sudden counterattack from Wazirwali, with heavy armour.

Lt.-Col. Tarapore, who was then at the head of the regiment, defied the enemy's charge, held his ground and gallantly attacked Philora. Though continuously under enemy tank and artillery fire, he remained unperturbed and refused to be evacuated even when wounded. Disregarding his injuries, he led his regiment to capture Wazirwali on September 14, and Jassoran and Butur Dograndi two days later.

Lt.-Col. Tarapore's tank was hit several times. Under his inspiring leadership, his regiment ferociously attacked the enemy's heavy armour and destroyed nearly 60 tanks. In the charge the gallant officer was mortally wounded.

The great tank battle around Philora perhaps also holds the record for the number of decorations won for gallantry in the Twentytwo-Day War. Majors Bhaskar Roy and Bhupinder Singh (posthumous) won the Maha Vir Chakra, the second highest award.

Major Bhaskar Roy knocked out six Pakistani Patton tanks. "Inspired by his daring and courage, his men pushed forward and threw the enemy back," said the citation.

Major Bhupinder Singh "showed great gallantry and led his squadron in the battle with great ability and grit." During the fighting, his unit knocked out 21 tanks. He personally destroyed seven Pakistani tanks. Bhupinder Singh later succumbed to his injuries in a military hospital.

In the same battle, Risaldar Major Ayub Khan got a

Vir Chakra for destroying an enemy Chaffe tank. (He promptly reported to his Commander: "Sir, Risaldar Ayub Khan has destroyed Field Marshal Ayub Khan's tank!") This engagement took place during the pitched tank battle on September 11, described as "the biggest and fiercest tank battle since the last World War."

After the capture of Philora, on September 12, there descended for the next three days, a lull on the battle zone. It was the calm before the storm—before another fierce tank battle broke out. But even in the interregnum, the Indians knocked out another 20 Pak tanks.

The third phase, or the third and last battle of the series, opened on September 14 and concluded on September 17. The fighting now shifted to the railway zone, with our armour columns heading in the direction of Chawinda, the key point on the Pasrur-Sialkot rail line.

On September 15, the Indian forces cut the rail line and captured Alhar railway station, on the way to Chawinda. The next day, they followed it up by taking Jassoran, on the eastern side of the rail line, near Chawinda, after a hectic battle in which six Pattons were knocked out and four others captured intact.

This was the position when the cease-fire came on September 23 at 3.30 A.M. In the 15-day tank battle, Pakistan had lost 243 tanks, knocked out or disabled by our armour, infantry and artillery and by the IAF. Indian tank losses were claimed to be a fraction of that figure.

At cease-fire, the 6th Infantry Division controlled 200 square miles of Pak territory, comprising 300 villages.

In the entire Sialkot sector, at cease-fire, the Indian forces held 180 square miles of Pakistani territory. North of Sialkot, the Indian forces were hardly 4,000 yards from the city, having cut its rail link with Chaprar. In the

city's south, they were astride the Sialkot-Pasrur rail line, having captured Alhar station, near Chawinda.

Meanwhile, on September 8 morning, the Indian Army had opened yet another front across the Rajasthan-Sind border. The Indian column entered Sind at Barmer and occupied Gadra town, six miles on the other side of the border, meeting hardly any resistance to speak of. The object was to create yet another distraction to the Pak Army at a distant, vulnerable point. The column headed towards Khokrapar, 15 miles from the border, to attack enemy troops concentrations along the strategic rail route to Mirpurkhas and Hyderabad (Sind).

On September 18, the Pakistanis launched a major attack in this sector. Their objective was Munabao, the last railway station on the Indian side of the border. This little border town was the subject of attention from both Pak artillery and air force, the latter making several sorties to strafe it.

As if in revenge for what the Pakistanis did to Munabao, the Indian forces next day took Dali town, 18 miles south-west of Gadra Road station.

In the meantime, on the political and diplomatic front certain significant developments occurred. The Anglo-American embargo on shipments of arms to Pakistan and India was clamped down, which would hurt the former much more because of her abject dependence upon the US for all kinds of military equipment. India was comparatively far more self-sufficient in arms and equipment and with her stronger industrial base, would be able to carry on the war very much longer.

Already more than half of Pakistan's armour had been smashed up, and overconfident and reckless, she had been prodigal with her free-gift equipment and ammunition.

President Ayub Khan who on September 6 had contemptuously warned Indians that they did not know

what they had bargained for by starting a war against Pakistan, now, a week later, called for "a purposeful cease-fire and an honourable settlement," in response to UN Secretary-General's appeal. He also now suddenly discovered that "this business of taking bits of each other's territory is not the answer."

The Field Marshal was speaking at a press conference in Pindi, at which he fervently appealed to President Johnson to intervene. He pleaded: "The US can play a definite role. She can tell both India and Pakistan that she will not stand for this trouble."

Even more importunately, he added, "(The US has) a role to play in this part of the world and they ought to play it more positively. The US has an enormous amount of influence in India and in Pakistan also. I think the US should have come out more openly and taken a direct hand in this matter. If she does not do that, it is not going to do the US prestige any good."

Reuter from Washington, however, reported the same day that the White House spokesman ruled out any direct US diplomatic intervention in the Indo-Pak conflict as proposed by President Ayub.

In New Delhi, Prime Minister Shastri's response was cautious when, on September 16, he stated in the Lok Sabha: "Among other things he (Ayub) is reported to have observed that good sense required that India and Pakistan live together in peace. If this is a new and sincere thought, I would greatly welcome it, however belated it might be. But if past experience is any guide, these remarks would appear to be part of a propaganda to beguile the world. Previously also, President Ayub had talked of the virtue of peace and had followed it up by unprovoked aggression against India in Kutch, and subsequently in Kashmir."

On September 17, President Ayub's "strange bed-

fellow," Chairman Mao Tse-tung, came to his rescue with a bombastic ultimatum issued to India, demanding the removal, within three days, of certain alleged Indian defence installations on the Chinese side of the Sikkim border.

This ultimatum evoked a grave warning to Peking from both Washington and Moscow against fishing in troubled waters in the Indo-Pak sub-continent.

In a dignified speech announcing the Chinese ultimatum to the Indian Parliament, Prime Minister Shastri denied and rejected the Chinese allegation but, for the sake of peace, agreed to accept an earlier Chinese proposal of joint inspection of the border to check up on the allegation.

He concluded his speech with the candid statement: "We do hope that China would not take advantage of the present situation and attack India. The House may rest assured that we shall fight for our freedom with grim determination. The might of China will not deter us from defending our territorial integrity."

In the meantime, it would appear, Field Marshal Ayub developed cold feet at having to receive the prickly hug of the Chinese dragon in the battlefield, in the face of Washington's stern disapproval. He now showed great concern to accept U Thant's proposal for a cease-fire, but still continued to bargain by putting down certain preconditions to his acceptance of it. He insisted upon tacking on to the cease-fire formula the need for a political solution of the Kashmir problem.

Uncertain of Ayub's next move or response to his gesture, Mao now found himself in a fix and extended his ultimatum by another three days, at the risk of losing face, with his anxious eyes fixed on the Security Council.

That however made no difference to Shastri's firm, rock-like stand on the question. He declared in the Indian

Parliament: "It is clear from the kind of response which China has sent that what China is looking for is not redress of grievances, real or imaginary, but some excuse to start its aggressive activities again, this time acting in collusion with its ally, Pakistan." He remarked, "The extension of the time-limit for the ultimatum was, in our view, no more than a device to gain time to watch what came out of the discussion in the Security Council."

With his characteristic sly humour, Shastri then observed: "If there are any structures on Chinese territory . . . there is nothing to prevent the Chinese Government from having them removed, instead of suggesting to us that we should have them removed, which would only be possible by our men going into their territory."

On September 20, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding a cease-fire, effective from 2430 hours on September 22, which India promptly accepted, but Pakistan hemmed and hawed, stalling for a better bargain. At last, after another blustering performance in the Security Council, her Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, announced at midnight on September 22, Pakistan's acceptance of the cease-fire proposal, whose deadline thereupon was extended to September 23, 0330 hours.

Thus the curtain was dropped on the hectic, intensive, Twentytwo-Day War that shook the Indo-Pak subcontinent and jolted both the countries to new thinking on national and international policies.

But, alas, one cannot yet see any grounds for the hope that the cease-fire, which is only a truce, would become a permanent peace between the two neighbours in the near future.

GLORY IN THE AIR

Indian armed forces were assigned two tasks in this war: (1) to halt the Pakistani armoured thrust through Chhamb, to Akhnoor and Jammu, and thus frustrate its fell objective to cut off our army in Kashmir from the rest of India; and (2) to blunt Pakistan's war machine by sheer attrition.

The Indian Air Force contributed a significant share in the attainment of both these tasks. It indeed played a pivotal role in halting the Pakistani thrust to Akhnoor. By systematic and devastating raids on Pakistani air bases and destroying as many as 73 Pak aircraft in air action (as against 35 lost by India), the IAF played its part in the second assignment.

In addition, the IAF were on constant vigil over their own bases and were so deadly and offensive that the enemy soon confined his air attacks on our bases to night time.

In response to the SOS from the thin line of defenders against the Pakistani *blitzkrieg*, the IAF flung itself into battle the very first day, on September 1. Twentyeight fighters, in sections of four each, took off from an Indian

air base, with a full complement of armament load. In their very first strike, comprising seven missions, IAF Mysteres and Vampires knocked out 14 Pak tanks and destroyed some 30 heavy vehicles.

This bolt from the blue staggered the Pakistani column till then relentlessly pushing eastwards like a bull-dozer against outnumbered and outarmoured defenders. At the end of the hectic day, IAF had lost two Vampires missing and two more damaged.

Wing-commander W. M. Goodman, a Mystere expert, who was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra, speaking about that memorable first day, stated: "Our boys were in like a flash and in no time the whole place was ablaze with burning enemy tanks and vehicles. The morale of our army was just wonderful. It could not have been higher. I am sure the enemy will never forget the Mystere."

It was however not till two days later that the IAF shot down its first Sabrejet—Squadron-leader Trevor Keelor snatched that honour. The next day another Sabre was brought down by Flt.-Lt. V. S. Pathania over the same area. Thereafter, the IAF knew what to do with a Sabre!

The next phase in the IAF's intervention in the war came when on September 6, the Indian Army marched across the border in the Lahore sector. Now the role of the IAF was, in addition to supporting the army on the ground, to disrupt the logistics of the enemy.

That evening, the PAF attacked two Indian air bases. Four F-86 Sabres came over Halwara, and our Hunters took up the challenge, and in a series of thrilling dog-fights in the air, shot down three of the Sabres, while the fourth one was brought down by our anti-aircraft fire. Four other Sabres, part of the raiding mission, were intercepted by our fighters and they sped back to base.

The other raid was carried out on the faraway IAF base in Kalaikunda, in the eastern sector. This attacking

force too comprised four F-86's, and all the four suffered the same fate as those over Halwara—two were shot down by our Hunters and two by ack-ack fire.

Thereafter, the PAF gave up daylight raids and confined their activity to darkness. But those two raids also invited retaliation from the IAF, who till then had refrained from attacking Pakistani air bases.

On the night of September 6, Indian bombers carried out their first attack on Sargodha and Chaklala. From then on till the cease-fire, on September 23, IAF bombers flew 200 sorties against Pakistani air bases. Only one IAF Canberra bomber was lost during that entire period. Apart from Sargodha and Chaklala, their targets were Peshawar, Kohat, Jhumra, Risalwara and Akwal.

A most devastating IAF raid was carried out on the radar installations in Badin, in Sind, just across Kutch, which are said to be the most modern and powerful in this part of the world. The radar system here was reported to have been completely disrupted by the raid. Incidentally, this attack, which was carried out a couple of days before the cease-fire, met only ack-ack resistance, while PAF aircraft were conspicuous by their absence.

As early as September 5 evening, the PAF carried out its first attack on our defence installations at Amritsar. One single battery of gunners held out gamely against the attackers and drove them away. The second raid on these installations came on September 8, and then the battery drew blood, shooting down one of the enemy planes. On September 15, valiant Amritsar faced 10 air attacks between 6 A.M. and 12.30 P.M. No bombs fell on the city during eight of the 10 raids, while some bombs were dropped in nearby Bhikiwind, without any damage reported.

By the time the hostilities ended, this ack-ack battery

at Amritsar had shot down ten Pak aircraft, including quite a few B-57 bombers.

The Halwara air base also received frequent attentions from the PAF—but after the first raid on September 6, all of them were at night by B-57s. Nine such raids dropped 83 bombs, but the Pak bombing was so inaccurate that the bombs did comparatively little damage, and many of the bombs fell two miles away. A direct hit killed three ack-ack gunners, while 12 airmen died in a trench due to debris falling on them.

This air base flew 800 sorties, including 500 operational ones, between September 6 and 23. No wonder the enemy made Halwara a favourite target of his.

Ambala, Adampur and Pathankot were the other objects of the PAF's special attention. While Pathankot was raided quite frequently, with some damage inflicted, Ambala's big nights were September 17 and 19 when the enemy dropped 16 bombs, three in the perimeter of the airfield, one hit the air control and two were duds. Adampur too was a favourite target of night attacks—often thrice a night—when the PAF dropped in all 43 bombs, 22 of which fell around the airfield. On September 14, one PAF B-57 was shot down over Adampur.

In offensive fighter sweeps, IAF aircraft knocked out tanks, heavy guns, armoured vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, heavy motorized transport and formation headquarters. During the 23 days' fighting, the IAF accounted for over 120 enemy tanks.

On September 8, four Hunters attacked a goods train carrying armour replacements to the Khem Karan sector, and destroyed four tanks and over 60 vehicles. Three days later, IAF aircraft blew up another train carrying 23 tanks to the Lahore front.

On September 17, in the Sialkot sector, IAF Mysteres intervened in support of ground troops and took a heavy

toll of Pak guns and tanks around Pasrur. The next day, in a fierce air battle over the Lahore-Kasur area, four Gnats engaged six F-86 Sabres and got the better of them. Squadron-leader Amarjeet Singh Sandhu got behind a Sabre in a dog-fight at 15,000 ft. and kept on closing in until he delivered a final burst and brought it down. The other three Gnats tried to engage the rest of the Sabres, but the latter sped away.

What was considered impossible in the jet age was achieved, when on September 19 IAF Gnats engaged PAF Sabres at an altitude of 1,500 ft. over the Chawinda area of the Sialkot sector, and in its final phase even came down to tree-top level.

The story is best told in the words of Squadron-leader Denzil Keelor (brother of Trevor Keelor, who shot down the first Sabre), who was also awarded the Vir Chakra for his gallant part in this thrilling air battle.

"I was escorting a section of four Mysteres to a target in the Kasur sector when the Mysteres were attacked by four F-86 Sabrejets as they reached the target area," said Denzil. During the engagement, Denzil and his sub-section leader Flt.-Lt. Kapila were in contact with each other, right through, and making sure there was no enemy aircraft behind them, "I also ordered him (Flt.-Lt. Kapila) to press home his attack and shoot down the Sabre which was ahead of him. This he did, most skilfully. When the Sabre was hit, I saw it go into a spin and crash to the ground.

"Then I attacked the second F-86 Sabre which was trying to get behind Kapila. In the engagement, I closed in on the enemy aircraft, and started firing from 600 yards. Soon after firing, I could see smoke coming out of his belly and I pressed home the attack.

"Kapila who was covering me at the time made an attack on the aircraft which was going down smoking

and then we both cleared out of the area, convinced that both the aircraft had been shot down."

Flt.-Lt. V. Kapila too got the Vir Chakra for his daring deed in this battle.

While IAF fighter-bombers gave effective support to our ground troops, exacting heavy toll of the enemy armour, guns and other positions, IAF fighters kept vigil in the skies to clear them of the Pakistani Sabres. The Indian Gnats and Hunters proved such a terror to Pak pilots that after their initial costly experience, they avoided confrontation with the Indian fighters and had to be cornered into combat.

The reputedly deadly Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, on which the PAF depended so heavily in air combat, were rendered ineffective by the Indian pilots, who compelled the Pakistani Sabres to come down to low altitudes before giving them battle. At that low level, 15,000 ft. to 20,000 ft., PAF's Sabres, and particularly the supersonic Starfighters, are at a disadvantage, while the Sidewinders, which are guided by a heat-attracting device towards the target, now went awry, being affected by radiation from the earth.

Indeed, the much-boosted Sidewinder got only one victim, an IAF Canberra bomber. Our Gnat pilots reported that more often than not the Pakistanis jettisoned those missiles when engaged by Gnats.

One of the major discoveries of this war was the brilliant performance of this Indian-made Gnat which went into production in this country in 1956. Light-weight and small, the Gnat is highly manœuvrable, and not easily seen or hit in air combat. It can climb vertically 40,000 ft. in 4 minutes. It is highly effective at 20,000 ft. whereas a Sabre, or even more, the sophisticated Starfighter, at that low altitude is like fish out of water—it is comfortable only at an altitude above 40,000 ft.

Incidentally, the Gnat, originally a British aircraft, saw action in war for the first time, and so did the Hunter.

The indifferent marksmanship of the Pakistani pilots was underscored by the contrast between their claims of toll in their attacks on Indian air bases and the actual result of these attacks.

After a night raid on Ambala the Pakistanis claimed to have destroyed 27 aircraft on the ground, whereas visiting foreign embassy air attaches and correspondents saw for themselves that the only damage done at the air base was to a section of the old flying control tower and that none of the airfield installations, let alone a single aircraft, had ever been hit.

But the bombs that the Pakistani pilots thought they had dropped on the Ambala air base, actually fell on the beautiful, hundred-year-old St. Paul's Cathedral, the military hospital and the Sirhind Club across the road, a couple of miles away from the base.

The PAF also claimed to have put out of action the airfields at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara, whereas the foreign visitors noted that none of these air bases had stopped functioning right through the war, nor could they find any evidence of severe or paralysing damage to the installations on the air bases.

Speaking of PAF raids on Halwara, here is a first-hand story of what happened on September 21 to a section of Sabres that came over the Indian air base.

That evening Flt.-Lt. D. N. Rathore, with Flying Officer V. K. Neb as his second-in-command, was detailed for a patrol over the Halwara air base. At forty minutes past six, as the sky glowed with the setting sun, Flt.-Lt. Rathore, three miles away from the base, saw two IAF Hunters engaged in a struggle with attacking Pakistani Sabres. The Hunters were led by Flying Officer A. R. Gandhi.

Rathore immediately turned towards the airfield, warning his number two, Flying Officer Neb. There they found that one of the four enemy Sabres had already been shot by anti-aircraft fire and another had been blown up by an angry burst from the guns of Flying Officer Gandhi's Hunter.

The remaining two Sabres were strafing the airfield and bombing it from a very low level. Jockeying for position was not difficult as the two Pakistani pilots were concentrating on the ground. Getting behind the Sabre, which was on his right, Rathore closed in to about a thousand yards, at the same time asking Neb to take on the Sabre on the left.

Overtaking the Sabre, Rathore fired on it. The Sabre had now abandoned its mission. Drawing closer, he fired from 500 yards. This time the Sabre was mortally hit. It started banking to the left, and then nosed towards the ground, exploding in a huge sheet of flame some five or six miles from the airfield.

Meanwhile, Neb had closed in behind the second Pakistani Sabre which, like the first one, was intent on pouring front gunfire on to the airfield below.

He came to within 400 yards of the Sabre and fired a burst. The Pakistani pilot at once gave up his attack on the airfield and shot up skywards. Neb rapidly closed in to less than 100 yards and fired again on the sharply rising Sabre, which was now a much better target. He saw pieces fly off the Sabre as his canon shells found their mark on its left wing. There was first a puff of smoke which rapidly turned into a sheet of flame, as the last of the four Pak Sabres disintegrated in midair.

Thus, the entire force of four Pakistani Sabres which had come to attack Halwara was destroyed by the IAF and anti-aircraft gunners in less than ten minutes. All

three IAF pilots, Flt.-Lt. Rathore, F/O Neb and F/O Gandhi were awarded the Vir Chakra.

Then again the PAF claimed to have destroyed all the nine MiG 21s possessed by the IAF, whereas all of them except one are still intact and in operation, and none of them were ever used in the 22-day fighting.

But it must however be conceded that the Air Force on both sides observed much restraint in generally confining their attacks to purely military targets. If civilian areas have suffered on either side during the Twentytwo-day War, it must have been because the attacking planes missed their targets—for in this jet age, a split-second error could convert a "direct hit" into a "near miss," nay, a "far miss," which might mean the bombs dropping anywhere from two to four miles away from the target.

In the last World War, in the pre-jet era, the targets of Allied attacking aircraft (which went in a swarm of a few hundreds at a time), were entire cities. In the Indo-Pak war, fought in the air by jet planes, the targets were minute—particular installations in an air base. In comparison with the Viet Nam or the last World War, the scale of operations in the Indo-Pak war was much smaller —not more than a couple of sections (8 aircraft) was employed in an attack; very often it would be a lone Canberra bomber coming over.

Having said this by way of extenuation, it is however difficult to explain the PAF's bomber attack on obscure, innocent Chherta, on the outskirts of Amritsar, on September 23, just a few hours before the announcement of cease-fire. Chherta had no military significance whatsoever and was primarily inhabited by workers.

Nor could one forgive the wanton and cold-blooded shooting down by PAF fighters of a small, unarmed, civilian plane, over Kathiawar, far inside Indian territory,

carrying Gujarat's Chief Minister, Mr Balwantray Mehta and his wife.

The Pakistani Air Force's use of napalm bombs was equally indefensible unless it is taken as the expression of the anger and frustration of a country getting the worse of the fighting.

The IAF, in contrast, ranged all over Pakistani territory attacking all its major air bases, while strictly avoiding civilian targets (inadvertent strafing or bombing apart). Thus the IAF did not touch Karachi's Mauripur airport and the Lahore airport (the latter was within the artillery range of the Indian Army sitting on the east bank of Ichhogil Canal, so much so the US authorities notified to the Indian Army when they evacuated American citizens from the Lahore airport).

The Indian Air Force, as was the case with the Indian Army, had employed only one-third of its forces, namely, those under the jurisdiction of the Western Air Command. Not a single plane was indented from either the Eastern or the Southern Air Command, which comprised the remaining two-thirds of the Air Force.

While an overwhelming majority of Indian pilots were trained in India, and went through a more intensive course of training, most of the Pakistani pilots were trained abroad. It would generally be correct to say that the pilots on both sides were competent, but it is possible that the Pakistani pilots, particularly in the latter stages of the fighting, were required to "hoard" their precious force of highly sophisticated American-gifted planes, more so after the US embargo on arms shipments to either country was enforced.

On the other hand, India's capacity for reinforcements, replenishments and replacements being relatively larger, the IAF showed greater stamina and enterprise. That also explains why in the latter days of the fighting, PAF

pilots were reported to be avoiding engagements, preferring sneak attacks on Indian targets, and when chased, tending to jettison their bombload in order to save their aircraft.

One explanation of PAF pilots' reluctance to get into combat given by senior IAF officers is that the Pakistani propaganda line which was hammered into Pak armed forces personnel—that if they were captured by the Indians, they would be lynched—deterred them from taking the risk of being shot down.

While all the pyrotechnics were going on on the Western Front, the Eastern Air Command kept itself fully busy with daylong patrols over their own front in order to intercept any possible attacks by East-Pakistan-based PAF aircraft against IAF bases in their own zone.

Even though the PAF carried out provocative and wanton attacks on Indian air bases at Kalaikunda, Barrackpore, Bagdogra and Agartala, the Pakistani allegation that the IAF planes attacked East Pakistani air bases or cities like Dacca and Chittagong were pure lies. The Pakistani reports that the IAF had raided Karachi and Peshawar or that India had landed paratroopers in Pakistani territory were completely untrue.

According to the figures issued by the British Institute of Strategic Studies in 1964-65, the relative air strength of India and Pakistan is:

India—4 Bomber squadrons (Canberras); 10 Fighter-Bomber squadrons (Hunters) and several others (Vampires, Toofanis); 8 Interceptor squadrons (Mysteres and Gnats); 10 to 15 Transport squadrons (C-47, C-119, Antonov and Viscounts), plus miscellaneous planes.

Pakistan—2 Bomber squadrons (Canberras); 5 Fighter-Bomber squadrons (1 Starfighter, 4 Sabres); 3 to 4 Transport squadrons plus miscellaneous planes.

Since then both countries have acquired quite an

assortment of aircraft. India has obtained a few MiG's, transport planes and helicopters, while Pakistan has had her quota of air aid from the USA.

According to the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Arjan Singh, Pakistan started the Twentytwo-day War with 104 Sabres, 24 B-57 bombers and 12 F-104s. At the end of the 22 days, half of her air force was a casualty.

Perfect understanding at the top between General Chaudhuri, Chief of the Army Staff, and Air Marshal Arjan Singh, Chief of the Air Staff, and fullest co-operation between the two Services were responsible for the outstanding total performance of India in defence of her honour and territory against a bellicose, belligerent and overconfident Pakistan.

Within twentyfour hours of the outbreak of the war, President Ayub Khan flung his Navy too in the fray. Out of sheer sadism—and there can be no other explanation for it—his frigates steamed up to and bombarded the nearest, smallest and innocent port of Dwarka, which had neither naval nor air importance. It must be conceded that the Indian Navy was caught napping by this unexpected attack.

The Indian naval ships had just returned from an exercise from the east coast and were re-servicing at the time when the Twentytwo-day War broke out. Actually, its only aircraft carrier, Vikrant, was at the time in dry-dock undergoing some repairs and was in no condition to go into action immediately.

A Pakistani submarine, the American-gifted " Ghazi " was found lurking around Bombay waters for a few days, and then it was chased away by our anti-submarine units and escaped to its lair in Karachi.

Then there was the Pakistani claim to have sunk an Indian frigate on September 22, somewhere off the Baluchistan coast. But the Indian Navy denied that there

had been any such incident or that they had lost any frigate. Later, foreign press reports referred to a "comedy of errors" in which the Pakistani Navy attacked two frigates which they thought were Indian naval ships. These latter turned out to be two frigates belonging to the Iranian Navy. After exchange of fire between the two parties, the mistake was discovered, and the two Iranian frigates, bearing quite a few "wounds", were escorted into Karachi harbour for hospitalization. It is significant that this foreign press report has not been contradicted either by Teheran or by Rawalpindi.

Despite its lack of a submarine and other material deficiencies, the Indian Navy kept up vigil along India's long coastline, protected the country's shipping and kept the enemy at arm's length.

"They Also Serve...."

"If we lose our crops, we can get them again next year,
If we lose our freedom, we lose everything."

"We have given up our homes once. We are not going to do it a second time. No, never. Nobody can get us out of here."

These sentiments respectively expressed by a Punjabi farmer as he swung his scythe through his standing sugarcane crop to winkle out hiding Pakistani paratroopers, and by the Sarpanch of a border village to a reporter, epitomized the spirit in which the people of the border areas took the war at their doorstep.

During World War Two, the British naval base, Malta was awarded the George Cross for valiantly standing up to Goering's Luftwaffe and cheerfully facing bombing and strafing day after day, month after month.

If there were an equivalent award in India that could be given to a city—and if there isn't, we ought to create

one—I would commend to the Government of India Amritsar in recognition of the heroic role this border city played in the Twentytwo-day War.

This city bore the brunt of Pakistani air raids, and consequently suffered a heavy blow to its economy. Many died and many more were wounded in the air attacks. Property was destroyed or damaged on a large scale. Yet the city took it all in its stride, with a grit and élan that was an inspiring example to any city in any country in the world.

Apart from a few families of the upper classes, the inhabitants stuck to their homes and shops, and every man, woman and child, came forward to do his bit for the war effort. They volunteered for guard duties at the city's strategic points, ran canteens for the jawans passing through, ensured a perfect black-out at night, ran up to the front with eats and snacks for the men in the fighting line.

The daily dozen visitations by the Pakistani aircraft soon ceased to worry them, and young and old would watch from their trenches, or some even from their *barsaatis*, air-battles and dog-fights, like boys witnessing kite-fights in the sky. They cheered and shouted when our ack-ack guns hit an enemy plane, and bits and pieces of it came raining down. Throughout the twenty-two days, the bazars were open, children went to school and picture-houses kept running.

At a prominent point where four roads met one saw a Patton tank with a Pakistani jeep and a Pakistani truck flanking it on either side, preserved with a railing around. Around this spot, I saw clusters of men, women and children proudly viewing the trophy of their war, like pilgrims at a shrine. All private buses and trucks were voluntarily placed at the disposal of the army.

Party and communal barriers dissolved in the heat of

war, and leaders and common people plunged into voluntary civil defence work. Cheering crowds saw marching troops off to the front, garlanded them and their tanks and vehicles, applied *kum-kum* to their foreheads and shouted "jais" to them.

But the Amritsaris' favourite heroes were the ack-ack gunners who guarded their city against attacks from the sky and shot down enemy planes like duck on the wing. To them they brought milk and choicest eats and "killed them with kindness."

Pakistan Radio's blatant wooing of the Sikh community, offer of simulated sympathy for the Akali demand of a Punjabi Suba and incitement to rebel against their Government was laughed out by the Sikhs, accompanied by some of the choicest, unprintable Punjabi swearwords, while Sant Fateh Singh suspended his fast and agitation for the suba. Pakistan Radio was thus quite apologetic about the repeated bombing of the holy city of the Sikhs for whom it had displayed so much solicitude!

Jammu town was another frontline city that faced with much poise the bustle, bombing and excitement of war on its doorstep. After the initial jolt, the city resumed its composure and valiantly strove to tackle the complex problem created by thousands of refugees pouring in from the Pak-occupied Chhamb sector. Families that had left the city in the early days of the war soon returned home, and schools and colleges reopened.

The scenes one witnessed in Amritsar were repeated in the scores of villages all along the 30-mile front in the Lahore sector. Indeed, the enthusiasm of the civilians was infectious, as villagers turned out *en masse* to do their bit for the country and help the Jawans defend their land.

They took up arms, belchas and lathis and joined the Police and the Army in stalking Pakistani paratroopers through jungles and fields. They did not hesitate to cut

their standing crops of maize and sugarcane to get at the hiding paratroopers. They hewed tracks through their farms for the Army to advance. They put up roadside stalls to offer free drinks and food to the soldiers passing along to the forward areas.

Girls flung packets of chapatis, parched gram and gur into passing Army vehicles. Young boys cycled between the front and Amritsar carrying stocks of cigarettes for the Jawans. There was nothing they would not do for the Army. Many an army and air force officer confessed to me that witnessing such popular emotion brought a lump in his throat. It was indeed a sight for the gods.

The peasants, many of them ex-servicemen or with relatives in the fighting line, watched with intelligent interest the battles going on, and like spectators on the sideline of a football match, knowledgeably discussed the progress. The Panchayati hall and radio were popular resorts in the village where people eagerly listened in to the news bulletins.

Lt.-Gen. Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, who was directly responsible for the conduct of the war in the entire theatre, paid a glowing tribute to the civilian war effort when he stated: " Much of the gallantry and self-sacrifice of the Indian Jawan was due to their confidence that the whole country was behind him." The General added, "The enthusiasm of the civilian population of the area and the emotional backing which they gave to the advancing troops was to be seen to be believed. Food, milk, tea and cold drinks were served free to troops round the clock at numerous stalls set up behind the front line. The courage and self-confidence shown by the peasant population in the forward areas also inspired the troops."

Outstanding acts of gallantry were performed by the civilian truck-drivers, 1,500 of whom offered their ser-

vices and trucks to the Army. They transported supplies, equipment and troops to the forward areas. These drivers, who have otherwise earned notoriety for rash and reckless driving along the highways, were now risking their lives for the country, carrying troops and supplies.

Many performed feats of daring and heroism, sacrificed their lives, got their trucks blown up, strafed and bombed by Pakistani planes. They showed remarkable skill and took extraordinary hazards in driving their heavy trucks in blackout conditions. An entire armoured division was assembled in its forward base within twentyfour hours, thanks to 150 civilian trucks summoned to the job at twelve hours' notice.

Sixty-year-old Charan Singh, with his son working as his cleaner, plied his truck daily between Khalra and Burki carrying foodstuff to the Jawans.

Seva Singh of Jullunder and his friend Santokh Singh of Amritsar, who drove their trucks between the supply dump and the forward line for an armoured unit, were rewarded with the spectacle of a dozen Pakistani tanks and their crew surrendering to our Army in the Sialkot sector. After off-loading their trucks, Seva Singh and his friend would lend a helping hand to the armour men. They clung to the armoured unit, until the day came when the unit had to part company with them.

Atma Ram of Amritsar was one of the truck-drivers who carried supplies to the forward dumps, and on the return journey brought the wounded and Pakistani prisoners of war. One night, when his convoy was bringing the POWs, Pakistani bombers chased the convoy along the route and tried to bomb them. The convoy came to a halt and the Jawans jumped out and took positions, while Atma Ram and his comrades guarded the trucks containing the Pakistani POWs lest they escape in the darkness.

Truck-owner Bhagwan Das and his driver Khairati Lal belonged to a convoy detailed in the Fazilka sector. They were in the thick of a fluid battle which swung back and forth. For seven consecutive days and nights they were on the move, pursued by Pak bombers like vultures. Their orders were: "Save the ammunition." They carried out the order, come what may; they drove day and night, without rest or sleep, speeding, halting, then speeding again, and when thirsty, drinking water from their truck radiators.

In the early days of the fighting, when the Army was continuously on the move, the Jawans did not have to do any cooking for themselves, as the villagers from miles around brought to them chapatis, tea, milk, parched gram, cigarettes, sweets and other snacks and eats. There was here no need for appeals to the people and exhortations from leaders or Government. The villagers did it spontaneously. On their own initiative they pooled their resources and organized production and distribution of their preparations to the forward areas.

Donations were collected, commodities purchased and before noon hundreds of stalls sprang up all along the route the Jawans took on their way to the front line. There was hardly a village along the road without a tea-stall. Those villagers who lived away from the roadside, brought their contributions of food to roadside points of assembly where ambulance vans would pick up the packets and deliver them in the forward areas. Hundreds of arches and banners went up along the road to the front which told the Jawans: "We are Proud of You." Children lined up the road to cheer the soldiers and give them a smart military salute as they drove past.

Inhabitants of the border villages, too close to the firing line, sent away their families but themselves stuck to their

posts, facing the dangers of cross-fire, bombing and strafing from enemy planes, and guided our Army units through local paths and tracks.

The Sarpanches of Wan, Dall, Daliri, Madi Kamoke, Madi Udhoke, Madi Meghan and other villages along the border set a noble example to their people by sticking to their villages with their entire families. They helped the Army in their tasks through miscellaneous services and went out on rekkee trips on their own and brought information of enemy movements.

Sajjan Singh, a Jat from Dall, an Indian village right on the border, is a notorious smuggler, who knows his way about on both sides of the border like the back of his hand, and was very much "wanted" by the Police. A few hours before the Indian Army marched into West Pakistan in the Lahore sector, Sajjan had slipped from across the border with a packet of opium.

Finding a police party lying in wait for him, he passed on his uncomfortable cargo to a comrade who, as the firing started, vanished with the treasure. Sajjan was however dragged to the local police thana for interrogation.

During the questioning, Sajjan came to know of the outbreak of fighting between India and Pakistan. He immediately placed his specialized knowledge at the disposal of the Army. The smuggler was familiar with every inch of the ground, including the location of culverts, bridges and the camouflaged pill-boxes. He pleaded to the local commander of the Indian forces: "Sir, I have hitherto braved death for my belly; now I want to brave death for my country."

Sajjan was entrusted with reconnaissance jobs, which he carried out with distinction. He brought to the local commander valuable information of the enemy positions and location of pill-boxes along and beyond the Hudiara Drain, Nurpur, Ghagha and many other vital points.

Every day he would go out into enemy territory, kill time in the day pretending to carry out innocent activity in the fields and at night prowl around or climb a sheesham tree to note the movements and positions of enemy troops and vehicles and bring home the intelligence.

One day, he was spotted by the enemy while having a good look around, standing on the west bank of Ichhogil Canal and a hail of bullets greeted him. Sajjan jumped into the canal; the bullets pursued him; he dipped down into the water, bobbing up for breath and then down to escape the bullets, until he swam across the canal, crawled through the fields and reached his commander with precious information.

On one of his nightly rekkee rounds, Sajjan, now put into a borrowed uniform, armed with a rifle, and accompanied by a Lance-Naik, stumbled upon a camouflaged Pakistani machine-gun nest. He tip-toed to it to find the sentry dozing away at the entrance to the picket. Sajjan crashed the sentry's helmet hard down on him, put a bullet through him and snatched away his rifle.

The sound of the shot invited a shower of bullets from another Pak post, and his companion, the Lance-Naik was badly hit. Undeterred, Sajjan crawled forward, bearing his wounded comrade as also the Pak sentry's rifle.

On the way, however, the Lance-Naik died. Thereupon, Sajjan had reluctantly to leave behind his comrade's body, but he picked up his light machinegun, crawled some furlongs, hid and walked through sugarcane fields, ran the gauntlet of enemy fire and reached his formation by dawn.

In the initial stages of the fighting our troops came upon an obstacle in the water-logged paddy fields in the Khalra sector. They requested the villagers around for help. Led by Sarpanch Hardyal Singh of Madi Meghan, Sarpanch Kashmir Singh of Daliri and the Sarpanches

of Madi Kamoke, Madi Udhoke and Dall, all adjoining the border, a volunteer force of a couple of hundred was gathered and put on the job. The obstacle was cleared and the troops advanced.

Later when the retreating Pakistani soldiers discarded their uniforms and stayed behind to hide in the tall reeds and sugarcane crops and snipe at our forces, a 500-strong force of sturdy farmers from these villages went into action with sickles and cut down the crops and reeds deep in enemy territory, while enemy bullets flew all round them. They cleared an area of four to five square miles, adjacent to the then enemy strongholds of Jhaman and Bedian, so that our troops could advance without having to look over their shoulders.

Baba Sohan Singh of Sursingh, a deeply religious man and the priest of Sursingh Gurdwara, at sixty, daily led a caravan of five tongas to the front, laden with milk, gur, parched gram and chapatis, more than twelve miles away, to distribute them to the Jawans. At the gurdwara langar, women volunteers worked day and night to prepare the food for the Baba to take it to the forward area.

It was the sarson sowing season when the fighting broke out. Undeterred by the war, with bullets flying about and bombs dropping from the skies, the peasants ploughed and sowed their fields. When enemy planes came overhead, the peasants fell flat on the ground and then resumed their work when the planes flew past. When the cease-fire came, sarson was standing a foot high in these fields, in contrast to the desolation one witnessed on the Pakistani side.

Thirty thousand NCC cadets including girls took up duty in civil defence in the border states of the country. The boys took up traffic control and guarding of bridges, dumps and other strategic points, while the girls manned telephone exchanges and worked in hospitals. In Punjab

alone there were 15,000 cadets functioning, providing guard at vital installations, helping to round up enemy paratroopers and carrying out civil defence duties. Seven thousand cadets went to work in Rajasthan.

The railways too did a grand job. Twenty railway workers died at their posts of duty when the enemy shelled and bombed our rail stations and trains. Fireman Chaman Lal, of the Northern Railway, was in the locomotive of a stationary goods train at Gurdaspur station when it was strafed by enemy planes.

Three tank wagons carrying diesel oil were hit and caught fire. Chaman Lal rushed out and delinked the wagons on fire to save the rest of the train. He did save the rest of the train, but he himself was engulfed in the flames and died.

The war brought the people and the Army closer together as never before and made it a truly people's Army. Never again will the nation grudge to our Forces their needs—not only because the country does not want to repeat past mistakes, but because a grateful nation would not deny anything that they asked for.

It was as though in the fiery ordeal of the war, the nation's soul was cleansed and purified. The country regained faith in itself and, what is more, in its ideology of secular democracy. The virtues of a secular, composite society, in which all were equal citizens, irrespective of race or religion, were underscored for all to see and feel proud of.

With their equality of sacrifice, the many elements that go to compose this nation spotlighted their equality of rights, including their right to lay down their lives in defence of their common motherland.

As Lt.-Gen. P. O. Dunn, the Corps Commander in the Sialkot sector, pointed out, this is the many-splendoured thing about this nation.

WHO WON THE WAR?

Who won the war? Neither country. It was, inevitably, an inconclusive war. It was too short to be otherwise. With the two Armies nearly evenly matched and well-evolved, no conclusion could have been possible in twentytwo days of fighting.

But it is equally true that Pakistan lost the war, in that she failed to win her military objectives, all along the line; and her political objective is doomed to be frustrated.

Militarily speaking, Pakistan lost the two most decisive battles of the war—the Battle of Assal Uttar in the Khem Karan sector and the 15-day tank battle in the Sialkot sector. Between the two of them, Pakistan lost nearly half of their American-gifted tanks. Their armoured corps, the very pride and spearhead of Pak Army, today stands crippled and humbled. The psychological impact of it all upon the Pak Army and the military leadership of the country cannot be underestimated.

In seeking to strike a balance-sheet of the Twentytwo-

day War, I am here deliberately relying upon the assessments of foreign neutral observers and military experts, and, for the moment, keeping aside the rival, conflicting claims of the two countries involved.

The *Times* (London) Defence Correspondent quoting "first professional reports," comments, "Though Pakistan originally claimed to have destroyed 500 Indian tanks, a more realistic figure is thought to be about 200 tanks casualties for India, of which about half would be in Pakistani hands." This estimate broadly approximates with our own figures.

The Defence Correspondent goes on to add: "Assuming a similar proportion of Pakistani tanks were lost to India, another 200 Pakistani tanks were probably hit but were recovered and should be repaired."

It is to be noted that the *Times* Defence Correspondent's article appeared soon after the visit of foreign embassy Military Attaches in New Delhi to the forward areas. There is indication in the article that it is based upon the report submitted to his home Government by the British Military Attache following his trip to the front.

The Correspondent concludes: "Prospects for Pakistan in any future armoured battle are gloomy and will not improve as they must rely on further deliveries of American tanks, a doubtful contingency at present."

Selig Harrison, New Delhi Correspondent of the *Washington Post,* supports the *Times* Defence Correspondent's conclusion. "In the critical area of heavy tanks, for example, India appears to have suffered relatively light damage," Harrison wrote. "Reliable figures indicate that less than one-third of its tank losses have been in heavy categories. By contrast, Pakistan's Pattons account for more than half of the Indian tank claims. Even if the overall numbers themselves are inflated, most observers

are inclined to accept the ratio of Pattons to the total."

Harrison further adds: "India's losses in aircraft have apparently not affected what was a four-to-two margin over Pakistan in the number of planes. It is possible that the effective balance may have been tipped even more sharply in India's favour. Pakistan's striking power has consisted mainly of 103 F-86 Sabrejets. Diplomatic sources estimate that at least 30 Sabrejets were shot down or bombed in the airfields (India claims 47)."

David Van Praagh writing from New Delhi in the *Globe and Mail* of Ottawa, stated: "Assessments made by professional experts and detached Western observers, who cannot be identified further, said Indian victory claims are not groundless even if self-satisfaction sometimes accompanying them may be unnecessary."

The dispatch pays a tribute to the Indian ack-ack gunners: "It was verified by independent eye-witness accounts that Indian radar-guided anti-aircraft fire was extremely accurate."

Discussing the failure of the Pakistani Pattons in the field of battle, Van Praagh stated, "Military observers reported that Pakistani tanks moved south too quickly leaving maintenance crews far behind. . . . Pakistani commanders failed to follow United States training advice to keep the tanks in reserve and spray the field with machine-gun fire before moving up."

A discovery made by the Indian Army in this war was that the Pak infantry, in its new role as, primarily, an adjunct to armour, is no more what it used to be in the good old pre-partition days. The Indian forces rarely came to grips with the Pak infantry, which seemed to be overdependent on its armour, and when the tanks were knocked out, the infantry, generally following the tanks in APCs (armoured personnel carriers), looked helpless, not knowing what to do next.

Within five days of the fighting, the Indian Army had snatched the initiative from the Pakistani Army. Apart from the twentyfive-mile saliant in West Jammu, a three-mile strip in Khem Karan and a dozen desert posts along the Rajasthan border, all the fighting took place in Pakistani territory—which fact was concealed from their people by the controlled press and Pakistan Radio. The latter regaled them to highly imaginative stories about Pak victories and large chunks of Indian territory occupied by their army.

At cease-fire on September 23, the total Pakistani territory under Indian occupation, including that in Pak-occupied Kashmir, was 740 square miles as against some 210 square miles of Indian territory in Pak hands. Pakistan however claimed much more Indian territory, by adding to the figure all the space between the dozen or more widely-separated Pakistani posts in the Rajasthan desert near the border, many of which were seized after the cease-fire.

In the air, the conflicting rival claims apart, there is no doubt that Pindi sustained a shock when it found that its Sabrejets and Starfighters, with their much-bruited Sidewinders, were not as invincible as they had expected, and that the IAF, with its comparatively less up-to-date machines, proved more than a match to them.

As to Pakistan's strategic objectives in the Twentytwo-day War, her initial guerilla-infiltration adventure came a cropper. The Kashmiris refused to have anything to do with their self-styled "liberators" and "freedom fighters" who, apart from doing some damage to public property and inflicting much suffering on the people by burning down their homes, got nowhere. To that extent, Pindi's political objective too was frustrated.

Secondly, the Chhamb thrust, which was to have blitzed its way to Akhnoor and Jammu city in a jiffy

and then in one sweep to cut off our forces in Kashmir from the rest of India, failed too.

Next, Pakistan's contemplated offensive via Dera Baba Nanak and Gurdaspur to Pathankot, the vulnerable key communications centre between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the rest of the country, never got beyond the Dera Baba Nanak Bridge. The dream exploded with the bridge when it was blown up by the retreating Pakistanis.

And last, but not the least, Pakistan's "master plan" of an armoured *blitzkrieg* to Beas and then a cakewalk on to New Delhi, was aborted on the battlefield at Assal Uttar.

Such then was the fate met by the Pak Army's military objectives in the Twentytwo-day War.

* * *

But what went wrong with the Pakistani Army? Why is it that its performance in the Twentytwo-day War fell far short of its expectations?

Pakistan's initial blunder was her overconfidence and arrogant underestimation of its adversary's strength and competence. The Pak Army's reckless tactics stemmed from that overconfidence and arrogance which thought in terms of crushing the "paper tiger" of the Indian Army with one heavy, overpowering, lethal blow. Into that blow they put everything they had, all at once—their armour, artillery, and air power, in full force, having convinced themselves they would win the war in a week's time.

Indian Army senior officers never ceased marvelling at the prodigality of the Pak Army in the use of their armour and the reckless expenditure of ammunition by its artillery.

The fact is that the Pakistan Army leaned too heavily on its much-bruited American-gifted equipment to do the fighting for it instead of on its own skill. Both in strategy and in tactics, the Indian Army, which entirely relied on human skill, outgeneralled the Pakistan Army in the field.

Nor is one surprised at it. For it is no secret, nor the result of deliberate design, that Partition found the Indian Army getting a larger share of the war-experienced senior officers. In Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri, the present Chief of the Army Staff, we have one of the most experienced generals in Asia—one of the three Indian brigadiers of the pre-Independence British Indian Army and a DSO who won laurels in three theatres during the last war. The American military journal *Armor* bracketed Gen. Chaudhuri among the four "top military men" in the field of armour in the world.

Indeed, it was fortuitous for India—and we must thank Mao Tse-tung for it—that the Chinese aggression against India in 1962 snatched Chaudhuri from the brink of retirement and catapulted him to the post of Chief of the Army Staff. Had it not been for the Chinese attack, the services of this great soldier and armour expert would not have been available to the country today in its dire need. For this was a war in which armour played the stellar role.

Neither Field Marshall Ayub Khan nor his Army Commander-in-Chief General Mahomed Musa are comparable with Gen. Chaudhuri in sheer professional competence and merit. Similarly, the six-footer Gen. Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C, Western Command, who was directly in charge of the operations on the western front, is an outstanding soldier, whose cool composure and expertise inspire confidence among his officers and men.

Complementing Gen. Chaudhuri and standing at the

head of the Indian Air Force, is Air Marshal Arjan Singh, the most experienced air man in the Indo-Pak continent who won his DFC in Burma during World War II, noted for his unflappable poise and outstanding service record.

But what happened to the famous Patton tank, claimed to be the last word on armour?

It would appear the highly sophisticated operation of this tank was the Pakistanis' undoing. Manipulation of the bewildering panel of gadgets inside the Patton possibly needed longer training than the Pakistanis got. For invariably, the Indian Centurion got in the first blow, and the Patton came second. Then, again, the Patton tended to catch fire easily—and every time a Centurion or a recoilless gun got a direct hit on its turret, it burst into flames, suggesting that the ammunition was stowed underneath in such a way as to make the tank vulnerable.

The *Times* (London) Defence Correspondent's explanation of this phenomenon is: "Battlefield analysis suggests that the armour plating of M-48 (Patton) is severely suspect, as several tanks were knocked out by the Centurions 20-pounder shells penetrating their turrets at the point of thickest armour."

The *Times* Defence Correspondent further testifies: "It is also claimed that the Centurion in close engagement normally managed to fire off its first round quicker than M-48 on account of the more complicated sighting mechanism of the American tank. Pakistanis, on the other hand, maintained that each of their Pattons at close range was worth at least two Centurions. Photographs undermine this claim, however, particularly the one showing a 'graveyard' of about 50 Pakistani tanks, mostly M-48s, collected simply from one engagement close to the Lahore-Amritsar road."

The British correspondent's final verdict is that the British tank "emerged superior" to the American tank.

The Defence Correspondent added that India is already producing first models of the 37-ton light tank designed by Vickers which mounts a 105 mm gun, generally accepted to be the best tank gun in service in the world. "The future development for this tank may involve mounting a swingfire, anti-tank rocket on to it too, giving the maximum flexibility of firepower," the Correspondent stated. "India has been given to understand that she can purchase swingfire after deliveries are made to the British Army in about 1968."

* * *

If, then, the Indian Army's performance in the Twentytwo-day War was nothing to be ashamed of, why did our "top brass" tend to shun public relations in general and shy at the foreign press in particular? Ask me another!

It is time the authorities in New Delhi realized that the foreign press, like the Biblical poor, will always be with us, whether we like it or not. We might then, as well, accept them with grace, and, indeed, harness them to our purposes by being human to them.

One could fully understand and sympathize with the need for "hush hush" in the initial phase of the Pakistani *blitzkrieg* through the Chhamb sector, when the Indian Army was on the defensive and falling back. But there was no justification whatsoever for reticence in the later, brighter phases of the fighting.

Whoever was responsible for the public relations fiasco in the Twentytwo-day War—and they are all passing the buck from one to the other—was largely responsible for the bad press that this war got abroad—and when I say

this I don't have in mind the political aspects of the Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir, where we do encounter deep and ancient prejudice in the foreign press against India's viewpoint.

The more the authorities tried to keep the foreign press at a distance, the more suspicious the foreign press got about the course of events at the front and convinced itself that the Indians had something to hide from them —and what is worse, they took their news from the more accessible Pakistani sources. This was exactly the opposite of what the publicity apparatus in New Delhi was trying to achieve by its clumsy tactics.

It is time that our armed forces "top brass" realized that the press and public relations, far from being a nuisance to be tolerated, are an essential adjunct of modern life, more so in a democracy. It is as much the duty of the Press to give the public and the country news of how their war is being fought for them by their Jawans as it is the duty of the "top brass" to give the press the facilities to discharge its duty to the people.

Lest I should be misunderstood, let me make it clear that it is entirely possible to give all legitimate facilities to the press without in the least jeopardising security considerations. The foreign correspondents constantly complained of vexatious, frustrating restrictions imposed on their functioning in New Delhi and compared them with the more trustful treatment they received in Pindi— the moral is clear: the party that gave them better treatment, got better coverage.

Nevertheless, the sneering cynicism displayed by the Western Press in distorting the Indian image, particularly in the earlier phases of the war, came as a revelation, and shook our faith in its veracity. Many of the newspapers' attitude could best be likened to that of a pack

of wolves, with salivating fangs, pouncing upon their kill rather than that of watch-dogs of truth and fairplay.

* * *

What, then, about Pakistan's political objectives in the war? That political aim was claimed to be the revival of the Kashmir problem, which India had declared as dead and buried five fathoms deep.

The only discernible sign of a likely attainment of that objective is the inclusion in the UN Resolution of a reference to the need of finding a political solution of the Indo-Pak differences as a follow-up to the cease-fire in the war. The actual words are "(consideration of) steps to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict." The first two clauses of the Resolution, namely, cease-fire and withdrawal of the forces of either side to their positions as on August 5 1965, are yet, three months after, far from being realized.

The Moscow-initiated and Washington-blessed Tashkent summit between Shastri and Ayub is another hope that Pakistan clings to.

But, on the other hand, Ayub's bloody attempt, through military force, to coerce India on the Kashmir question—now that the attempt has failed and embittered feelings, all the more—has resulted in India finally banging and bolting the door on any negotiations with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.

Indeed, never before in the eighteen-year history of this Indo-Pak dispute has New Delhi been so categorical and unequivocal in its declaration that Kashmir is an integral part of India and that it is a closed chapter, never to be reopened. In the present mood and temper of the country, no Government in New Delhi dare agree to negotiate with Pakistan on the status of Kashmir.

In the meantime, there are indications that world opinion, and particularly American opinion, is shedding its fascination for the clichés, "self-determination" and "plebiscite," and seem to favour any practical solution of the problem, the accent now being on the restoration of permanent peace in the Indo-Pak continent.

Thus Shastri goes to Tashkent with a mandate from the nation that he is free to discuss the entire gamut of Indo-Pak differences with a view to banishing tensions and restoring peace between the two neighbour countries, but so far as Kashmir is concerned, that state is not negotiable. That, of course, did not mean that there could not be a settlement of the problem on the basis of *status quo,* with appropriate adjustments of the present borderline between the two Kashmirs.

Thus, Pakistan which has, for the last eighteen years, set her heart on getting hold of the beautiful vale of Kashmir, is doomed to disappointment. If past experience is any index, however, Pakistan will not take it lying down. She might resort to other tricks and methods to wheedle the coveted Valley out of the Indian Union.

* * *

In other words, where do we go from here? Violations of the cease-fire are intermittent, and not a day passes without incidents and exchange of fire between the forces on either side.

Pakistan has sworn that she will not give up the 210 square-miles territory she has seized in Jammu. India has made it clear that if Pakistan does not get out of Jammu, the Indian Army would continue to sit on the doorstep of Lahore and Sialkot till "thy kingdom come." Nor is India prepared to withdraw from the Uri-Poonch Bulge,

and the several posts taken in the Tithwal and Kargil sectors.

All along the line the troops of either side are standing face to face, with loaded guns, which is the primary cause of the constant breaches of the cease-fire. This unnatural and combustible situation cannot, in the very nature of things, continue for long without a major "bust-up." Nor can Pakistan tolerate for ever the Indian Army breathing down the neck of Lahore and Sialkot, their two key cities.

Besides, a public opinion fed on heady, though fictitious, stories of victories in battle and war against India is bound to intensify its agitation to "finish off the job" by expelling the Indians from Ichhogil Canal and "liberating" the "Kashmiri Muslims" from "Hindu colonialism."

The Pakistani people do not yet know of the fate suffered by their Pattons and Sabrejets. Many of them would still be wondering if the Pakistani forces won the war, how come the Indian Army is sitting on Ichhogil Canal, in the backyard of Lahore!

As a result of the Twentytwo-day War, the Pakistani leadership and Army have now, however, developed a healthy respect for India's armed strength, and would not, any more, light-heartedly undertake a military adventure against India. But fight India, they must; about which Pakistan is convinced. And the Pakistani Army is still not beaten—far from it.

The logic of the situation therefore leads one to the conclusion that Pakistan will get even closer than hitherto with China and possibly, next summer, have another go at India, this time with more active collusion and collaboration with Peking right in the field of battle.

One significant feature of President Ayub's visit to the White House in December was that even though he was desperately anxious to please President Johnson, he drew

the line when it came to giving up his flirtation with Mao. For he had no doubt in his mind that in the pursuit of Pakistan's main passion to get even with India, Peking must be given a higher priority than Washington.

Much as Ayub might persist in his current feat of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, his latest Washington trip brought him to the point where he had to choose once for all, either Washington or Peking. President Johnson may soon compel him to divulge his choice.

This brief war had lessons for us, Indians, too. It rubbed into us certain vital facts of international life: that God is on the side of the legions; that the world respects only military strength; and that in such a world, Gandhian pacifism is entirely misplaced and misconstrued. We live and learn.

This bitter realization may indeed prove a watershed in this country's foreign policy, philosophy and history. The nation emerged out of the Twentytwo-day War with "Self-reliance" as its watchword and a deep distrust of dependence on other countries in military matters.

Appendix 1

THE KUTCH AGREEMENT

[Text of the Kutch Agreement signed between India and Pakistan on June 30, 1965.]

WHEREAS both the Governments of India and Pakistan have agreed to a cease-fire and to restoration of the *status quo* as at January 1, 1965, in the area of the Gujarat-West Pakistan border, in the confidence that this will also contribute to a reduction of the present tension along the entire Indo-Pakistan border;

Whereas it is necessary that after the *status quo* has been established in the aforesaid Gujarat-West Pakistan border area, arrangements should be made for determination and demarcation of the border in that area:

THE ARTICLES

Now, therefore, the two Governments agree that the following action shall be taken in regard to the said area,

ARTICLE 1:
There shall be an immediate cease-fire with effect from 0030 hrs. GMT July 1, 1965.

ARTICLE 2:
On the cease-fire:
(*i*) All troops on both sides will immediately begin to withdraw;
(*ii*) This process will be completed with seven days;
(*iii*) Indian police may then re-occupy the post at Chhadbet

in strength no greater than that employed at the post on December 31, 1964;

(*iv*) Indian and Pakistan police may patrol on the tracks on which they were patrolling prior to January 1, 1965, provided that their patrolling will not exceed in intensity that which they were doing prior to January 1, 1965 and during the monsoon period will not exceed in intensity that done during the monsoon period of 1964;

(*v*) If patrols of Indian and Pakistan police should come into contact they will not interfere with each other, and in particular will act in accordance with West Pakistan-India border ground rules agreed to in January, 1960;

(*vi*) Officials of the two Governments will meet immediately after the cease-fire and from time to time thereafter as may prove desirable in order to consider whether any problems arise in the implementation of the provisions of paragraphs (*iii*) to (*v*) above and to agree on the settlement of any such problem.

ARTICLE 3:

(1) In view of the fact that:

(A) India claims that there is no territorial dispute as there is a well-established boundary running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch as shown in the pre-partition maps, which needs to be demarcated on the ground;

(B) Pakistan claims that the border between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch runs roughly along the 24th Parallel as is clear from several pre-partition and post-partition documents and therefore the dispute involves some 3,500 square miles of territory;

(C) At discussions in January, 1960, it was agreed by Ministers of the two Governments that they would each collect further data, regarding the Kutch-Sind boundary and that further discussions would be held later with a view to arriving at a settlement of this dispute:

(*i*) As soon as officials have finished the task referred to in Article 2(*vi*), which in any case will not be later than one month after the cease-fire, Ministers of the two Governments will meet in order to agree on the determination of the border in the light of their respective claims, and the arrangements for its demarcation. At this meeting and at any proceeding before the

tribunal referred to in Article 3(*ii*) and (*iv*) below, each Government will be free to present and develop their case in full.

(*ii*) In the event of no agreement between the Ministers of the two Governments on the determination of the border being reached within two months of the cease-fire, the two Governments shall, as contemplated in the joint communique of October 24, 1959, have recourse to the Tribunal referred to in (*iii*) below for determination of the border in the light of their respective claims and evidence produced before it and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on both parties.

(*iii*) For this purpose there will be constituted, within four months of the cease-fire, a Tribunal consisting of three persons, none of whom would be a national of either India or Pakistan. One member shall be nominated by each Government and the third member, who will be the Chairman, shall be jointly selected by the two Governments. In the event of the two Governments failing to agree on the selection of the Chairman within three months of the cease-fire they shall request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to nominate the Chairman.

(*iv*) The decision of the Tribunal referred to in (*iii*) above shall be binding on both Governments, and shall not be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both Governments undertake to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible and shall refer to the Tribunal for decision any difficulties which may arise between them in the implementation of these findings. For that purpose the Tribunal shall remain in being until its findings have been implemented in full.

Appendix 2

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1965

[*Following is the text of Security Council Resolution of September 4, 1965.*]

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/6651) dated September 3, 1965,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Concerned at the deteriorating situation along the cease-fire line in Kashmir,

1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease-fire.

2. Calls upon the two Governments to respect the cease-fire line and have all armed personnel of each party withdrawn to its own side of the line.

3. Calls upon the two Governments to co-operate fully with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance of the cease-fire.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three days on the implementation of this resolution.

Appendix 3

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 6, 1965

[Following is the text of Security Council Resolution of September 6, 1965.]

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Noting the Report by the Secretary-General on developments in the situation in Kashmir since the adoption of the Security Council Cease-fire Resolution on 4 September 1965 [S/RES/209 (1965)] being document S/6661 dated 6 September 1965, noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting which adds immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation;

1. Calls upon the Parties to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this Resolution and the Resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures possible to strengthen the UNMOGIP, and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the Resolutions and on the situation in the area;

3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security in the area.

Appendix 4

THE UN RESOLUTION

[The text of the UN Security Council's Resolution dated September 20, 1965, that called for a cease-fire to the fighting between India and Pakistan.]

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, having considered the reports of the Secretary-General on his consultations with the Governments of India and Pakistan, commending the Secretary-General for his unrelenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the Security Council's resolutions of September 4 and 6.

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan.

Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/6683), but noting further with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into being.

Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences between the two countries on Kashmir and other related matters.

1. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday, September 22, 1965, at 7 a.m. GMT (12.30 p.m. IST) and calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before August 5, 1965.

2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel.

3. Calls on all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area.

4. Decides to consider as soon as operative Paragraph One of the Council's resolution 210 of September 6 has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end.

5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the Security Council thereon. [*Reuter.*]

Appendix 5

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN KASHMIR WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND THE FUNCTIONING OF UNMOGIP

PART I

Purpose of this Report

1. THIS REPORT on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to recent extensive disregard for the Cease-Fire Agreement and the Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir (CFL), together with the functioning of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is submitted in order to provide information for the use of the Council. In the course of my recent consultations with members of the Council, a need for a report from me was generally expressed. The report will serve to inform the Members of the grave situation that has developed in Kashmir, of my deep concern about it, and of the steps I have been taking in past weeks in seeking to avert further deterioration of that situation and to restore normal condition in the area. For this same purpose, I presented to the Council members individually on 31 August an informal and confidential paper, which was made available also to India and Pakistan.

Gravity of the situation

2. There can be little doubt that the Kashmir problem has again become acute and is now dangerously serious. Implicit in it, in my view, is a potential threat to peace not only between India and Pakistan, but to the broader peace. As Secretary-

General, my primary concern at this stage has been necessarily with the current breaches of the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL. There is, of course, a long and extensive background to the Kashmir problem, of which the Cease-Fire Agreement is but one aspect. No effort is made in this report to assess the political background of the problem or the possible root causes of the recent unusually large number of violations of the CFL. Thus, reference to the political factors in the broad Kashmir issue, past and present, and political assessments or judgments are avoided here. Though fully aware of the political factors and their implications, I could not presume to act as political arbiter. It is enough to say here that, for whatever reasons, the Cease-Fire Agreement entered into by the parties at Karachi on 29 July 1949, thus realizing an objective of Security Council resolution S/726 of 21 August 1948, has collapsed, although I hope only temporarily. Each side, naturally, puts forth justifications for its actions which have led to this condition. In any case, it seems to me that the quiet which would result from mutual observance of the Cease-Fire by India and Pakistan would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir are sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peace in that area is ever to be secure.

UNMOGIP

3. The United Nations maintains UNMOGIP with its forty-five Observers along the CFL of almost 500 miles, about half of which is in high mountains and is very difficult of access. UNMOGIP exercises the quite limited function of observing and reporting, investigating complaints from either party of violations of the CFL and the Cease-Fire and submitting the resultant findings on those investigations to each party and to the Secretary-General, and keeping the Secretary-General informed in general on the way in which the Cease-Fire Agreement is being kept. Because the role of UNMOGIP appears frequently to be misunderstood, it bears emphasis that the operation has no authority or function entitling it to enforce or prevent anything, or to try to ensure that the Cease-Fire is respected. Its very presence in the area, of course, has acted to some extent as a deterrent, but this is not the case at present.

The Secretary-General exercises responsibility for the supervision and administrative control of the UNMOGIP operation.

Increase in violations of Cease-Fire

4. There has been a disturbing increase in the number of incidents involving violations of the CFL since the beginning of 1965. In mid-June of this year, for example, General Nimmo reported that during the previous five months, a total of 2,231 complaints from both sides charging violation of the Cease-Fire had been submitted to UNMOGIP. Most of these involved firing across the CFL, although some concerned crossings of the Line by armed men. As of that date, 377 violations in all categories had been confirmed by investigations of the Observers, 218 of which were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India. Some of these violations took the form of "heavy and prolonged firing" from weapons up to the calibre of field artillery. Among the most serious of the violations was one that occurred in May of this year when Indian troops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remained in occupation of them. In the interest of preserving the CFL, I appealed to the Government of India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the Line. On assurance from me that UN Observers would henceforth be stationed on both sides of the Line in that area, which India considered strategically vital to the security of the Srinagar-Leh Road, the Government of India agreed to do so and in due course the Indian troops were withdrawn, thus closing the matter and making unnecessary any further consideration of a report on it to the Security Council. Subsequently, there were some military attacks on the road by armed elements from the Pakistan side.

Events since 5 August

5. The current serious trouble affecting the Cease-Fire and the CFL in Kashmir dates from 5 August 1965, and consists of a large number of violations of the CFL by crossings of the Line, by firing across it with artillery pieces, and by the occupation of positions on the wrong side of the Line. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, has been sending the

United Nations Headquarters daily cables on the incidents that have been occurring as reported to him, together with as much confirmed information as possible on the basis of the investigations of specific incidents by United Nations Military Observers. The investigations, being conducted on the spot, require time, of course, particularly since some of the places are very difficult of access, fighting is going on and roads are sometimes closed by military order. UNMOGIP has never before been called upon to cope with such a great number of simultaneous violations of the CFL. The adequacy of the present number of Observers and of their function may well be reappraised in the light of experiences since 5 August.

6. General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side. This is a conclusion reached by General Nimmo on the basis of investigations by the United Nations Observers, in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities and their proximity to the CFL, even though in most cases the actual identity of those engaging in the armed attacks on the Indian side of the Line and their actual crossing of it could not be verified by direct observation or evidence. As regards violations by artillery, there was heavy and prolonged artillery fire across the Line from the Pakistan side in the Chamb/Bhimber area on 15-16 August, and on 19 and 26 August the town of Punch was shelled from the Pakistan side, some of the shells hitting the building occupied by UN Military Observers. Pakistan artillery again shelled the town of Punch on 28 August. There was an exchange of artillery fire between the Uri sector on the Indian side and the Chakothi sector on the Pakistan side on 14 August. Also, it has been confirmed and reported on 25 August that Indian artillery shelled the village of Awan, in Pakistan, five miles from the CFL in the Bhimber sector. It is likewise confirmed that as of 24 August armed elements from Pakistan were still occupying Indian positions (pickets) north of Mandi in the Punch Sector of the CFL. On the other hand, it is confirmed by both UN Observers and official Indian sources that on 15 August, Indian Army troops reoccupied the Pakistan positions in the Kargil area and have remained there; Indian

Army troops on 24 August supported by artillery occupied and retained Pakistan positions in the Tangdhar-Nauseri (Tithwal) area; while on 27/28 August, Indian artillery shelled the area north of Punch on the Pakistan side and Indian troops crossed the CFL in the Uri-Bedori area. It has been confirmed that Indian troops have reached the Haji Pir Pass, which is five miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL on the Uri-Punch road. Each instance of violation is protested by the UN Observers who demand that troops on the wrong side of the Line be withdrawn.

7. UNMOGIP received an Indian complaint of Pakistan shelling, on 1 September, of pickets and a battalion Headquarters in the Chamb area of the Jammu-Bhimber sector of the Cease-Fire Line. The complaint stated that at 0230 hours on that date one and a half Pakistan tank squadrons crossed the Cease-Fire Line in this area, supported by artillery. Pakistan artillery was also said to have fired on a battalion Headquarters near Punch from 1630 hours on 1 September and on an Indian battalion Headquarters in the Jangar area. The substance of these complaints was subsequently confirmed by United Nations Military Observers. A Pakistan complaint reported that Indian soldiers had crossed the CFL in strength in the Kargil, Tithwal and Uri-Punch sectors, as reported above. Pakistan, in this complaint also affirmed the crossing of the CFL by Pakistan troops in the Bhimber area on 1 September, as a defensive measure to forestall Indian action, asserting also that in this sector the Indian Air Force had taken offensive action against Pakistan troops. Also on 1 September armed infiltrators ambushed an Indian convoy at Gund, north-east of Srinagar on the Leh Road and both sides sustained casualties. On 2 September the Jammu team of UNMOGIP received an Indian complaint that Pakistan aircraft had attacked the road between Chamb and Jaurian during the morning of 2 September and that Jaurian village was in flames. The air attack on Jaurian was confirmed by UN Military Observers. The complaint also alleged that Pakistan troops had crossed the border with approximately 90 tanks and were moving from Chamb sector toward the east. Pakistan artillery fired in the Punch area during the night of 1/2 September and in the afternoon of 2 September.

8. An annotated list of complaints of incidents of violation that have been investigated thus far by the Observers, as

reported to me by General Nimmo, is presented in Part II of this report. [*See* Appendix 7.]

Efforts of the Secretary-General

9. On the morning of 9 August, a cable was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the CFL. On the basis of this report, I saw the Representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the Line, and also my strong appeal that the CFL be observed. That same afternoon I saw the Representative of India, told him of the information I had received from General Nimmo and of the démarche I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days, I repeated these appeals orally for transmission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the Line be withdrawn to its own side. I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the Cease-Fire and the CFL will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that Line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by their Representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the Cease-Fire Agreement and the CFL if Pakistan does likewise. In the meantime, reports from UNMOGIP as of 30 August indicate a continuation of violations of the Cease-Fire and the CFL from both sides.

10. In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation as of 16 August, I gave consideration to a further step in the form of a draft statement about the Cease-Fire violations which was designed for public release. The draft was handed to the two Representatives to be transmitted for the information of their Governments. Both Governments reacted promptly. The Government of India had no objection to the release of the statement but at first wished certain modifications which, in part

at least, I regarded as unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative about the statement in general on the grounds that it favoured India in that it dealt only with the current cease-fire situation without presenting the political background of the broad issue and thus was lacking in balance, since a cease-fire alone supports the *status quo* to India's benefit.

11. Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicating or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it. I thought it might be helpful to make another quiet effort toward achieving observance of the Cease-Fire through a new approach to the two Governments. Consequently, I gave thought to the possibility of sending urgently to the area a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the purpose of meeting and talking with appropriate authorities of the two Governments and with General Nimmo; conveying to the Governments my very serious concern about the situation; and exploring with them ways and means of preventing any further deterioration in that situation and regaining quiet along the CFL. If such a mission had materialized, I had it in mind to ask Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, to undertake it. The idea was broached by me informally to the two parties on 20 August. The subsequent responses of the Governments, while not negative, involved in each case conditions which, in my view, would make the mission not feasible at that time and therefore I abandoned it.

12. As a further and immediate step, however, on 23 August I asked General Nimmo to come promptly to United Nations Headquarters for consultation with me about the situation in Kashmir, and he arrived in New York from Srinagar on the 26th. Consideration of other efforts that I might make was then undertaken in the light of the discussions with General Nimmo.

13. General Nimmo's reports on incidents continue to be received as the Military Observers carry out their investigations of specific actions. The procedure that has been followed is for General Nimmo to submit the reports of the investigations of each incident and the Observers' findings fixing blame, to

each party, confidentially, and to send copies to me, without any public disclosure. This procedure, which has been found to be in the best interest of the effective functioning of UNMOGIP is being continued.

14. In view of alarming reports indicating a steady escalation of the fighting in the air and on the ground, involving regular army forces on both sides, I addressed on 1 September an appeal to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan which was circulated to the Council in document S/6647.

Conditions for a Restoration of the Cease-Fire

15. Restoration of the Cease-Fire and a return to normal conditions along the CFL can be achieved only under the following conditions:

(*a*) A willingness of both parties to respect the Agreement they have entered into.

(*b*) A readiness on the part of the Government of Pakistan to take effective steps to prevent crossings of the CFL from the Pakistan side by armed men, whether or not in uniform.

(*c*) Evacuation by each party of positions of the other party now occupied and withdrawal of all armed personnel of each party to its own side of the line, which would include the withdrawal once more of Indian troops from Pakistan positions in the Kargil area.

(*d*) A halt by both parties to the firing across the CFL that has been occurring from both sides in some sectors with artillery and smaller guns.

(*e*) Allowing full freedom of movement and access to United Nations Observers by both parties on both sides of the line.

Appendix 6

SECOND REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN KASHMIR

THIS REPORT is submitted urgently so that Members of the Council may be informed of new and serious developments in the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir since the adoption by the Security Council on 4 September of the Resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.

2. The Council's Resolution was notified to the Governments of India and Pakistan immediately after its adoption on 4 September. No official response to this call for a cease-fire has been received from either Government.

3. Reports received from the Chief Military Observer in Kashmir, General Nimmo, on 5 and 6 September indicate that the fighting continues on both sides of the Cease-Fire Line. Indeed, it is clear that the conflict between India and Pakistan is broadening and intensifying.

4. General Nimmo has reported the following incidents of fighting as breaches of the cease-fire since 4 September:

(A) To General Nimmo's 'official protest and urgent request' for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the Chhamb sector which was lodged on 4 September, the C.O.S. Pakistan gave the following reply:

"We are aware of your genuine efforts to make the Indians vacate their aggression. But having seen the hopelessness of these efforts we were forced to take action to stop the Indians from annexing Azad Kashmir. Our action was taken after repeated requests to you to convey to Indians that their failure to vacate positions on our side of CFL will have very serious consequences. Indians apparently

refused to heed our warning. They are maintaining their occupation of posts on our side of CFL in Kargil, Tithwal and Uri-Punch sectors and have now crossed the CFL in yet another sector. Under these circumstances how can you expect us to unilaterally halt our purely defensive operations which are designed to forestall Indian aggressions?"

(B) Observers in the Jammu sector on morning of 5 September observed two Pakistan Jet fighters in the sector which were engaged by Indian anti-aircraft.

(C) The following information concerning the Haji Pir area is confirmed; an Indian Infantry Brigade, supported by two Field Artillery Batteries (Wt Pounders) and one medium gun is operating on that front. The Brigade is deployed on a 12-mile front. The Indian Command informed the Military Observers that the action in the Haji Pir Pass area was necessary in self-defence to cut off infiltrators.

(D) A Captain captured at the Haji Pir Pass was interviewed by a United Nations Observer and stated that he belonged to the 6th Azad Kashmir Battalion and was in charge of 100 Mujahids whose task was to harass Indian troops covering Uri.

(E) Indian Local Commander in the Baramula sector confirmed to United Nations Observers that his troops had crossed the CFL in Sunjoi (3 miles north of Tangdhar) and had captured some hill features with the aim of cutting the supply line to Pakistan infiltrators in the north of the Tangdhar area, specifically a Pakistan Company Group located 5 miles north of Sanjoi and one and one-and-a-half miles on the Indian side of the CFL. On September 5 at 1807 hours the Pakistan Local Command at Domel complained that Indian troops had occupied Sunjoi East 8942 after heavy shelling on the night of 3-4 September.

(F) As regards the Jammu-Bhimber sector of the Cease-Fire Line United Nations Observers at Jammu were informed by the Indian Local Command on 5 September at 1200 hours that "Pakistan troops attacked along the Jaurian-Akhnur Road with two Armoured Regiments and along the road Kalit-Akhnur with one Armoured Regiment and were approximately 14 miles on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line". They also stated that the attack was being supported by three

Medium Artillery Regiments, two Self-propelled 155 mm Regiments and one 208 mm Battery. Military Observers had not confirmed this information at the time it was despatched but stated, however, that Radio Pakistan on 5 September at 2030 hours, had broadcast that "Azad Kashmir" and Pakistan troops had reached Jaurian on 5 September at 0800 hours, which is fourteen miles on the Indian side of the CFL. This corresponds with a statement attributed to a Pakistan spokesman that Pakistan forces had advanced to within a few miles of Akhnur. The Military Observers also reported that the Indian radio had broadcast on 5 September at 2100 hours that heavy fighting had taken place in the Jaurian area on 5 September.

(G) General Nimmo reported in the early morning of 6 September that the following information had just been received from the CGS Pakistan Command:

> "On 060500 September 1965 Indian troops have attacked across the West Pakistan border from Jassar Bridge (Pathankot area and south to Salamank). Major attacks Lahore, Sialkot from Jassar and Kasur from Ferozepur (all in Pakistan). Estimated strength whole Indian army less four Divisions."

General Nimmo also states that in this regard the United Nations Military Observers stationed in Sialkot had just reported hearing shelling east of their location which was coming from the border between Kashmir and Pakistan in the Jammu-Sialkot sector.

Appendix 7

ANNOTATED LIST OF THOSE INCIDENTS SINCE 5 AUGUST 1965 WHICH HAVE BEEN INVESTIGATED BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS PRIOR TO 3 SEPTEMBER 1965

LETTER dated 30 August 1965 from the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP to the Secretary-General.

I submit to you herewith an annotated list of recent incidents affecting the Cease-fire and the CFL in Kashmir. This list comprises only incidents on which complaints have been submitted asserting violation of the Cease-fire and the CFL between 5 and 30 August 1965 and which have been investigated and reported upon prior to 30 August. The list is by no means complete in the sense that in the stated period there have been many more complaints of incidents submitted by both parties which the Observers have not yet been able to investigate. The annotations on the list have been compiled from the information thus far submitted in my letters to you described as sections I through IV and in my cabled messages. The investigations of incidents continue and I shall, of course, keep you informed of their results. To my great regret, incidents are also continuing.

As you will note, the investigations, which often have to be carried out in extremely difficult circumstances and at varying lengths of time after the particular action has occurred, have in general not yet been able to verify, either through observation or direct evidence, the identity of those responsible for the action and participating in it, or whether and to what extent there has been in fact a crossing of the CFL.

(*Signed*) R. H. NIMMO
Lt.-General
Chief Military Observer, UNMOGIP

ANNOTATED LIST OF INCIDENTS ANNEXED TO THE LETTER OF 30 AUGUST FROM GENERAL NIMMO

1. *Incident of 5 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side of the CFL*

NATURE

On 5 August, an Indian patrol was attacked by a group estimated at about seventy armed men at a point 8,000 yards from the CFL.

The attackers abandoned a quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the attack had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the attackers and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was presumed that they did.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: three Indian soldiers and three attackers killed.

2. *Incident of 5/6 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 5/6 August, a clash took place in the Gulmarg area between an Indian patrol and a group of armed men, who, after firing at the patrol, disengaged, leaving behind a quantity of arms, ammunition and equipment.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers saw the abandoned materials and noted that the weapons had their markings scratched off.

3. *Incidents of 7/8 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on two Indian battalion headquarters and eight pickets, all located from three to six miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms, ammunition, equipment and leaflets calling the people of Kashmir to "holy war."

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed that the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was presumed that they did.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: one Indian soldier wounded and four raiders killed.

4. *Incidents of 7/8 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on five bridges, two formation headquarters and six pickets, all located between two to seventeen miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms and ammunition. Two raiders were captured by the Indian forces.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place.

The casualties of the attacks seen by the Observers included: thirteen Indian soldiers killed, twelve Indian soldiers wounded and one Indian policeman wounded; one raider killed and one wounded.

The Observers interviewed one of the captured raiders, who stated that he was a soldier of the 16 Azad Kashmir infantry battalion and that the raiding party was composed of about 300 soldiers of his battalion and 100 "mujahids" (armed civilians trained in guerilla tactics).

UN Observers noted that some of the materials said to have been abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

5. *Incidents of 7/8 August in the Jammu sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed

groups on two Indian battalion headquarters, two and six miles from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned some arms and ammunition.

INVESTIGATION

United Nations Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come across the CFL, although this was believed to be the case.

The casualties seen by United Nations Observers included: five Indian soldiers killed and five wounded.

6. *Incidents of 7/8 August in the Naushera sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 7/8 August, attacks were carried out by armed groups on one petrol oil and lubricant dump, one battalion headquarters and two pickets, all located 4,000 to 10,000 yards from the CFL.

The raiders abandoned a quantity of arms and ammunition.

INVESTIGATION

United Nations Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place, but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although it was thought that they had.

7. *Incidents in the Punch sector on the Indian side beginning on 7/8 August*

NATURE

On the night of 7/8 August, a group of raiders attacked an Indian picket fourteen miles northeast of Punch. In later attacks, large groups of raiders occupied the town of Mandi and several pickets in the area.

Indian troops recaptured Mandi on 12 August and continued their drive against the raiders.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed most of the reported fighting. The

number of raiders was estimated to exceed 1,000. The available evidence indicated that some of the raiders must have come from across the CFL.

As of 24 August, the raiders were still holding some Indian pickets north of Mandi. The situation was still confused and UN Observers were unable to visit some of the areas concerned because of continuing hostilities and closed roads.

8. *Incident of 10 August in the Kargil sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 10 August, attacks were carried out by small armed groups on 2 bridges and one picket, 6-8 miles from the CFL.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: 5 Indian soldiers, 2 Indian policemen and 1 raider killed; five Indian soldiers and one Indian army porter wounded.

The dress worn by the dead raider was similar to the uniform of Pakistan frontier corps of scouts.

9. *Incidents of 12 August in the Kotli sector on the Pakistan side*

NATURE

On 12 August, Indian troops fired 3.7″ howitzer artillery at the Mendhar area, 1 mile on the Pakistan side of the CFL. A bridge was damaged.

INVESTIGATION

The action was confirmed by UN Observers.

10. *Incidents of 13 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 13 August, the Indian picket at Naugam, 12 miles from the CFL, was attacked by a group estimated at about 40 men.

Later the convoy evacuating the wounded from Naugam was ambushed.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the attacks had taken place but could not determine with certainty the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although this was believed to be the case.

The casualties in those attacks were said to be 10 soldiers killed and 23 wounded on the Indian side. The Observers saw and interrogated 22 of the wounded soldiers.

11. *Incidents of 14 August in the Baramula/Domel sectors*

NATURE

On 14 August, the Uri area (7 miles on Indian side of the CFL) was shelled by Pakistan artillery from the Chakothi area (12 miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL).

Indian artillery returned the fire later.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the shelling from both sides.

12. *Incidents of 14/15 August in the Skardu/Kargil sectors on the Pakistan side*

NATURE

On the afternoon on 14 August, Indian troops fired with 120 mm mortar across the CFL in the Dalunang area.

On 15 August, Indian troops crossed the CFL and occupied 3 Pakistan positions near the Line, northeast of Kargil.

INVESTIGATION

These actions were confirmed by UN Observers.

13. *Incidents in the Jammu/Bhimber sector on the Indian side beginning on 14 August*

NATURE

On 14 August, armed elements from the Pakistan side allegedly crossed the CFL in the Chhamb area and penetrated up to 1

mile on the Indian side of the Line. Indian positions along the CFL were subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Pakistan side on 15-16 August. The attacking forces captured 9 Indian positions on 16-17 August.

As of 26 August, the Indian forces had reportedly recaptured 7 pickets and continued their counter-attack with artillery support.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the shelling of Indian positions and considerable fighting in the area.

On 15 and 17 August, the Observers saw at a hospital in Jammu 62 Indian soldiers wounded during the incidents and were told that there were more casualties.

The Observers were unable to investigate most of the alleged attacks on the spot because of continuing hostilities.

14. *Incidents of 15 August in the Jammu sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 15 August, an armed group raided the village of Rajpur, 5 miles on the Indian side of the Pakistan Jammu border.

11 villagers were reportedly killed and 4 wounded.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the attacks, but could not determine the identity of the raiders and in particular whether any of them had come from across the CFL, although this was the presumption.

15. *Incident of 16 August in the Galuthi sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 16 August, a convoy of Indian vehicles, civilian buses and one UN jeep was fired upon with 2″ mortars, rocket launchers and small arms on the main road from Punch to Galuthi.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the incident.

They saw eight Indian soldiers killed, seven wounded and three vehicles destroyed by bullet and grenades. The UN jeep was hit by bullets.

16. *Incident of 18/19 August in the Kargil sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the night of 18/19 August, an armed group attacked an Indian battalion headquarters and an adjacent road construction camp.

The attackers abandoned a quantity of equipment.

INVESTIGATION

The attack was confirmed by UN Observers.

The casualties seen by the Observers included: 2 road construction workers killed and 2 wounded.

17. *Incident of 19 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 19 August, Pakistan field artillery fired 25 pounder shells across the CFL on the airfield and the hospital at Punch.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the shelling.

They were told by the Pakistan command that this limited action was necessary because the airfield was being used by Indian aircraft to direct Indian artillery fire against Pakistan positions and that the hospital was hit by accident.

18. *Incident of 24 August in Pakistan near the Bhimber sector*

NATURE

On 24 August, Indian artillery shelled the village of Awan in Pakistan, 1,000 yards south of Pakistan-Kashmir border and five miles west of the CFL in the Bhimber sector.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed the shelling.

19. *Incident of 24 August in the Baramula/Domel sectors on the Pakistan side*

NATURE

On 24 August, Indian troops supported by artillery, crossed the CFL and occupied Pakistan positions in the Tangdhar/Nauseri (Tithwal) area.

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers confirmed this action.

The attack was admitted by the Indian local commander who claimed that Pakistan forces had attacked first.

20. *Incident of 24 August in the Baramula sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

It was reported on 24 August that in a clash at the Chor Panjal pass six miles on the Indian side of the CFL, Indian troops had killed twenty-one "intruders."

INVESTIGATION

UN Observers visited the site of the clash and saw nine bodies dressed in green "selwar" (trousers) and "kamiz" (shirts). The clothing and general appearance of the bodies led the Observers to believe that they were those of Azad Kashmir soldiers.

21. *Incident of 26 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 26 August, Pakistan artillery shelled the area of the town of Punch.

INVESTIGATION

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

22. *Incidents of 27/28 August in the Punch/Rawalakot sectors on the Pakistan side*

NATURE

On 27/28 August, Indian artillery in the Punch area fired 25 pounder shells at the Pakistan side across the CFL north of Punch.

Indian troops crossed the CFL from the Uri area into the Bedori area on the Pakistan side of the Line.

UN Observers confirmed these actions.

As of 29 August, Indian troops had reportedly reached the Haji Pir Pass, five miles on the Pakistan side of the CFL on the Uri/Punch road.

23. *Incident of 28 August in the Punch sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 28 August, Pakistan artillery shelled the area of the town of Punch for half-an-hour.

INVESTIGATION

This action was confirmed by UN Observers.

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SUMMARIES OF INCIDENTS REPORTED BY GENERAL NIMMO SINCE HIS LETTER OF 30 AUGUST

1. *Incident of 1 September in the Naushera sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the morning of 1 September, Pakistan artillery fired at an Indian battalion headquarters in the Jangar area about 2.5 miles from the CFL.

INVESTIGATION

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

2. *Incident of 1 September in the Srinagar area on the Indian side*

NATURE

On 1 September, an Indian convoy was ambushed by an armed group at Gund, 24 miles on the Indian side of the CFL on the Srinagar-Leh road.

INVESTIGATION

The attack was confirmed by UN Observers.

The Observers saw the bodies of 8 attackers, one prisoner captured during the clash and a quantity of arms and equipment left by the attackers.

The prisoner informed the Observers that he was a member of the Karakoram Scouts (based in the Skardu sector on the Pakistan side) and that he and a number of other scouts had been selected to destroy the bridge at Gund on the Srinagar-Leh road.

The Observers also noted that some of the arms and equipment abandoned by the raiders were manufactured in Pakistan.

3. *Incidents of 1 and 2 September in the Punch sector on the Indian side*

NATURE

On the afternoon of 1 September, on the night of 1/2 September and again on the afternoon of 2 September, Pakistan artillery fired with 25 pounders at the Punch area.

INVESTIGATION

The shelling was confirmed by UN Observers.

4. *Incidents on the Indian side in the Jammu/Bhimber sectors beginning on 1 September*

NATURE

On 1 September, the Indian command complained that early on 1 September, Pakistan artillery shelled an Indian battalion headquarters and Indian pickets in the Chhamb area. One and one-half tank squadrons later crossed the CFL and attacked an Indian picket located 2 miles from the CFL.

A second complaint received on 1 September stated that 3 Indian pickets had been occupied by Pakistan troops and that the artillery and tank attack was still in progress.

On 2 September, the Indian command reported that on the morning of 2 September Pakistan aircraft attacked the road between Chhamb and Jaurian, 14 miles east of the CFL and 5 miles of the Pakistan/Jammu border, with rockets and machine-gun fire. It was claimed that Pakistan troops had crossed the border with approximately 90 tanks and that by the afternoon of 2 September 16 of those tanks had been destroyed.

INVESTIGATION

The Pakistan command informed UNMOGIP on 2 September that its troops had crossed the CFL on 1 September in the Bhimber sector, pointing out that this was a purely defensive measure to forestall Indian action in the area. It complained that for the first time since the Cease-fire on 1 January 1949 Indian aircraft had intervened in ground battle by taking offensive action against Pakistan troops in the Bhimber sector. Four Indian vampires were reportedly shot down by Pakistan aircraft.

UN Observers confirmed most of the reported actions had taken place.

Although the Observers had been unable to proceed west of the Munawarwali river since the beginning of the Pakistan thrust, the evidence available to them as of 2 September seems to indicate that the Pakistan troops have managed to occupy an area of approximately 30 square miles, roughly extending 5 miles east of the CFL up to the Munawarwali river and 6 miles north of the border up to the Chhamb village area.

Appendix 8

RISE TO MEET THE CHALLENGE

[*Text of Prime Minister Shastri's broadcast to the Nation, New Delhi, September 3, 1965.*]

MY FELLOW COUNTRYMEN: I speak to you tonight to acquaint you with the situation that has arisen as a result of Pakistan's aggression against us and to share with you the anxieties and the responsibilities devolving on us in this critical hour. As you know, on September 1, Pakistan mounted a heavy attack in brigade strength in the Chhamb sector of Jammu. The attack was supported by heavy artillery and tanks of the Pakistan army. Our Armed Forces went into action against them and knocked out several tanks and many army vehicles. Pakistan's initial thrust has been halted. An instance of what Pakistan is doing in that area is the bombing by the Pakistan Air Force of civilians, killing many men, women and children, as well as destroying a mosque. The people of Jammu and Kashmir are facing the situation with great fortitude. I wish to pay a warm tribute to our security forces. The whole nation is proud of them and has the fullest confidence in their ability to defend the country. The whole country stands behind them.

The attempt of the armed raiders who had entered Kashmir earlier to damage bridges and administrative and military centres and to commit other acts of sabotage, has largely failed. The raiders failed also in enlisting the sympathy of the local population. In fact, they had to indulge in acts of loot and arson to sustain themselves. The raiders were able to move about in villages for a few days under the cover of darkness, but this phase is now over and many of the infiltrators have been driven to seek cover in thick jungles. The presence of these infiltrators within Kashmir and their sporadic attempts at

sabotage make it essential that we should be constantly alert and vigilant.

The infiltrators were well armed with modern weapons and the whole operation was conceived, planned and executed by Pakistan. This, we believe, has been established beyond doubt in the reports submitted by the Chief Military Observer to the United Nations Secretary-General. These reports, in spite of our request, have not seen the light of day. We have dealt successfully with hundreds of infiltrators and, as an inescapable measure of self-defence, we have to take military action to occupy certain strategic posts beyond the cease-fire line in order to block the routes of the infiltrators. Some bands of raiders are, however, still attempting to come in with full backing of the Pakistan army. Pakistan has denied responsibility for such infiltrations. The Pakistan Government has endeavoured to create the myth, and this myth has been reiterated in President Ayub Khan's broadcast of September 1, that the infiltrators are freedom fighters and that there is an internal revolt in Kashmir. The whole world knows that there is no revolt. The Indian people of Kashmir have remained calm and have co-operated with the authorities in tracking down the infiltrators.

In 1947-48, Pakistan continued to deny for several months after she had sent her troops illegally into Kashmir, that they were there. It was only in 1948, when the truth could no longer be hidden, that the Pakistan representative confessed to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan that Pakistan forces had been fighting in Kashmir for several months.

In the Agreement between India and Pakistan in connection with the Gujarat-West Pakistan border, signed on June 30 of this year, Pakistan solemnly affirmed its hope that the Agreement would result in better relations and easing of tensions between India and Pakistan. The conscience of the world would be shocked to know that even at the time that this Agreement was being signed, Pakistan had already drawn up a plan of armed infiltrations into Kashmir and was training its personnel in Murree for the operations which were undertaken just over a month later, even before the ink was dry on the Agreement of June 30. Such conduct speaks for itself.

The Pakistani ruling circles accuse India of practising colonialism in Kashmir. President Ayub seems to have forgotten that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, juridically and in fact,

is a part of India. The people of Kashmir are Indian citizens who enjoy all the rights and privileges guaranteed to them under the Constitution of India unlike their unfortunate brethren across the cease-fire line in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Let me add that our quarrel is not with the people of Pakistan. We wish them well, we want them to prosper and we want to live in peace and friendship with them.

What we are up against is a regime which does not believe in freedom, democracy and peace, as we do. It talks glibly of a plebiscite in Kashmir, while it is not prepared to have a free election in its own country. In the State of Jammu and Kashmir there have been three elections since 1949. What once was a princely State, ruled on dynastic principles, is now a State in our Federation under a Constitution which guarantees civil rights, freedom of worship and free elections. How would Pakistan like a plebiscite in the Pakhtoon area to find out whether it wishes to remain a part of Pakistan? How would Pakistan like a plebiscite in East Bengal to find out whether the people of East Bengal want to be ruled from Rawalpindi?

What is at stake in the present conflict is a point of principle. Has any country the right to send its armed personnel to another with the avowed object of overthrowing a democratically elected Government?

I have received a communication from the Secretary-General of the United Nations containing an appeal to both sides to observe the cease-fire line. The Secretary-General has appealed both to Pakistan and to India for peace. We believe in peace. We have worked for it and we shall never cease to work for peace.

Those who want peace will always have our support and co-operation, but they must face the realities of the situation. A cease-fire is not peace. We cannot simply go from one cease-fire to another and wait till Pakistan chooses to start hostilities again.

President Ayub, in his recent broadcast, referred to the conversation he had with me in October 1964. It is perfectly true that, when I agreed to meet President Ayub, I had done so with a desire to promote a better understanding between India and Pakistan. He had brought up the Kashmir question and said that Pakistan felt strongly about this matter. At that time, I had told him in reply, in the clearest possible terms, that if

public opinion in Pakistan was very strong on this matter, the Indian opinion was also equally strong, if not stronger than that in Pakistan. There was, therefore, no easy solution to this problem. I asked him to devote attention to other issues which were urgent, for instance, the question of continuous firing across the cease-fire line. President Ayub said that he was himself worried over this and was willing to have this position reviewed immediately. In fact he himself suggested a meeting of the commanders of the two sides to sort out this problem. When subsequently such an idea was mooted, Pakistan did not react favourably. President Ayub did raise the question of evictees and I also referred to the huge number of refugees coming into India. It was agreed between us that the Home Ministers of the two Governments should meet to discuss this matter. On my return to India, action was initiated for a meeting of the Home Ministers. Specific dates were suggested on more than one occasion, but Pakistan, on one pretext or another, did not agree to our suggestions for quite some time. Eventually, November 23, 1964, was fixed and India's delegation was announced, but this meeting was called off by Pakistan on the ground that they were busy with their elections. These details I am mentioning because apparently President Ayub has forgotten them altogether. That can be the only reason for his having made the observations that he did.

What is the duty and responsibility of our citizens in this hour of serious crisis? Your foremost duty at the present moment is to do everything possible to ensure that peace is not disturbed and that communal harmony is maintained. There are no Hindus, no Muslims, no Christians, no Sikhs, but only Indians. I am confident that the people of this country who have given proof of their patriotism and commonsense on so many occasions in the past, will stand united as one man to defend their country. We must all be on guard against mischief-makers and enemy agents who may try to instigate communal disturbances. The Government will deal firmly with any such persons.

Our security scheme in regard to Civil Defence measures is being enforced with immediate effect in the Punjab and in Delhi. Later, it would be extended to additional areas. Those of you who are called upon to participate in this scheme should come forward and undertake the task in the spirit of a soldier

at his post. Home Guards will be strengthened in the urban areas. I would like men and women to join the Home Guards in large numbers. To the industrial workers, I would like to address a personal appeal. I know of their patriotism and I am sure it would be uppermost in their minds. We have to maximise production in our industrial units and we have to maintain our communications, our harbours and our supply lines in a state of maximum efficiency. Every worker should make the best possible contribution he can towards the achievement of these objectives.

The men of business and industry have a very heavy responsibility in the present situation. The supply of essential consumer goods to the community must be maintained. Prices have not only to be maintained; they have to be brought down. Men engaged in the wholesale and retail trades must themselves exercise great restraint and serve the country at this time with a sense of patriotic duty.

The country has to prepare itself for hard days ahead. Everyone must perform his duty fully and faithfully. We may have to suffer damage from air raids. The nation must get into the mood which is necessary for undergoing sufferings and making sacrifices cheerfully. This is the price of freedom which we all have to pay. This is a call to the nation to rise and meet the challenge.

Appendix 9

WE MUST NOT SLACKEN

[*Text of translation of speech in Hindi made at Ramlila Grounds, New Delhi, September 26, 1965.*]

AUGUST 5 is a date which has acquired a special significance in our history. It will be difficult for us to forget this date, at least for some time. The chain of events that started on August 5 is continuing even now. On that date, thousands of armed men from Pakistan entered Kashmir. They moved swiftly and created a dangerous situation, a situation which was dangerous not only for Kashmir but for all of us. You can imagine how serious a situation can become when five to seven thousand armed men invade a country. A few months ago, Mr Bhutto said that Pakistan had a "master plan" for Kashmir and that they proposed to follow this plan step by step. We were aware of what Mr Bhutto had said and, therefore, had some inkling of what was in store. But we could never have imagined that Pakistan would try to put her "master plan" into action so soon after the Kutch agreement. You all know how particular we were that the Kutch problem should be solved through peaceful negotiations. We also signed an Agreement to this effect. It is most unfortunate—and it has been a great shock to me personally—that even while we were in the process of signing the Kutch Agreement, full-fledged preparations for an attack on Kashmir were going on in Pakistan. What could be more improper and perfidious than this? While we on our part were trying our best to solve all our boundary problems peacefully, Pakistan was preparing to attack our country on a much larger scale than the attack in Kutch. Obviously, Pakistan was only making a show of willingness to solve the Kutch dispute peacefully.

This was the background of the attack on Kashmir. It was natural for us to fight back with all our power and all our resources in an effort to repulse this attack. The task of our security forces was no easy one, for these infiltrators came furtively in twos and threes taking cover in ravines and desolate mountain tracks. Pakistan believed that the people of Kashmir would revolt against their Government. The armed infiltrators were convinced that as soon as they entered Kashmir, the Kashmiri people would throw in their lot with them and help them in over-throwing the Government, so that their land could become part of Pakistan. The armed infiltrators attacked police posts, tried to reach the airport, and made many attempts to set fire to villages and towns. While they were indulging in such activities, the people of Kashmir did not give them food or shelter and did not co-operate with them in any way whatsoever. They demonstrated more clearly than any argument could have done that Kashmir was an integral part of India, and that it had nothing to do with Pakistan.

In my judgment, it was a great blow to Pakistan that a territory which they had imagined would join Pakistan within two or three days did not do anything of the kind. It soon became clear to Pakistan that the people of Kashmir, far from helping the intruders, would withstand their attack and stoutly resist them to the last. When this scheme of sending infiltrators into Kashmir to create a "revolution" did not succeed, Pakistan resorted to the method of attacking with regular armed forces. As you all know, India did not indulge in any aggressive activity, did not attack an inch of Pakistan's territory in the beginning. Even when they were sending armed men into Kashmir, we only took measures to prevent them from coming into our territory.

At first Pakistan's attack was a disguised one, and they persisted in saying that the trouble in Kashmir had been created by the people themselves. But in such matters truth cannot be concealed indefinitely, and Pakistan's intention became more than clear when they launched their full-scale attack in Chhamb with infantry divisions and a hundred tanks.

This was no border incident, and they crossed not only the cease-fire line but also the international border and entered the Chhamb territory of Jammu. Time was of the essence and we had to act quickly. Although Pakistan's attack on India was first

launched in Chhamb, they had an eye on our territory of Punjab also. As you know, they made a rocket attack on Amritsar and tried to destroy the airport near Wagah.

President Ayub had been talking a great deal about the tanks and other military equipment Pakistan had acquired and had on many occasions boasted that if they decided to march to Delhi, it would be a walkover. The military situation created by Pakistan was such that our Forces had no choice but to advance in the Lahore sector.

The British Government criticised India bitterly for her action and accused her of attacking Pakistan but did not say that India had been attacked by Pakistan when thousands of armed infiltrators from Pakistan entered Kashmir. Nor did they say a word when Pakistan crossed the international border, or even when Pakistan launched her massive attack on Chhamb with heavy armour.

Pakistan's attack was so formidable and so swift that we could not afford merely to talk of defending ourselves. We had to take decisive, effective action, without losing time. The needs of the situation could no longer be answered by local action. We could not afford to endanger the freedom of our country; no country in the world would have allowed its freedom to be threatened as ours was. We have always held fast to the principle of peace, but in the situation that was created, not to act would have been cowardice and sloth. The display of armed might we saw within our territory could be resisted only with arms. It is not customary to let out State secrets, but I can tell you that when our Generals consulted the Government about the situation, I told them firmly that there was no room for indecision, that they must go ahead and not flinch.

And the Indian Army did not flinch. They advanced in Sialkot, Kasur, Lahore and across the Rajasthan border. They took the town of Gadra and captured many posts and dug into their positions. The Security Council, and indeed the whole world, started to talk of peace. We have no objection to peace and do not want the conflict between Pakistan and India to become a conflagration where all the countries of the world have to come in. The world knows that we have time and again offered our services for peace-keeping operations. Our great leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, worked for peace all his life and on many occasions succeeded miraculously in averting war. We

cannot suddenly forget these principles. We hold steadfastly to the ideals of peace in the world. We want to live in our country in peace, so that we can work for progress, so that we can fight the poverty of our people and build up a new society for them. We are content in our own country and do not want to grab anybody else's territory. Nothing could be farther from our minds than to become the cause of armed conflicts in the world. That is why we agreed at once when the question of peace and a cease-fire was brought up. We had talks with the Secretary-General of the United Nations when he came here and told him that we would agree to a cease-fire. Even after Pakistan accepted the cease-fire, she continued air attacks and shelling on Indian positions and did not desist from trying to inch her way forward all along the border. It is for the United Nations or the Security Council to judge the appropriateness or otherwise of Pakistan's actions after the announcement of the cease-fire.

It has been said that it is we who have attacked Pakistan after the cease-fire. I want to say categorically that our armies have not attacked any part of Pakistan's territory anywhere, after the cease-fire. Of course, if they attack us, we have to resist them and repulse their attacks. But we on our part sincerely wish to maintain the cease-fire. Even after the cease-fire, Pakistan has been making free use of the language of threats. Every day Mr Bhutto makes menacing speeches. If the Security Council and the other big powers allow themselves to be pressurised by his speeches, it will create a very difficult situation for us. If Mr Bhutto maintains that Pakistani forces will withdraw when the Kashmir issue is solved, I would like to submit to him that the Kashmir issue cannot be solved in this way. If Pakistan is not willing to withdraw her forces, our Jawans will also stay where they are.

The issues in the Kashmir dispute are too well known to need repetition. Pakistan demands that we should withdraw from Haji Pir, Tithwal and from Kargil. But are they not in unlawful occupation of the whole of what they call "Azad Kashmir"? Is that a part of Pakistan? If you look at the old proposals and resolutions of the Security Council, you will see that the administration of the so-called "Azad Kashmir" is the responsibility of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan should first withdraw from the so-called "Azad Kashmir" and then talk to us of Tithwal and Kargil. Our stand

What are we afraid of? What is achieved if a handful of people manage to protect themselves against shortages? What is the point of saving our lives at the expense of thousands of our countrymen? It is much better to die. If we understand all this, we shall certainly be able to defend ourselves. When I returned from Russia, I told you about the city of Leningrad where 500,000 people died in the defence of their city. Many of them died of starvation. I do not say that this grim picture is about to become a reality in our country, but at the same time we must try to produce enough for our needs within the country. Each man should willingly share with his brother, with his neighbour, whatever he has, so that nobody need starve. This is what we must resolve today.

It is true that the Government must face its own responsibilities and fulfil the needs of the country. But I would like to appeal to all traders that in the matter of prices and the price-line, it does not behove us today to talk of legal restrictions and disciplinary action. The situation demands that the traders must hold the price-line. The traders and dealers can be of great help and service in this hour. If they guarantee price stability, the other tasks that are before us today can be carried out without unnecessary complications.

I know that we are capable of combining our efforts for Civil Defence in a most effective manner. I would like to congratulate those who made such successful Civil Defence arrangements in the city of Delhi, all within two or three days. The whole city was plunged in darkness but not a single untoward incident was reported. The civilian population, including children, were intent on making the blackout a success. This is a time when we must not depend on officers and official organisers. Each one of us must feel responsible for our own Civil Defence, and prepare ourselves coolly and calmly to face bombing raids or any other kind of attack. In such eventualities, we must not give way to panic and run for our lives but stand firm, ready to be of help. Each city, each town, each village in the country must prepare itself. I am confident that the young people of our country will come forward and contribute their effort in Civil Defence most ungrudgingly.

I want to say one more thing. The B.B.C. has said that since India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri is a Hindu, he is ready for war with Pakistan. There is no doubt that I am a

Hindu. Mir Mushtaq Sahib who is presiding over this meeting is a Muslim. Mr Frank Anthony who has also addressed you is a Christian. There are also Sikhs and Parsis here. The unique thing about our country is that we have Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and people of all other religions. We have temples and mosques, gurdwaras and churches. But we do not bring all this into politics. We are not working to make India a Hindu State or a Muslim State. This is the difference between India and Pakistan. Whereas Pakistan proclaims herself to be an Islamic State and uses religion as a political factor, we Indians have the freedom to follow whatever religion we may choose to worship in any way we please. So far as politics is concerned, each one of us is as much an Indian as the other. It is a distortion of facts to accuse India of hostility to Pakistan on account of the narrow point of view of religion. After all China is not an Islamic State! So far as the territorial integrity of India is concerned, we have taken the same stand with China as we have taken with Pakistan. If China attacks us, we shall resist her and defend ourselves with all the resources at our command, no matter how great her might. The defence of the country has nothing to do with religion; it is a matter of the freedom and sovereignty of the Motherland. Not an inch of our land shall be severed from us. We must have it and be prepared to sacrifice our lives in the effort.

In this crisis there has been a great demonstration of unity and discipline in the country. This has meant a new upsurge of life and I have full faith that the morale of our people will remain as high as it is today. Anyone who undermines this morale in any way will be playing into Pakistan's hands. Whoever brings up internal dissensions, whoever breaks the peace and unity of the country will be considered a traitor. We must guard our unity and cherish it. If we are united and resolved, if we are able to feed ourselves through our own efforts, if we are prepared for sacrifices to strengthen our defences, I have no doubt that our army will be able to defend our freedom wherever that freedom may be threatened.

Yesterday, I visited some of our wounded Jawans and officers in the military hospital. They have been badly hurt but I did not see a single tear or even a sad face. However serious the injury or wound was, each of them was smiling and cheerful. An officer whose leg had been amputated told me with pride

that he had shot down a Pakistani officer after his leg received the injury on the battlefield. I was very much moved to see another officer, Bhupinder Singh, whose whole body was covered with blood. Even now it is difficult to put a piece of cloth anywhere on his body. He was lying in bed with eyes closed. He apologised to me for not being able to stand up to show respect to the Prime Minister who was visiting him. He told me that he destroyed seven enemy tanks and that his Unit had knocked out thirty-one. He also said that he was sure he would get well again but even if he did not, it did not matter because the country can now hold its head high. I told him how proud the country was of him, how deeply grateful the people of the country were for the way in which the Indian Armed Forces had faced the enemy. Every child, every man and woman in this country has the deepest respect for the men of the Indian Army, for the Air Force pilots and other fighters. The whole country is deeply aware of the sacrifices they have made and cherishes them. We shall stand by our Armed Forces with all our strength and make it possible for them to lead the country from victory to victory. I believe that justice is on our side, that fairness is on our side, that truth is on our side and that the final victory will be ours.

Appendix 10

CHINESE ULTIMATUM

[Text of Prime Minister's statements in Parliament, New Delhi, September 17 and 20, 1965.]

I WANT TO INFORM the House that this morning we received a communication from the Chinese Government demanding that within three days we should dismantle our defence installations which, they allege, are located on their side in Tibet across the Sikkim border. I might, for the benefit of the House, read out the relevant portions of the communication.

"In its notes the Indian Government continues to resort to its usual subterfuges in an attempt to deny the intruding activities of Indian troops along the Sino-Indian boundary and the China-Sikkim boundary. This attempt cannot possibly succeed. Since cease-fire and troop withdrawal were effected along the Sino-Indian border by China on her own initiative in 1962, Indian troops have never stopped their provocations, and there have been more than 300 intrusions into China either by ground or by air. The Chinese Government has repeatedly lodged protests with the Indian Government and served warnings to it, and has successively notified some friendly countries. The facts are there, and they cannot be denied by the Indian Government by mere quibbling. Moreover, the Chinese Government has four times proposed Sino-Indian Joint Investigation into India's illegal construction of military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary, but has each time been refused by the Indian Government. Now the Indian Government pretentiously says that the matter can be settled if only an independent and neutral observer should go to the border to see for himself. It further shamelessly asserts that Indian troops have never crossed the Sikkim-

China boundary which has been formally delimited, and that India has not built any military works either on the Chinese side of the border or on the border itself. This is a bare-faced lie. How can it hope to deceive anyone?

"As is known to everybody, the Indian Government has long been using the territory of Sikkim against China. Since September 1962, not to mention earlier times, Indian troops have crossed the China-Sikkim boundary, which was delimited long ago, and have built a large number of military works for aggression either on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself. There are now fifty-six such military works, large and small, which they have built in the past few years all over the important passes along the China-Sikkim boundary, thus wantonly encroaching upon China's territory and violating her sovereignty. In these years the Chinese Government has made thirteen representations to the Indian Government. But the Indian Government has all along turned a deaf ear to them and does not have the slightest respect for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Far from stopping its acts of aggression, the Indian Government has intensified them by ordering its troops to intrude into Chinese territory for reconnaissance and provocations."

We are sending a reply to all those points. I will read out the relevant portions of our reply:

"Ever since the Sino-Indian border problem was raised by the Chinese Government, the Government of India had made strenuous attempts to settle the question peacefully and with honour. Even after the unprovoked Chinese attack across the border in October-November 1962, the Government of India consistently followed the policy of seeking a peaceful settlement honourable to both the parties concerned.

"As has been pointed out in various notes to the Chinese Government in the past, the Government of India have given strict instructions to its Armed Forces and personnel not to cross the international boundary in the Eastern and the Middle Sectors and the so-called 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector. The Government of India are satisfied after careful and detailed investigations, that Indian personnel as well as aircraft have fully carried out their instructions and have not transgressed the international boundary and the 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector at any time at any place. The

Government of India are, therefore, absolutely convinced that the allegations contained in the Chinese note under reply are completely groundless. The Government of India are constrained to reject these allegations and to re-assert emphatically that they do not accept the claims to vast areas of Indian territory in the Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors of the border put forward in the Chinese note under reply. As regards China's stand on Kashmir and on the present unfortunate conflict between India and Pakistan, it is nothing but interference on the part of China calculated to prolong and to enlarge the conflict."

The background of the matter is that, in September 1962, some defence structures were constructed on the Sikkim side of the Sino-Indian frontier. These structures have not been in occupation since the cessation of hostilities in November 1962. Since the Chinese Government alleged that some of these structures were on their side of the border, India had in its note of September 12, 1965, gone to the extent of suggesting that an independent observer be allowed to go to this border to see for himself the actual state of affairs. The Chinese Government has not, unfortunately, accepted this reasonable proposal and has reiterated its proposal for joint inspection. We are informing the Chinese Government that their contention is entirely incorrect. Nevertheless, as an earnest of our desire to give no ground to the Chinese for making this a pretext for aggressive action, we are informing them that we have no objection to a joint inspection of those points of the Sikkim-Tibet border where Indian personnel are alleged to have set up military structures in Tibetan territory. The Government of India, on their part, are prepared to arrange such an inspection as early as possible, at an appropriate official level, on a mutually convenient date.

We have sent a reply to the Chinese note accordingly and hope that the Chinese Government would agree to action being taken as proposed.

I know that the House would feel concerned about the intentions of the Chinese Government. We do hope that China would not take advantage of the present situation and attack India. The House may rest assured that we are fully vigilant and that it we are attacked, we shall fight for our freedom with grim determination. The might of China will not deter us from defending our territorial integrity.

A CHINESE DEVICE

I place on the Table of the House the text of a further note which was handed over, to our Charge d'Affaires in Peking yesterday.

The House will recall that we had taken an attitude calculated to maintain peace when replying to the last note which we had received from the Chinese Government. It is clear from the kind of response which China has sent that what China is looking for is not redress of grievances, real or imaginary, but some excuse to start its aggressive activities again, this time acting in collusion with its ally, Pakistan. The extension of the time-limit for the ultimatum was, in our view, no more than a device to gain time to watch what comes out of the discussions in the Security Council.

The allegations which China has been making in the series of notes that it has been sending to us, are such that they would hardly justify any civilized Government having recourse to force, even if the allegations were true. If there are any structures on Chinese territory in areas where the border is delimited and not in dispute even according to the Chinese, surely, there is nothing to prevent the Chinese Government from having them removed, instead of suggesting to us that we should have them removed, which would only be possible by our men going into their territory. Similarly, no one can imagine that any Government would threaten another on the ground that their cattle have been lifted or on the ground that out of the thousands of Tibetans who have sought asylum in this country, two or four are being detained here against their wishes.

To justify its aggressive attitude, China is pretending to be a guardian of Asian countries which, according to China, are being bullied by India. The basic objective of China, therefore, is to claim for itself a position of dominance in Asia which no self-respecting nation in Asia is prepared to recognize. Large or small, strong or weak, every country in Asia has the fullest right to preserve its independence and sovereignty on terms of equality. The dominance of the Chinese cannot be accepted by any of them. We reject China's claim to tell us anything about what we should or should not do about Kashmir which is an

integral part of India. Our offer of resolving the differences over these minor matters by peaceful moves is still open.

However, China's aggressive intentions are clear from the fact that even while they have, in their note, extended the time-limit by 72 hours, in actual fact, they have started firing at our border posts both in Sikkim and in Ladakh. If China persists in aggression, we shall defend ourselves by all means at our disposal.

Appendix 11

PAK'S MASTER PLAN FOR A THRUST TO BEAS

[*The following is the text of Pakistan's master-plan for a blitzkrieg to Beas.*]

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 3
HQ 4 Armd Bde
G-3548
08 Sep 65

(No change from VOs)

00 No 1

Maps:—1 in to 0.789 Miles sheets 44 I 7, 8, 11, 12, 15 and 16 44 M 3 and 4.

1. *SIT*

a. *En Forces.* A bde gp sp by tks each in KHEM KARAN 8256 and BEDIAN 7576 area.

b. *Friendly Forces*

(1) 3 Armd Bde Gp moving astride KASUR Branch to secure JANDIALA GURU.

(2) 12 CAV will move ahead of 3 Bde on Div CL.

(3) 5 Armd Bde after having secured br II at KASUR 7153 in 11 Div Op, will revert to parent fmn and will move on axis WEST of KASUR Branch.

c. *Atts and Dets*

(1) *Under Comd*	ACT Two ADS ex 48 Fd Amb Lt Wksp pl 72 EME Bn Det Pro
(2) *In DS*	15 (SP) Fd Regt
(3) *In Sp*	Div Arty when in range.

2. *MSN.* 4 Armd Bde Gp will adv on axis KASUR-KHEM KARAN VALTOHA 9064—X rds 0872— NABIPUR 1868—astride SOBRAON BRANCH on orders and secure BEAS br on main GT Rd.

3. *EXEC.*

a. *Gen Out-line* The op will be in three phases:—

(1) *Phase 1* Move into br H area.

(2) *Phase 2* Secure gen line TARAN TARAN 1896—FATEHABAD 3789. Completion nickname KHANJAR.

(3) *Phase 3* Secure BEAS Br. Completion nick name TALWAR.

b. *5H*

(1) *Grouping*

(a) *Under Comd* 'A' Coy 10 FF

(b) *In DS* 'P' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt

(c) *In Sp* 15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'P' Bty

(2) *Tasks*

(a) *Phase 1* Orders later.

(b) *Phase 2* Cont as adv gd and secure gen line FATEHABAD.

(c) *Phase 3* Be prep to assist in the cutting of the en L of C at BEAS Br.

c. *4 CAV*

(1) *Grouping*

(a) *Under Comd* One Coy 10 FF (In phase 3 only)

(b) *In DS* 'Q' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt

(c) *In Sp* 15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'Q' Bty

(2) *Tasks*

(a) *Phase 1* Orders later.

(b) *Phase 2* Fol in order of march. Be prep to assist in the securing of phase 2 line.

(c) *Phase 3* Act as adv gd and secure BEAS Br.

d. *10 FF*

(1) *Grouping*

(a) *In DS* 'R' Bty 15 (SP) Fd Regt.

(b) *In Sp* 15 (SP) Fd Regt less 'R' Bty.

(2) *Tasks*

(a) *Phase 1* Orders later.

(b) *Phase 2* Be prep to assist 6 H in securing gen line FATEHABAD.

(c) *Phase 3* Be prep to assist 4 CAV in securing BEAS Br.

e. *15 (SP)*

(1) *Allotment* As given above.

(2) *Tasks* Provide max aval sp in all phases.

f. *Coord Instrs*

(1) *Timings* ST for phase 1 and H Hr for phase 2 later.

(2) *SP* Later.

(3) Bdrys. Incl to 4 Armd Bde line SIRHALI KALAN 2175 NAUSHARA 2080. RANWAN 2282—DHOTAN 2788—VRING 3495—DHOTA 3800—RAYA KALAN.

(4) *Order of March*

(a) 5 H Gp

(b) 15 (SP) Fd Regt

(c) 10 FF

(d) Bde HQ

(e) 4 Cav

(f) Adm Gp

(5) *Bounds*

	Place	*Nickname*
(a)	Line SIRHALI KALAN—CHOHLA	TOMCAT
(b)	Line DHOTAN—JAMERA 3283	KING CROW
(c)	Line DHOTAN 3603—KIRI SHAH 4494	BULL PUP

(6) Con Pts. List att.

(7) Bde CL. NABIPUR—KHARA Disty—SOBRAON BRANCH.

4. *ADM AND LOG*

a. *Gen*

(1) Normal maint will cont.

(2) DAA will be in present loc at BHAI PHERU will mov to MANGA on orders.

(3) SRP at OKARA.

b. *Rats*

(1) Normal maint.

(2) 7 days res will be carried.

c. *Ammo*

(1) First line ammo in unit tpt.

(2) Sed line with 21 S & T Bn.

d. *POL*

(1) All veh tks full.
(2) Jettison equpt. full.
(3) 50 miles res in unit tpt.
(4) Sec line lift with 21 S&T Bn.
(5) All issues on container to container basis.

e. *Tps*

(1) Al each under unit con.
(2) A2 Ech will be brigaded in present loc and mov as Bde ADM Gp in order of march.
(3) B Ech, if any, will remain with unit A2 echs.

f. *Repair and Rec*

(1) LADs auth to carry out fd repairs within their scope.
(2) Lt Wksp Pl will move with Bde Adm Gp in order of march.
(3) All vehs will be recovered to the Bde CL under unit arrangements.
(4) Fd Wksp Coy in DAA.

g. *Med*

(1) *Evac.* Normal chain of evac.
(2) *ADS.* Will mov with Bde Adm Gp. One ADS will function and the other remain on vehs at all times.
(3) *MDS.* In DAA.
(4) *CCS.* Lec OKARA.

h. *Pers*

(1) Reports and returns will be submitted as per Bde Standing Orders for War.
(2) *PW* Cage in DAA.
(3) Pro—To estb Tp as ordered.

5. *COMD AND SIG*

a. *Bde Tac HQ.* To move behind adv. gd.
b. *Main Bde HQ.* In order of march.
c. *Sig Instrs.* Already issued.

ACK.

DISTRIBUTION LIST—ATT.

Sd/- x x x x x
Maj
for Comd
(RAJA SAROOP KHAN)

TOP SEC
DISTR LIST

		Copy No.
1.	5 H	1
2.	4 CAV	2
3.	10 FF	3
4.	15 (SP) Fd Regt	4
5.	48 Fd Amb	5
6.	Lt Wksp Pl 72 EME Bn	6
7.	Det Pro	7
8.	Arty 1 Armd Div	8
9.	3 Armd Bde	9
10.	5 Armd Bde	10
11.	12 Cav	11
12.	HQ 1 Armd Div	12
13.	Comd	13
14.	BM	14
15.	GSO 3(O)	15
16.	DAA & QMG	16
17.	SC(AQ)	17
18.	4 Armd Bde Sig Coy	18
19.	File	19
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21.	Spare	22-23

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